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Irregular migration has become a politically controversial issue in most immigrant- 
receiving countries. Academic research has shown that states and their immigration 
policies actively create the legal conditions for the existence and perpetuation of 
irregular migration. Much of this literature, however, focuses on the United States 
and thus cannot examine how variation in contexts of reception may produce differ-
ent configurations of legal status. In addition, much research on immigration has 
neglected migration from sub-Saharan Africa despite this region’s demonstrated 
migration potential.
This book uses a novel quantitative data source, the Migration Between Africa 
and Europe (MAFE) study, to examine the production of irregular legal status 
among Senegalese migrants in France, Italy, and Spain and the consequences of 
configurations of irregularity. A historical chapter outlines the evolution of immi-
gration policies in each country that set the parameters for irregular legal status.
The first empirical chapter studies the pathways into irregular status for 
Senegalese migrants. Pathways early in a migrant’s trip—no-visa entry and over-
staying—are more sensitive to both contextual variables and access to forms of 
capital, indicating that both state control and migrant agency shape these pathways. 
In contrast, befallen irregularity is less related to contextual variation, perhaps 
because immigration policies and enforcement resources are not focused on migrant 
integration.
The second empirical chapter examines how immigration policy creates gen-
dered channels of access to labor markets. Senegalese women with configurations 
of legal status indicative of family reunification are more likely than women with 
other legal statuses to be economically inactive upon arrival, while there is little 
association between Senegalese men’s legal status and their participation. Results 
show, however, that family reunification does not preclude labor-market participa-
tion, as women with family-reunification profiles eventually transition into eco-
nomic activity.
vi
The third empirical chapter looks at the link between legal status and transna-
tional activities. It finds that Senegalese migrants with irregular status are effec-
tively confined to the destination territory, making them unable to visit the homeland. 
This confinement short-circuits the entire social infrastructure underlying remitting 
and investing: the affective ties that underlie long-distance cross-border activities 
wither when migrants are unable to circulate.
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Immigration and its economic, political, cultural, and social consequences have 
recently emerged as increasingly contentious issues in Europe. Although some 
European countries have long histories of welcoming immigrants, the relative cul-
tural and ethnic homogeneity of many others has thrown recent increases in foreign- 
born populations into sharp relief. European anxiety over immigrant integration has 
also increased with the recognition that unauthorized immigration has been a per-
sistent and seemingly intractable challenge for the continent’s immigration poli-
cies. While quantifying irregular migration in Europe remains an exercise in 
“counting the uncountable” (Vogel et al. 2011), recent research estimated the EU’s 
stock of irregular migrants to be between two and four million1 (Triandafyllidou 
2009; Vogel et al. 2011).
These stocks of irregular migrants have given rise to reactive migration- 
management policies: between 1973 and 2008, European countries carried out 68 
regularization programs, thereby adjusting the status of 4.3 million people (Kraler 
2009). The majority (59%) of these regularization programs occurred between 1998 
and 2008 (Kraler 2009). Although many European countries—both post-war labor 
importers (such as France) and more recent countries of immigration in Southern 
Europe (such as Italy and Spain)—have employed toleration of unauthorized resi-
dence and subsequent regularization of status as a de facto migration policy to meet 
the structural demand for immigrant labor (Kraler 2009), the frequency and visibil-
ity of regularizations have contributed to public and political perceptions of irregu-
lar immigration as a major issue.
1 Given the impact of the refugee crisis, the estimates of irregular migrants in the EU are likely 
quite different today yet the close interaction between asylum and undocumented migration makes 
it very difficult to conceptually unpack asylum from irregular migration. In practical terms, signifi-
cant numbers of irregular entrants enter the asylum system and temporarily obtain a (limited) sta-
tus as asylum seekers, those who are rejected often are known to the authorities and are in a strict 
sense not undocumented, even if liable to return. Nonetheless, there have been few asylum seekers 
from Senegal either historically or during the recent European refugee crisis.
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Irregular migration from sub-Saharan Africa in particular has provoked fears of 
an “invasion” of “fortress Europe” (Collier 2013; Connor 2018; de Haas 2008b). 
Despite this concern, irregular migration in Europe in general and irregularity 
among African migrants in particular are poorly understood phenomena. Although 
a voluminous research literature on undocumented migration exists in sociology, 
economics, and political science, many studies are limited by reliance on limited 
variation in contexts of reception and a simplified conceptualization of legal status 
(Bean et  al. 1990; Espenshade 1995; Massey and Bartley 2006; Massey and 
Capoferro 2004; Massey and Singer 1995; Portes 1978, 1979). Most studies of 
African undocumented migration to Europe are either small-scale or speculative, 
leading researchers to call for more rigorous examination of this phenomenon (de 
Haas 2008a; Lessault and Beauchemin 2009a; Vickstrom 2014; Beauchemin and 
Lamboni 2017; Schoumaker et al. 2018).
This book will examine how immigration policies in Europe create irregularity 
among Senegalese migrants and how the resulting complex trajectories of legal sta-
tuses shape these migrants’ lives. While this research will investigate an understud-
ied but increasingly important emigrant population (Hatton and Williamson 2003), 
its relevance is not limited to understanding African migration. The findings help 
inform policy debates surrounding this phenomenon in Europe and contribute to 
refining sociological theories of irregular migration.
1.1  What Is Irregularity?
“Irregular” is often used interchangeably with “undocumented,” “unauthorized,” 
“clandestine,” or “illegal” to describe both an aggregate process of migration and an 
individual attribute of migrants (Donato and Armenta 2011). While the terms seem 
to describe similar phenomena, migration scholars argue that different terms have 
different underlying historical specificities and political resonances (Düvell 2008). 
Scholars increasingly avoid the terms “illegal migration” and “illegal migrant” 
because of their implicit criminalization of migrants; “illegal” is often used as a 
technical term to describe entering a country in violation of the law or as a descrip-
tion of a condition (e.g., “illegal work”) (Triandafyllidou 2010). “Unauthorized” is 
often used in the U.S. context (Düvell 2008), but does not necessarily adequately 
describe the situation of the foreign-born population in a given destination as not all 
foreigners need explicit authorization to enter, reside, or work in a destination coun-
try (Triandafyllidou 2010). “Undocumented” is also limited in its descriptive capac-
ities by the fact that not all migrants who enter, reside, or work without legal 
permission actually lack documents. “Irregular” is often used in the European con-
text and has broad connotations that can refer to both flows and stocks of migrants 
and can encompass a variety of legal arrangements (Triandafyllidou 2010). This 
book thus uses the term “irregular” to describe statuses that arise from migration 
that occurs outside of the legally defined framework for entry, residence, or work of 
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foreigners in a destination country, and, by extension, migrants that have engaged in 
such entry, residence, or work.2
1.2  Multiple Contexts of Reception, Complex Configurations 
of Legal Status, and the Consequences of Irregularity
Advancing our understanding of irregular migration in Europe as well as in other 
settings depends on challenging the limitations of existing research paradigms: 
existing theories built on limited variation in contexts of reception and a simplified 
conceptualization of irregularity cannot satisfactorily explain irregular migration 
and its consequences in Europe. This book will fill these gaps by asking how mul-
tiple contexts of reception produce distinct pathways into irregular legal statuses and 
how the resulting complex configurations of irregular statuses shape migrants’ eco-
nomic integration into host societies as well as their ongoing participation in the 
development of their homelands. While this research is vital for understanding 
irregular migration in Europe, it will also help open new theoretical perspectives 
valuable for future research on irregular migration in other contexts, including the 
United States. This book will combine a review of historical immigration-policy 
texts with analyses of a unique quantitative dataset on Senegalese migrants in 
Europe to answer these questions. African migration in general and Senegalese 
migration in particular offer unique opportunities to study the production and con-
sequence of pathways into irregular legal status because of diversity in contexts of 
reception and exit.
This book is organized into three parts. The first part examines the framework of 
immigration policy and mechanisms of control across multiple contexts of recep-
tion to understand the legal creation of pathways into different kinds of irregular 
statuses among Senegalese migrants in France, Italy, and Spain. In doing so, it will 
attempt to understand the variation in policies both within each context over time 
and across these contexts. The second part is an empirical analysis that will attempt 
to incorporate insights about the variation of policies developed in the first part and 
apply them to a conceptual framework that is able to make sense of multiple path-
ways into irregular status. The third part of the book grapples with the consequences 
of complex configurations of irregular status for Senegalese migrants. The analyses 
2 In this book, I use “legal status” to refer to the status that migrants possess vis-à-vis the legal 
framework that governs their entry, residence, or work in a given country. “Fully regular status” (or 
“fully regular legal status”) denotes possession of all required authorizations to live and work in a 
given country, while “fully irregular status” (or “fully irregular legal status”) denotes the lack of all 
required authorizations to live and work in a country. This contrasts with other academic work 
where “legal status” can refer to what this book calls “fully regular status.” Thus, “legal” here 
simply refers to the domain of the status and does not indicate the possession of authorization. An 
analog would be the term “socioeconomic status,” which describes a person’s status in the socio-
economic realm; additional qualifiers (such as “high” or “low”) would be required to describe an 
individual’s status.
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will seek to explore “…when and if—and to the degree to which—the legal reality 
constrains the relationships and actions” (Cvajner and Sciortino 2010: 397) of 
migrants with configurations of irregular status.
1.3  Variation in Legal Contexts of Reception Is Crucial 
for Understanding the Pathways into and Consequences 
of Irregularity
The first part of the book explores the variation in the legal contexts of reception 
facing Senegalese migrants over time in France, Italy, and Spain. The legal con-
straints that migrants face in terms of entry, working, and residing in their chosen 
destination are an important part of what sociologists call the “context of reception.” 
Alongside the conditions of the labor market and the characteristics of the immi-
grant’s ethnic community, Portes and Rumbaut (2006) define the policies of the 
receiving government the most important aspects of any given context of reception 
and argue that these contexts can channel immigrants with similar individual endow-
ments into different paths in the destination society.
Portes and Böröcz (1989) consider three ideal-typical illustrations of contexts of 
reception that different groups of migrants may face. A negative context of recep-
tion features low receptivity on the part of the destination society such as govern-
mental attempts to reduce or prohibit inflows, employer discrimination in hiring for 
only menial jobs, and general societal prejudice. These negative stances lead to 
precarious settlement, blocked economic mobility, and an imperiled second genera-
tion (Portes and Rumbaut 2001, 2006). A neutral context of reception permits but 
does not encourage immigration and does not stereotype immigrants; migrants 
adapt to this neutral context through individualistic models of occupational and 
economic attainment. An advantaged context of reception features active legal and 
material assistance from governments and a positive public perception; migrants are 
often able to combine this governmental support with pre-existing skills to adapt 
favorably to the destination society. These contexts of reception combine with the 
class origins of immigrants to create the diversity of settlement patterns or modes of 
incorporation apparent for contemporary immigrants (Portes and Böröcz 1989). 
Contexts of reception are thus crucial for understanding immigrant incorporation.
While the legal, economic, and social elements of these contexts are interrelated, 
Portes and Böröcz (1989) point out that it can be useful to separate them for analyti-
cal purposes. Governmental and policy stances towards immigrants are of particular 
importance for two reasons. First, immigration policies create and police the legal 
categories to which migrants are subject in their entry, settlement, and work in des-
tination countries. Legal contexts of reception thus produce pathways into a variety 
of regular, semi-compliant, and irregular legal statuses (De Genova 2002, 2005). 
Second, irregularity of legal status resulting from an exclusionary stance from the 
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legal context of reception may result in negative consequences for multiple aspects 
of immigrants’ lives.
While research in Europe and the U.S. provides important evidence that contexts 
of reception, and the legal statuses they define, matter for immigrant integration into 
host societies, much of the research is limited by reliance on limited variation in 
contexts of reception. This is clearly the case with research done in the U.S. context. 
U.S.-focused research has argued that variation in context of reception can help 
explain resilient differences in integration outcomes among different migrant 
national-origin groups; but the group-specific contexts are all nested in one national 
political and socioeconomic context. Similarly, variations in policies—such as the 
amnesty resulting from the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act—are within 
an overall U.S. context that has a long history of engagement with immigration. 
Existing research has not sought to understand how cross-national variations in 
policies, labor markets, and communities can shape the production and conse-
quences of migrant irregularity. In effect, much existing research has sought to gen-
eralize from the U.S. case by using comparisons between multiple immigrant 
groups. While the contexts of reception facing these groups vary within the overall 
American context, additional insight could be gained by comparing multiple 
destinations.
Research in Europe is more varied in its engagement with multiple legal contexts 
of reception faced by migrants across a multitude national political and socioeco-
nomic settings, many studies nonetheless remain limited to case studies of unitary 
contexts and do not engage in comparison across contexts. Two subsets of research 
in the European context highlight this reliance on unitary contexts of reception. The 
first subset focuses on single groups in single countries, such as Turks in Germany 
(Gerdes and Reisenauer 2012), Senegalese in Italy (Riccio 2001), or Ghanaians in 
the UK (Krause 2008) or the Netherlands (Mazzucato 2008). The second subset 
includes studies of one or more migrant groups in a single context of reception. 
Diehl and Schnell (2006) study labor migrants in Germany, with a focus on Turks 
and emigrants from the former Yugoslavia. Bradatan and Sandu (2012) focus on 
Spain and compare Moroccans and Romanians. Riccio (2008) examines the experi-
ences of Ghanaians and Senegalese in Italy. While all of these studies contribute 
valuable findings about single contexts of reception, they cannot help us understand 
how variation across contexts may shape migrants’ experiences.
Theoretical insights derived from studies based on a unitary context of reception 
cannot readily explain migrant irregularity in a European setting marked by a diver-
sity of contexts of reception. Fortunately, the European context also provides exam-
ples of comparative studies that leverage multiple contexts of reception. Ersanilli 
and Koopmans (2010, 2011) compare Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands 
France, and Germany, while Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) studies Turkish political 
organizations in the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark. Fokkema and de Haas 
(2015) compare multiple groups of African migrants in Italy and Spain. The 
Undocumented Workers’ Transitions Project (McKay et al. 2011) examined irregu-
larity across seven countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Spain, UK and 
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Bulgaria). Van Meeteren (2012) includes both the Netherlands and Belgium in 
 analyses of irregular migration, and van Nieuwenhuyze (2008) compares 
Senegambians in Barcelona and Antwerp.
This book will draw inspiration from these comparative approaches by taking 
advantage of variation across multiple legal contexts of reception. Chapter 2 traces 
the evolution of immigration policies and the external and internal mechanisms of 
control that they define (Brochmann 1999) in the main Senegalese European desti-
nation countries of France, Italy, and Spain. The chapter examines immigration laws 
and other legal texts (such as treaties, decrees, and administrative circulars) to out-
line how these states created the legal parameters that defined pathways (Düvell 
2011b) to regular or irregular legal statuses for Senegalese migrants. Variations in 
contexts of reception have produced a variety of socio-legal configurations that have 
given rise to different pathways of irregularity. Senegalese in France had de facto 
regular status for much of the 1960s and 1970s in that they did not need explicit 
authorization to enter or reside in France and were able to take advantage of com-
mon post facto regularization procedures. Irregularity became more common among 
Senegalese in France as this preferential regime crumbled. Irregularity seems to 
have been a consistent component in contexts of reception in Italy and Spain, as 
their frequent and massive regularization programs demonstrate. Much of this irreg-
ularity seems to stem from the mismatch between restrictive immigration-control 
measures and structural demands for cheap, low-skilled labor.
1.4  Simplified Operationalizations of Legal Status Hamper 
Understanding of Irregularity
The second part of the book applies the lessons learned from the first part about 
variation across legal contexts of reception to an empirical analysis of pathways into 
multiple configurations of irregular status for Senegalese migrants in Europe. In so 
doing, it draws on insights into the multidimensionality of legal statuses, especially 
in the European context. Much research on irregular migration is limited by a sim-
plified conceptualization of legal status. Many studies, especially in the U.S. con-
text, employ a simple dichotomization of legal status, comparing undocumented to 
documented migrants (or newly legalized migrants to legal migrants—see Borjas 
and Tienda 1993; Connor and Massey 2010). While this practice may have much to 
do with data limitations, scholars of immigration have also been calling for a more 
nuanced approach that is sensitive to transitions between multiple kinds of legal 
statuses (Massey and Capoferro 2004; Menjívar and Kanstroom 2014). The multi-
tude of contexts of reception in Europe along with frequent recourse to regulariza-
tion programs mean that migrants may experience multiple legal statuses 
simultaneously (e.g., legal residence without legal right to work) along with com-
plex trajectories of legal status over time. A reliance on a documented/undocu-
mented dichotomy may thus obscure both the factors producing various forms of 
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irregularity and the consequences that complexities of legal status have for the lives 
of migrants.
Research on irregularity in Europe has been more sensitive to the nuances of 
multiple legal categories. Triandafyllidou (2010) argues that conceptualizations of 
irregularity depend on the legal domain under consideration (entry, residence, or 
work). This approach allows for differentiation between different kinds of irregular 
statuses (e.g. irregularity of entry, residence or work) and for transition between 
statuses over time. This research shows, in fact, that status-related flows—move-
ment between regular and irregular status—is a more important pathway into irreg-
ularity than irregular geographic flows across borders (Triandafyllidou 2009, 2010). 
Some empirical analyses in the European context have operationalized legal status 
in a way that accounts for complexities of legal domains and transitions over time. 
Ruhs and Anderson (2010) highlight the condition of semi-compliance, in which 
migrants who are legally resident work in violation of restrictions on their 
employment.
Chapter 3 draws on the European literature on complex conceptualizations of 
legal status to examine how immigration policies and mechanisms of immigration 
control are translated into multiple pathways into irregular status. The chapter mod-
els three such pathways: entry without a visa, overstaying, and befallen irregularity. 
Using data from the Migration between Africa and Europe (MAFE) Project, the 
chapter empirically tests the hypotheses that variation in context of reception—as 
measured by destination and period—would produce different pathways, and that 
migrants’ strategies, as measured by access to forms of capital and institutional con-
nects, would also influence their navigation of these pathways. Analyses of the 
empirical data reveal that pathways that occur early in a migrant’s trip—no-visa 
entry and overstaying—are more sensitive to both contextual variables and access 
to forms of capital, indicating that both state control and migrant agency shape these 
pathways. In contrast, befallen irregularity is less related to contextual variation, 
perhaps because immigration policies and enforcement resources are not focused on 
migrant integration. Furthermore, these transitions are rare and migrants who have 
“legal capital” in the form of regular status are able to avoid this transition.
1.5  So What? When, How, and Why Does Irregularity 
Matter?
The third part of the book looks at the consequences of configurations of legal status 
for the economic integration of Senegalese migrants in France, Italy, and Spain as 
well as their ongoing transnational participation in their homeland. In so doing, it 
both draws on large body of literature that demonstrates the negative effects of 
irregular status on various facets of migrants’ lives and problematizes the relation-
ship between irregularity and migrants’ life chances. Some scholars have gone so 
far as to say that irregularity “forces immigrants into a wholly underground 
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existence” (Portes and Rumbaut 2006: 93), but this book will attempt to ascertain 
when, how, and why irregularity matters for migrants.
A voluminous research literature in both Europe and the United States has found 
that negative legal contexts of reception can not only create irregularity of status 
among migrants but also puts migrants with irregular legal status and their children 
at an economic and social disadvantage compared to migrants with regular legal 
status (Alba and Nee 2003; Borjas and Tienda 1993; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 
2000; Phillips and Massey 1999; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Research on a multi-
tude of migrant populations in Europe has shown the importance of the legal facets 
of the contexts of reception on migrant integration in an array of European coun-
tries. Cvajner and Sciortino (2010) theorize the link between precarious legal status 
and exclusion from formal institutions such as the labor market, and argue that 
irregularity forces migrants to rely on high-cost survival strategies to negotiate the 
risky environments, such as informal labor markets, to which they are relegated.
Many empirical studies of irregularity in Europe echo the theoretical link 
between lack of secure legal status and precarity. Anderson (2010) highlights how 
immigration-control mechanisms create precarity among immigrant workers in 
Europe through dependency on employers fear of deportation. Van Nieuwenhuyze’s 
(2008) study of Senegambians in Barcelona and Antwerp shows that irregularity 
can force migrants into the shadow economy, where wages are low, working condi-
tions bad, and there is little recourse against abusive employers. Sigona (2012) dem-
onstrates how irregularity leads migrants in the United Kingdom to fear deportation 
and have difficulty establishing trust, fostering their social isolation. Results from 
the Undocumented Workers’ Transitions Project show how migrants with irregular 
status regularly face discrimination, exploitation, and even violence (McKay et al. 
2011). The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2011) summarizes 
many of the negative effects of irregularity: it creates a risk of exploitation in the 
labor market, leads to precarious and insecure housing situations, and can imperil 
migrants’ access to healthcare and education.
Research on immigration to the United States echoes many of the negative asso-
ciations between irregularity and migrants’ life chances demonstrated in the 
European context. Massey’s (2007) research shows that the category of “undocu-
mented migrant” has become a prime vehicle for inequality in the U.S. by excluding 
undocumented migrants from effective participation in labor markets and other for-
mal institutions that structure life chances. Immigration policy and border control in 
the U.S. have created a social category of migrants devoid of regular legal status and 
the rights it affords. Massey and colleagues (2007; Durand et al. 2016) identify the 
immigration-control system as the principle institution of stratification for Latinos 
in general and for Mexicans in particular. Massey (2007) argues that wage discrimi-
nation and marginalization from the social safety net in the wake of the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in the 1980s led to a decrease in income and an 
increase in poverty among Latinos. Other literature confirms that legal status has 
become an axis of stratification in the United States (Menjívar 2009). Psychological 
research using the stereotype content model has found that undocumented migrants 
are seen as “barely human” at a neural level, confirming their disadvantaged  position 
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in the American stratification system (Lee and Fiske 2006; Massey 2007). Greenman 
and Hall (2013) conclude that legal status is an important axis of stratification for 
Latinos’ educational attainment, with undocumented youth less likely to graduate 
from high school and enroll in college. Marrow (2013) lists the myriad other ways 
in which immigrants’ life chances are adversely affected by the institution of ille-
gality: undocumented migrants suffer disparities in access to health care and educa-
tion, they are unable to get drivers’ licenses and are thus less geographically, 
economically, and socially mobile; in addition, spillover effects mean that many 
documented Latino immigrants are caught in the legal, social, and representational 
webs of illegality in ways that restrict their participation in American society.
Despite this mountain of evidence that irregular legal status is detrimental to 
migrants, the third part of this book will try to dig deeper to examine when, how, 
and why configurations of irregularity might matter. As Van Meeteren (2012) points 
out, policies and the configurations of irregularity that they produce do not neces-
sarily mechanically constrain migrants’ actions and it is important to try to under-
stand migrants’ reactions to the legal constraints they face. This approach echoes 
Cvajner and Sciortino’s (2010) exhortation to pay attention to how and to what 
extent legal realities constrain the actions of migrants.
The empirical analyses in the third part of the book will thus examine how con-
figurations of legal status constrain Senegalese migrants’ labor-market participation 
and transnational activities. Chapter 4 focuses on how immigration policy creates 
gendered channels of access to destination societies’ labor markets. The chapter 
hypothesizes that the effect of legal status on economic incorporation will differ for 
women and men. Women’s legal statuses are more likely to be the product of 
dependency- inducing family reunification policies that disincentivize work, while 
men have more options for labor-market access regardless of legal status. Women’s 
labor-market participation is thus structured by their legal status, with those women 
reunifying with spouses at a destination less likely to work upon arrival than autono-
mous women or men. At the same time, female migrants entering under family- 
reunification provisions may also have an easier time making eventual transitions 
into the labor market. Analyses show that Senegalese women who have configura-
tions of legal status indicative of family reunification are more likely than women 
with other legal statuses to be economically inactive upon arrival, while there is 
little association between Senegalese men’s legal status and their participation. The 
data also reveal, however, that family reunification does not preclude labor-market 
participation, as many of the women with family-reunification profiles eventually 
transition into economic activity.
Chapter 5 looks at the link between legal status and transnational activities. The 
literature on transnational activities has not sufficiently grappled with the role of 
physical mobility in the maintenance of affective ties that underlie non-mobile, 
long-distance transnational activities nor has it adequately examined the role of the 
state in constraining this geographical mobility. The legal constraint of irregular 
status may both physically confine migrants to the destination territory, decreasing 
homeland visits, and indirectly constrain other non-mobile transnational activities 
by reducing affective ties with origin communities through limited physical 
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 mobility. The MAFE data show that Senegalese migrants who lack secure legal 
status are effectively confined to the destination territory, making them unable to 
make short visits to the homeland. The reduced physical mobility resulting from 
this confinement short-circuits the entire social infrastructure underlying remitting 
and investing because the affective ties that underlie long-distance cross-border 
activities wither when migrants are unable to circulate. Analyses also reveal an 
important difference between household-based activities—remitting and invest-
ing—and the communal activity of hometown association participation, with the 
former being more responsive to the territorial confinement produced by irregular 
status.
1.6  Senegal as a Strategic Site for Migration Research
Senegal, a country of about 15 million people on the Atlantic coast of West Africa 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2018), has a long and diverse history of both intra- and inter- 
continental migration (see Fig. 1.1 for maps of Senegal’s geographic relationship to 
West Africa and Western Europe). Like other sub-Saharan African countries, much 
migration from Senegal has been directed towards other African countries, and 
Senegalese migrants can be found in most regions of Africa (Bredeloup 2007; 
Flahaux et al. 2010). Senegal has also played a particularly large part in the recent 
evolution of sub-Saharan migration flows to Europe. While recent population esti-
mates indicate that the former French colony accounts for approximately 4% of the 
population of West Africa (U.S. Census Bureau 2018), Senegalese made up 18% of 
West African migrants in the main European receiving countries in the early 2000s 
(de Haas 2007), a figure that had increased to almost 20% by 2010 (Organisation for 
Fig. 1.1 Geographic position of Senegal in relationship to West Africa and Western Europe. 
(Notes: Map data © 2013 Basaroft, Google, ORION-ME)
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Economic Co-operation and Development 2015). In addition to Senegalese migrants 
being disproportionately represented in Europe, Senegal stands out as a country that 
has diversified its migration destinations, with Senegalese increasingly present in 
Italy, Spain, and the United States as well as their traditional destination of France 
(de Haas 2007; Schoumaker et al. 2013). Senegal is now considered to be the source 
of one of the major “new African diasporas” (Koser 2003).
Senegalese migration to Europe offers an ideal opportunity to study the produc-
tion and consequences of complex trajectories of irregularity in multiple contexts of 
reception. Although many Senegalese migrants travel to African destinations, most 
increasingly choose high-income destinations in Europe and North America 
(Schoumaker et al. 2013). There are especially high concentrations of Senegalese 
migrants in France, Italy, and Spain. These three countries account for 45% of the 
Senegalese emigrant population (Beauchemin and González-Ferrer 2011) and 86% 
of the Senegalese resident in OECD countries in 2010 (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 2015). Senegalese constitute the largest group of 
sub-Saharan African migrants in Italy and Spain and the second-largest group in 
France as of 2010 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
2015). In addition to the evolution of Senegalese migration towards new destina-
tions, Senegalese migrants have faced variation in governmental policies, labor 
market conditions, and attitudes of the native-born towards immigrants in the main 
contexts of reception. All three countries have histories of tolerating or even encour-
aging illegal immigration and subsequent regularization while also stigmatizing and 
racializing illegal entry, residence, and work.
Although detailed data on irregular migrants by nationality are rare, Senegalese 
are thought to have high rates of irregularity. The Senegalese Ministry for Senegalese 
Abroad estimates that there are two undocumented Senegalese migrants for every 
documented Senegalese migrant (Di Bartolomeo et al. 2010). Recent research finds 
that almost 30% of Senegalese migrants in Europe lacked a residence permit during 
their year of arrival in European destinations, with 16% in irregular status at the 
time of the survey (Schoumaker et al. 2013). Senegalese were estimated to account 
for 18% of the undocumented sub-Saharan migrants in Spain prior to a regulariza-
tion campaign in 2005 (de Haas 2008a). They are the largest group of West Africans 
regularized in Italy (de Haas 2008a) and were overrepresented in France’s most 
recent regularization effort (Lessault and Beauchemin 2009b). In addition, Willems 
(2008) estimates that half of the 33,000 sub-Saharan Africans who arrived clandes-
tinely in the Canary Islands in 2006 were Senegalese, with many of the boats leav-
ing from the Senegalese coast. Senegal has thus become a major sender of migrants 
to Europe and has become linked with the phenomenon of undocumented 
migration.
In addition to Senegal’s prominence in both intra- and intercontinental migration 
flows, it is clear that emigration profoundly shapes the demography, economy, and 
culture of Senegal itself. Daffé (2008) reports that emigrants made up approxi-
mately 4% of the 2005 Senegalese population, compared to 2.1% for sub-Saharan 
Africa as a whole; emigration rates to OECD destinations in 2010 were 3.2% for 
Senegal compared to 1.1% for all of sub-Saharan Africa (Xenogiani et al. 2015). 
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The number of Senegalese emigrants increased by 1.8% per year between 2000 and 
2005 and approximately one in ten Senegalese households counts at least one emi-
grant among its members (Daffé 2008). The economic impact of this migration flow 
is significant: official monetary remittances to Senegal stood at 10% of GDP in 
2008 after rising to $1.2 billion from $305 million in 2002 (Cisse 2011). Remittances 
have since increased by 58% to $2.3 billion in 2017 (World Bank Group 2017). 
Senegal ranks third in sub-Saharan Africa in the absolute value of remittance flows, 
behind only Nigeria and Ghana, while it ranks fifth in remittances as a percentage 
of GDP behind the smaller countries of Liberia, Comoros, the Gambia, and Lesotho 
(World Bank Group 2016). These flows of cash have reduced poverty in Senegal by 
30% and have contributed positively to Senegal’s macroeconomic accounting by 
equaling 40% of export earnings (Cisse 2011).
These demographic and economic impacts have emerged alongside what Massey 
et al. (1998) call a “culture of migration.” Fieldwork in urban areas of Senegal found 
that fully half of men and 25% of women intended to leave their country, with many 
respondents arguing that emigration constitutes a rite of passage for young 
Senegalese (Willems 2008). Recent results from the Gallup World Poll echoed these 
findings, with 37% of Senegalese responding that they would move permanently to 
another country if given the opportunity; this share increased to 51% of those aged 
15–24 (Xenogiani et al. 2015). Indeed, Tall argues that “the emigrant is perceived 
by Senegalese as a model of success” (2008: 37). This valorization of emigration 
takes place under the cloud of poor macroeconomic performance, declining real 
incomes, low human development, and high rates of poverty, all of which make 
emigration an attractive option for youth (Daffé 2008; Willems 2008).
While Senegalese emigrants were traditionally mostly of rural origin, Daffé 
(2008) reports the recent emergence of significant emigration from Senegal’s cities: 
59% of international migrants now come from urban zones. In contrast to the 
national average of 11% of households with migrants, almost 20% of households in 
the urban zones of Dakar and Touba had a member abroad and that 82% of these 
households received remittances (Daffé 2008). Tall (2008) argues that urban 
migrants have invested a large proportion of their foreign earnings in real estate, and 
that these visible (and occasionally ostentatious) signs of success have played a 




1.7  The Migration Between Africa and Europe (MAFE) 
Project
The main data source of empirical data for the book is the Migration between Africa 
and Europe (MAFE) project.3 The MAFE project arose to fill a long-running gap in 
the availability of quantitative data on African migration (Beauchemin 2012, 2018). 
In general, the study of migration in many regions of the world has often been ham-
pered by a lack of high-quality data. This is partly due to the myriad difficulties in 
studying migration, especially when compared to other demographic processes: 
while birth and death can only take place once for each person and in one place, 
migration can take place multiple times and, by definition, involves a change in 
geographic location. While a number of high-profile data-collection efforts have 
emerged during recent decades to start to fill the migration-data gap, most of these 
projects have focused on migration systems centered on the United States. The 
Mexican Migration Project (MMP) and the Latin American Migration Project 
(LAMP) have pioneered innovative multi-sited data collection techniques and have 
served as the basis of many of the studies that have defined the contours of our cur-
rent knowledge on migration processes. Nonetheless, the dearth of individual-level, 
longitudinal data on African migration has been decried by scholars (Beauchemin 
2012; Lucas 2006) and has remained an obstacle to scholarship: it has generally not 
been possible to test hypotheses developed in the U.S. migration system in an Afro- 
European context.
This lack of data has important repercussions for the study of legal status. 
Immigration-policy making and the elaboration of both external and internal immi-
gration controls have rested on dramatic images of death-defying migration attempts 
or sensationalized portrayals of the living conditions of irregular migrants instead of 
solid scientific evidence on causes and consequences of African migration flows. 
These often-unfounded images have provided fodder for political debates on migra-
tion that have led to increasingly restrictive immigration policies across Europe 
(Düvell 2011a). It is widely acknowledged that immigration-control systems are out 
of sync with the realities of irregular migration. While control focuses on repressive 
border enforcement, the vast majority of irregular migrants—including irregular 
African migrants—are thought to enter Europe as tourists and subsequently over-
stay their visas (Schoumaker et al. 2013). Only reliable and comparative data on 
3 The MAFE project is coordinated by INED (C. Beauchemin) and is formed additionally by the 
Université catholique de Louvain (B.  Schoumaker), Maastricht University (V.  Mazzucato), the 
Université Cheikh Anta Diop (P. Sakho), the Université de Kinshasa (J. Mangalu), the University 
of Ghana (P.  Quartey), the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (P.  Baizan), the Consejo Superior de 
Investigaciones Científicas (A.  González-Ferrer), the Forum Internazionale ed. Europeo di 
Ricerche sull’Immigrazione (E. Castagnone), and the University of Sussex (R. Black). The MAFE 
project received funding from the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme under 
grant agreement 217206. The MAFE-Senegal survey was conducted with the financial support of 
INED, the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (France), the Région Ile de France and the FSP pro-
gramme ‘International Migrations, territorial reorganizations and development of the countries of 
the South’. For more details, see: http://www.mafeproject.com/
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African migration can inform scholarly and policy debates on the scope and scale of 
forms of irregularity among African migrants.
The MAFE project aspired to collect comparative and representative data on sub- 
Saharan African migration using a multi-sited data collection methodology, with an 
emphasis on migration systems (Kritz et  al. 1992) linking Africa and Europe in 
which people, culture, money, and ideas circulate transnationally. The project, in its 
methodology and scientific objectives, recognized the increasingly complex trajec-
tories of African migrants and thus emphasized that migration is not a unidirectional 
event (hence the choice of the preposition “between” in the project’s name). Its 
innovative focus thus explicitly allows for the study of circulation, return migration, 
and transnational practices.
The project chose to focus on three discrete sub-systems of the Afro-European 
migration system, focused on the African countries of Senegal, Ghana, and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). These countries represent three of the 
four largest populations of sub-Saharan Africans in Europe, thus making them 
numerically important populations to study (Beauchemin 2012). The countries were 
also chosen because of the variation they offer: they have different colonial back-
grounds and thus different traditional migration destinations and their economic, 
ecological, and political conditions differ.
The project selected multiple European destinations for each of these African 
hubs, including the former colonial power and one or more new destinations. For 
Senegal, France is the former colonial power and Italy and Spain are new destina-
tions; for Ghana, Great Britain is the traditional destination and the Netherlands is 
the new destination; and for the DRC, Belgium is the former colonial power and 
Great Britain the new destination. This choice of destinations allows for the exami-
nation of changing patterns of migration over time and also creates the variation in 
contexts of exit and reception necessary for comparative studies (Beauchemin 
2012). As this book uses only the data from the Senegalese sub-sample, further 
discussions of the MAFE project will be limited to the Senegalese case.
1.7.1  Sampling Design of the MAFE Project
One of the major goals of the MAFE project was to produce representative socio- 
demographic data for both the sub-Saharan African origin countries and the 
European destination countries. The MAFE project thus employed a multi-site 
design, collecting data on both current migrants in European countries and non- 
migrants and returned migrants in the country of origin. This design overcomes the 
limitations of surveys only at origin—such as reliance on proxy respondents—or 
only at destination—such as the exclusion of non-migrants or returned migrants—
and thus avoids sample-selection problems that plague much research on migration 
(Beauchemin 2012, 2018).
The MAFE sample in Senegal was drawn from the region of Dakar, the 
Senegalese capital city, and its administrative departments of Dakar, Pikine, 
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Guediawaye, and Rufisque. Approximately 25% of Senegal’s population lives in 
this region, and it accounted for more than a quarter of all of the country’s interna-
tional emigration departures in the 5 years prior to 2002 (Mezger Kveder 2012). The 
project, which collected its data in 2008, employed a three-stage probabilistic sam-
pling design to construct a sample of households within the region, oversampling 
those households with migration experience and using the 2002 population census 
as a sampling frame to select primary sampling units. Census districts served as the 
primary sampling units and were divided into ten strata of equal size based on 
migration prevalence. Six census districts were randomly selected from each stra-
tum, and the project enumerated households within each selected district and 
divided them into migrant and non-migrant strata. The project then randomly 
selected 11 households from each stratum in each district, or 1320 total households, 
for participation in the survey. Of the selected households, 1141 completed a house-
hold questionnaire (87%), with an 11% refusal rate.
The household questionnaire generated a list of household members, defined as 
individuals who had lived for at least 6 months in the household at the time of the 
survey or plan on living there for at least 6 months. This list of household members 
served as a sampling frame for the individual survey and the project randomly 
selected at most two returned migrants, two spouses of migrants, and one non- 
migrant per household for participation. Individuals had to meet the following cri-
teria in order to participate: (1) be between 25 and 75 years old; (2) have been born 
in Senegal; and (3) currently hold or in the past have held Senegalese citizenship. A 
total of 1338 individuals were selected and the project completed 1062 interviews. 
The majority of non-response was due to lack of ability to locate the individual after 
repeated attempts. The Senegalese sample as thus constructed is representative of 
households and individuals in the Dakar region.
The main challenge in collecting data on migrants in a destination is the lack of 
a suitable sampling frame. Migrants, especially those who lack regular legal status, 
may not be systematically recorded in population registers that, if they are even 
available, could otherwise serve as sampling frames. Migrants also tend to be a 
hard-to-reach population (Mezger Kveder 2012). The MAFE project thus used a 
variety of methods to construct a sample of Senegalese migrants as representative as 
possible of the population of Senegalese living in each destination country. The 
main approach in France and Italy was the quota method: using auxiliary data about 
the population of Senegalese in each destination country, the project set quotas for 
the number of respondents by different characteristics, including gender, age, region 
of residence, and socioeconomic status (Beauchemin 2012, 2018). The project also 
varied the recruitment methods (via Senegalese associations and snowballing tech-
niques) and places (such as metro stations, hairdressers’ shops, and public places) 
so that the selection biases of each method would, in theory, cancel each other out.
In Spain, however, the MAFE project had the advantage of a sampling frame in 
the Padrón Municipal. Inclusion in this municipal population register gives 
migrants—even those with irregular status—access to a variety of benefits, meaning 
that most foreigners are on the list. In addition, the project attempted to contact 
migrants in Europe using information collected from households in Senegal. This 
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matched sampling strategy met with only limited success, however, and thus 
accounts for a small proportion of migrants interviewed in Europe (Beauchemin 
and González-Ferrer 2011).
In all three European countries, sampling was limited to selected regions that 
incorporated between 64% and 75% of all Senegalese migrants living in the coun-
tries. Individuals were eligible for participation if they met the criteria described 
above for participation in the individual survey; in addition, in an attempt to exclude 
migrants of the 1.5 generation, individuals had to have migrated to Europe for the 
first time at age 18 or later. The project successfully collected about 200 interviews 
each in France, Italy, and Spain. The MAFE project team computed a variety of 
weights for use in accounting for sampling design (Schoumaker and Mezger 2013).
1.7.2  MAFE Questionnaires4
The MAFE project administered a household questionnaire to the head of each 
selected household in Dakar and a biographical questionnaire to each individual 
selected to participate in the study either in Senegal or in Europe. The household 
head responded to questions for all individuals currently living in the household, 
and also for all other children of the household head not physically living in the 
household, as well as current migrants who were related to the head, the head’s 
spouse, or the spouse of a household member. The proxy data thus collected for 
each individual included education, occupation, religion, ethnicity, and past and 
current migrations (including destination and years of departure and return), and 
links with current migrants. The questionnaire also collected household-level data 
on housing characteristics and ownership of durable assets.
The biographical questionnaire was administered to individuals in all project 
countries. Its goal was to permit the reconstruction of the respondent’s life history 
in multiple domains in a coherent fashion. The questionnaire thus consisted of two 
data-collection tools: (1) a biographical event grid or life-history calendar tied to the 
age of the respondent and the corresponding calendar year in which the interviewer 
recorded the respondent’s life events; and (2) a questionnaire with both a set of open 
questions that helped to fill in the basic structure of the calendar and a variety of 
modules with structured questions. The biographical questionnaire collected a wide 
array of information on each respondent. Traditional life-history data included fam-
ily history (relationships and children), residential history (places of residence of a 
year or more), education, occupation, and asset ownership; these modules were 
applicable to migrants and non-migrants alike. Family events were recorded early in 
the interview as they are usually the easiest to recall; this personal history thus then 
provides a temporal “backbone” that can aid recall for the rest of the 
questionnaire.
4 All MAFE questionnaires are available at http://mafeproject.site.ined.fr/en/methodo/methodo/
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In keeping with the survey’s focus on migration, the questionnaire also included 
a number of modules about migration events and experiences, including migration 
attempts; long and short stays outside of Senegal; long and short return trips to 
Senegal; migration experience of friends and relatives; citizenship history; asylum 
claims; work and residence permits; money transfers; and participation in migrant 
associations. All modules asked the respondent to indicate dates for events, allow-
ing the transcription of information into the life-history calendar at annual 
intervals.
1.7.3  Advantages of the MAFE Data
This book will use the data collected by the MAFE biographical questionnaires. 
These data have a number of advantages for the study of the determinants and con-
sequences of legal statuses of current and former Senegalese migrants in Europe.
 Inclusion of Regular and Irregular Migrants
First of all, the sampling design purposefully includes both regular and irregular 
migrants. The Padrón in Spain offered the opportunity to include both documented 
and undocumented Senegalese migrants in the sample, and the project also made 
effort in France and Italy to include undocumented migrants in the sample in order 
to avoid the biases that excluding this population would bring about (Beauchemin 
2012, 2018). Descriptive statistics in Table 1.1 indicate that the project was success-
ful in including this traditionally hard-to-reach population: across the three European 
countries, almost 18% of the respondents lacked a residence permit at the time of 
the survey, while almost 60% had lacked this authorization at some point in the past. 
The percentages vary by country, with a higher proportion of currently undocu-
mented migrants in the Spanish and Italian samples than in the French sample.
Table 1.1 Percentage of 
Senegalese migrants without 











ages of respondents declaring 
that they did not hold a resi-
dence permit
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 Longitudinal Measurement of Legal Status
In addition to making efforts to include migrants with irregular experience in the 
sample, the MAFE project also included a module in the biographical questionnaire 
that allowed for the collection of longitudinal, comparable data on legal statuses. 
Figure 1.2 displays the questions5 the interviewer used to elicit information about 
legal statuses over time from the respondent. Starting with the first period of resi-
dence outside of Senegal, the interviewer asked that respondent to indicate the com-
bination of visa, residence permits, and work permits that the individual had upon 
arrival. The interviewer recorded this information, including any combinations of 
permits specified by the individual, in the life-history calendar at the year corre-
sponding the migrant’s arrival in the destination. The interviewer then asked if the 
individual’s situation with regard to both residence and work authorizations changed 
during the first period of residence outside of Senegal and recorded any changes in 
the life-history calendar. The interviewer repeated this cycle of questions for each 
period of residence outside of Senegal. The MAFE data thus include data on 
Senegalese migrants’ legal statuses in the domains of entry, residence, and work for 
each year of residence in each of the foreign countries in which they lived.
5 The English-language version of these questions appeared in the Ghana biographical survey, 
adapted here for Senegal for the convenience of Anglophone readers. The questions in the Senegal 
biographical survey were identical and were posed in French, Italian, or Spanish.
Fig. 1.2 MAFE-Senegal biographical questionnaire module on legal statuses
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These kinds of longitudinal data on legal statuses are both rare and important. 
Very few data sources on migrants in Europe include information on legal status, 
either because the data are pulled from population registers that include only legal 
migrants or because the sampling scheme includes potentially undocumented 
migrants but the questionnaire does not ask about legal status (Amuedo-Dorantes 
et al. 2013). Given the debate about undocumented migrants in both the US and in 
Europe (Düvell 2011a; Massey et al. 2002), however, collecting data on legal status 
is important. Migration scholars have started calling for longitudinal data on legal 
statuses in particular, which are necessary to answer questions about transitions 
over time between various legal statuses (Donato and Armenta 2011; Massey and 
Capoferro 2004) and combinations between different kinds of authorizations. Time- 
varying indicators of legal statuses are also necessary as predictor variables of time- 
varying outcomes, such as employment and remitting, that may be linked to entry, 
residence, and work authorization. The MAFE-Senegal data provide such longitu-
dinal data on a rich array of variables measuring legal statuses.
 Comparability of Legal Statuses
The data on legal statuses collected by the MAFE project are also comparable both 
across countries and over time. While MAFE ensured basic comparability by using 
the same carefully translated questionnaire in all survey locations, the multi-sited 
survey design combined with a retrospective questionnaire required a deeper level 
of conceptual comparability. Concepts measured by the questionnaire had to be 
understandable and relevant in multiple contexts over different geographic loca-
tions, time periods, languages, and personal histories. As Beauchemin (2012, 2018) 
points out, some concepts lent themselves easily to this kind of comparability, either 
because they are universal or because standard solutions exist (such as the 
International Standard Classification of Occupations or ISCO, which MAFE used to 
code occupations). Measuring legal statuses was a case in which contextual speci-
ficities required the invention of a standardized framework.
Each country has its own set of laws regulating the entry, residence, and work of 
foreigners, and the authorizations are rarely comparable. The alphabet soup of visas 
for entering and residing in the United States, for example, does not have an exact 
analog in Europe. Even European countries differ greatly in their external and inter-
nal mechanisms of immigration control (Brochmann and Hammar 1999) despite the 
attempts of the European Union to harmonize migration policies. Indeed, 
immigration- policy making is a fiercely guarded realm of national sovereignty in 
Europe. Laws and regulations defining legal statuses can also vary over time within 
the same country, thus making comparability over time difficult and complicating 
retrospective data collection (Beauchemin 2012, 2018).
The MAFE project thus adopted a flexible strategy to capture all of the legal situ-
ations of Senegalese migrants at all times and places: the project assumed that visas, 
residence permits, and work permits were the basic mechanisms of immigration 
control to which migrants are subject. The questionnaire did not differentiate 
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between different kinds of visas, residence, or work permits that may be specific to 
a time period or destination. By asking about visas, residence, and work permits 
separately and encouraging migrants to list all authorizations and changes in autho-
rizations, the questionnaire was as exhaustive and comprehensive as possible. In 
addition, migrants had the possibility of answering that they did not need a permit, 
reflecting the complicated evolution of immigration-control legislation vis-à-vis 
Senegalese in France.
1.7.4  Limitations of the MAFE Data
While the MAFE project has generated rich, longitudinal, multi-sited and compa-
rable data that can be used to study the determinants and consequences of the legal- 
status trajectories of Senegalese migrants in Europe, the data also have a number of 
limitations stemming from compromises in the survey design.
 Sample Size
Because of cost considerations, the inherent difficulty in sampling a hard-to-reach 
population, and the lack of availability of a sampling frame, the MAFE project set a 
goal of interviewing 200 Senegalese migrants in each of the three destination coun-
tries (Beauchemin 2012, 2018). The sample is of a reasonable size when pooled, 
especially if non-migrants interviewed in Senegal are included in the analysis, 
which would give a sample size of 1668 individuals and almost 70,000 person- 
years. The relatively small sample sizes in each country, however, limit the ability 
to conduct destination-specific analyses.
 Recall Bias
The second compromise was the retrospective nature of the data collection, which 
leads to the potential limitation of recall bias. Collecting longitudinal and time- 
specific information on migration-related events that would allow analyses of deter-
minants of migration was an important objective for the project, and a retrospective 
design was more cost-effective than a prospective panel for doing so (Beauchemin 
2012, 2018). In addition, the retrospective survey could ensure a representative 
sample at the time of the data collection, while a panel survey loses representative-
ness through attrition over time (Mezger Kveder 2012). Nonetheless, retrospective 
data collection does open the door to the possibility of recall bias in the reporting of 
past events. Respondents had an average age of 40 years at the time of data collec-




Mezger Kveder (2012) argues that this effort can result in measurement error 
through the misreporting of the timing of events or the complete omission of events. 
Research has shown that this recall bias depends, in part, on the kind of event being 
recalled. Respondents tend to remember rare events readily because of their relative 
salience (Eisenhower et al. 2004), which means that events like births and marriages 
should be subject to less recall bias (Poulain et al. 1992). Residential histories tend 
to present more difficulty in recall especially if the exact timing is of interest 
(Poulain et  al. 1992), but respondents seem to have less difficulty in accurately 
reporting migration events, especially if the move is long-distance (Smith and 
Thomas 2003). Recall bias in other areas seems to be more problematic: unemploy-
ment spells, for example, tend to be underreported, even in shorter reference inter-
vals (Horvath 1982; Manzoni et al. 2011).
In addition to these substantive variations in recall bias, research has shown that 
time since the event seems to have a non-linear relationship to recall accuracy, with 
a deterioration in recall stabilizing over time (Mayer 2007); overall age also seems 
to be associated with decreased recall accuracy (Haaga 1988). The MAFE project 
sought to limit recall biases by using salient events—such as birth or marriage—to 
anchor the life history calendar and encouraged respondents to think about event 
timing in relation to these anchor events (Beauchemin 2012, 2018). The interview-
ers also had an array of dated local, national, and world events that could also serve 
as recall anchors.
The effect of recall bias on the reporting and measurement of legal statuses has 
not been examined, most likely because there is no source of prospective data on 
legal statuses to compare with retrospective sources. The main concern is that 
reporting of legal status may be prone to measurement error through misreporting 
of timing or omission of changes in legal status. The existing research on recall bias 
suggests, though, that legal status might be a domain where there is little recall bias. 
Given the widespread knowledge throughout Senegal of the external immigration 
controls in the form of visa requirements of most European countries (Willems 
2008), it is reasonable to assume that legal vs. unlawful status upon entry would be 
a salient feature that migrants would recall with accuracy. Still, this may not be true 
in respect to those who still enjoyed visa-free travel to France or Italy (see Chap. 2) 
or in respect to persons who were only marginally involved in the organization of 
travel, such as children but perhaps also reunified spouses.
First residence and work authorizations, which are linked in time to the year of 
arrival at a given destination, may also be a salient feature in migrants’ memories. 
Recall may become more difficult for some subsequent changes in legal status. 
Transitions from regular to irregular states via the expiration of a permit for which 
the migrant does not need to take concrete action may be associated with fuzzier 
recall. Renewals of permits or acquisition of regular status, on the other hand, are 
likely to be salient events if only because of the bureaucratic paperwork often 
involved in these processes (Spire 2005). In addition, the MAFE data show transi-
tions between different legal statuses once in a destination to be somewhat rare: the 
average Senegalese migrant reports 1.73 legal-status spells, or 0.73 transitions; 
more than half never experience a change in legal status. Thus, most migrants do 
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not face great challenges in their recall of their legal statuses, which are also most 
likely salient.
 Time Resolution
The third compromise stemming from the survey design was the choice of retro-
spective time resolution. The project decided on yearly intervals for recording 
events as a way to both simplify data collection and limit response burden 
(Beauchemin 2012, 2018). While this produces life histories of adequate length for 
analysis, the time interval may obscure events and changes of state that happen dur-
ing that year. The questionnaire allows for some recording of multiple events at the 
same time but does not necessarily allow for the recording of the precise ordering of 
events. Even if only one event of interest happened during the year, the time resolu-
tion does not allow the establishment of temporal precedence vis-à-vis other events 
that occurred in the same year. These issues may be particularly relevant for legal 
statuses, as migrants may experience multiple status transitions in a given year, 
especially if they have short-term permits. Thus, the survey may conceal some 
instability in migrants’ legal trajectories (Beauchemin 2012, 2018). The time reso-
lution issue also affects other variables under study in this book: migrants may 
engage in transnational activities, such as remitting, multiple times during a year; 
migrants may also experience multiple spells of employment and unemployment 
during the same year.
 Standardization of Heterogeneous Legal Statuses
The fourth compromise arising from the design of the survey was the necessary 
standardization of questionnaire items, including those asking about legal status. 
While this standardization is an advantage in that it allows comparison across time 
and between countries, it also creates a gap between the data collected and the legal 
reality in each time period and destination. For example, residence and work per-
mits are often differentiated by length of validity and conditions for renewal, dis-
tinctions which often correspond to “temporary” and “permanent” permits with 
different connotations for the stability and longevity of residence. Spire (2005) 
argues that these kinds of distinctions were used to create a hierarchy of more- and 
less-desirable immigrants in France. The former were granted permanent residence 
with long periods of authorization and few occupational or geographic restrictions, 
while the latter obtained only short, precarious authorizations. Italy and Spain have 
also recently introduced longer-term “permanent” residence permits (see Chap. 2), 
access to which is often difficult and dependent on continuous prior regular status.
There is thus clearly important heterogeneity even within the category of “regu-
lar” migrants: those with temporary authorizations are more precarious than those 
with permanent authorizations. The MAFE project only collected standardized data 
on the possession of residence and work permits and did not allow for the 
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 differentiation of different kinds of permits. The survey recorded the length of dif-
ferent spells of authorization, so some indication of the precarity of statuses is pos-
sible, but there is no straightforward way to match spell length with different kinds 
of authorization. As a result, there is a degree of unobserved heterogeneity that is 
unavoidable.
In addition to the lack of information about the kind of entry, residence, and work 
authorizations, the study’s standardized approach did not permit the collection of 
information about the mechanisms by which migrants acquired or lost their legal 
statuses. Senegalese migrants may have entered the destination country on a tourist, 
work, or family-reunification visa, and residence and work permits may have come 
from regularization programs or marriage. While auxiliary data on the timing of 
other life or national events could help construct indicators of different types of 
mechanisms of access to regular statuses, the lack of direct observation of these 
mechanisms is a limitation. Standardization also limited the ability to collect data 
on more convoluted legal arrangements, such common Senegalese strategy of using 
false documents (either counterfeit or belonging to someone else) (Spire 2005).
 The Murkiness of Legal Status
Finally, there are some potential sources of bias in data on legal statuses that stem 
not so much from the design of the MAFE survey as from the very nature of legal 
statuses themselves. Immigration policies and the mechanisms of control they 
define are complex and multifaceted, and the bureaucracies that administer them are 
equally complex. It is possible that migrants may not fully understand the details of 
their past and/or current legal statuses. While the standardization of the legal-status 
instruments in the MAFE survey may help overcome this issue, it is still possible 
that there is some misreporting of legal status due to simple misunderstanding.
For example, Senegalese migrants in France in the 1960s needed neither a visa 
for legal entry nor a residence permit for legal residence, but technically needed a 
work permit and a contract for work-related migration; many Senegalese thus 
entered and resided legally without any authorization and subsequently found work 
and were often regularized post facto. A migrant recalling this situation might 
declare not needing a visa or a residence permit but not having a work permit (and 
then having one); s/he could also declare not having any form of authorization or, 
on the contrary, having all of the forms of authorization. There is thus probably 
some degree of a gap between legal statuses as they exist in the law and legal sta-
tuses as they exist in migrants’ comprehension of them.
Bias could also arise from migrants underreporting irregular status because of 
the fear of deportation if the data were revealed to public authorities. The MAFE 
project made great efforts to assure respondents of the confidentiality of their per-
sonal data, though, and the prevalence of migrants who reported current or past 
irregular status (see Table 1.1) indicates that this fear did not prevent reporting of 
irregularity. In any event, even if underreporting occurred, the estimates in this book 
could then be considered conservative lower bounds.
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Despite these limitations, most assessments of the MAFE project’s approach 
(Beauchemin 2012, 2018; Center for Global Development 2009; Mezger Kveder 
2012; Toma 2012) conclude that it is furnished a unique dataset which takes a step 
towards filling the gap in the availability of quantitative data on African migration. 
Not only is it, like other migration datasets, certainly “better than nothing” 
(Beauchemin 2012: 36), but it is offers information on a rich array of topics that 
permit investigation of a large number of questions in migration research. The data 
are especially valuable for studying legal statuses, the contexts of reception that 
produce them, and the impacts that they have on Senegalese migrants’ lives.
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Chapter 2
Evolution of Immigration-Control Policies 
in France, Italy, and Spain
2.1  Policy Evolution in Multiple Contexts of Reception
Senegalese migration is a useful case to study because Senegalese migrants are 
present in many different contexts of reception. They have long migrated to destina-
tions within Africa, including neighboring countries such as the Gambia and Guinea 
and more-distant destinations such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, and South Africa (Bredeloup 1993). While France was the main destination 
of Senegalese intercontinental emigration during most of the twentieth century, 
Senegalese migrants have since diversified their mobility to include many countries 
in Europe, North America, and Asia. Indeed, most Senegalese who travel abroad 
can recount stories of meeting other Senegalese in the markets of Nairobi, the cafés 
of Paris, the New York subway, or the streets of Bangkok.
This book takes advantage of part of this diversity of destinations to examine 
how variation in the socio-legal features of different contexts of reception creates 
complex trajectories of legal status for this intrepid group of migrants and will link 
different forms of legal status to the migrants’ integration in the destination society 
and their ongoing participation in the development of their origin communities. 
While many different destinations could have been considered, this book and the 
data-collection project on which it is based chose to focus on France, Italy, and 
Spain. These three countries account for approximately 45% of all Senegalese 
migrants residing abroad (Beauchemin and González-Ferrer 2011). While they are 
all developed countries in the European Union, variations in their historical relation-
ship with Senegal, the evolution of their immigration-control policies, their experi-
ences in receiving immigrants, and their economies all create different configurations 
of legal status and possibilities of irregularity.
France is of obvious interest as the former colonial power in Senegal. Research 
has shown that links of language, transportation, and economic exchange forged 
during colonial times underlie many migration systems across the world (Kritz et al. 
1992), and the migration patterns between Senegal and France are no exception to 
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this rule (Garson 1992). No understanding of Senegalese migration would be com-
plete without an accounting of Senegalese migration to France. In addition, the 
colonial relationship had important implications for the socio-legal parameters 
structuring the legal statuses of Senegalese migrants in France in the post- 
independence period. During the colonial era, Senegalese born in the so-called qua-
tre communes of St. Louis, Gorée, Rufisque, and Dakar had a form of French 
citizenship, which Senegalese deputies to the French Assembly in the early twenti-
eth century sought to reinforce via military service during the two World Wars. This 
“blood debt” later served as a pillar in the fight for secure legal status for Senegalese 
sans papiers in France (Coquery-Vidrovitch 2001; Mann 2003).
The colonial relationship also directly structured post-independence immigration- 
control measures in France. The former colonial power sought to defend the ves-
tiges of colonial privileges of free entry and establishment in Senegal for its own 
citizens, and thus created a preferential bilateral immigration-control regime with 
Senegal that facilitated the entry and eventual settlement of Senegalese in France. 
This preferential regime was largely at odds with the ordinance of 1945 that sought 
to recruit immigrants from culturally similar southern European countries for eco-
nomic and demographic purposes (Spire 2005), which nonetheless established the 
framework for a restrictive immigration-control regime. While French policymak-
ers immediately and constantly chipped away at the preferential regime between 
France and Senegal, it officially lasted until the early twenty-first century, and the 
evolution towards a closed and restrictive regime more in line with national immi-
gration law was instrumental in encouraging both the settlement of formerly-mobile 
Senegalese migrants and their families in France and the exploration of new destina-
tions such as Italy, Spain, Greece, and the United States.
The new destinations of Italy and Spain provide counterpoints to the experience 
of Senegalese migration to France. Both Italy and Spain have long histories as coun-
tries of emigration; indeed, both provided many migrants to France in the post- 
World War II period. In contrast, these countries’ experience receiving immigrants 
is much more recent. While France has been a country of immigration (in demo-
graphic if not cultural terms) since the late nineteenth century, Spain and Italy only 
started receiving migrants in the 1990s. As a result, Spanish and Italian apparatuses 
of immigration control are much more recent. Neither had any national-level immi-
gration policy with the normative status of legislation until the 1990s, and the impe-
tus for this legislation came from the European Union integration instead of any 
overriding internal concern with immigration; indeed, both countries still had low 
levels of immigration at the time of their respective laws (González-Enríquez 2009; 
Sciortino 1999).
Immigration-control policies in both southern European countries have since 
developed in a restrictive fashion, marked by an overriding concern with border 
control along Mediterranean coastlines. Indeed, these countries have reputations for 
being the clandestine port of entry for migrants from less-developed neighboring 
countries such as Morocco and Tunisia, and these North African countries have 
themselves transformed into transit points for migrants from sub-Saharan African 
countries (including Senegal) (de Haas 2007). Italy and Spain thus have a different 
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history of immigration-control policies than France and face different immigration- 
control challenges than their northern neighbor.
In addition, these two new destinations do not have any meaningful historical 
links with Senegal. Neither country had any colonial enterprises in Senegal or any-
where in West Africa, nor do they share cultural or linguistic links with Senegal. 
Unlike many other European countries of immigration, they also did not engage in 
post-war labor recruitment in former colonies. Research suggests that Senegalese 
migration to southern European countries started as a result of the confluence of 
immigration-control policies in the traditional and new destinations (Fall 2005; 
Kaag 2008; Tall 2008). France was tightening the preferential bilateral regime with 
Senegal in the 1980s and 1990s at the same time that Italy and Spain were starting 
to come to grips with increasing numbers of immigrants within their borders.
One of the first immigration-policy measures that the southern European coun-
tries pursued was regularization programs, which reportedly attracted Senegalese 
migrants from France who were finding it increasingly difficult to gain and maintain 
secure legal status (Fall 2005; Kaag 2008; Schoumaker et  al. 2013; Tall 2008). 
Research also points to the role that the economies of these southern European 
countries played in attracting Senegalese migrants. Both countries have a more- 
robust informal sector than France, wherein migrants can find gainful employment 
without competing with natives or the need for legal authorization (Gonzalez- 
Enríquez and Triandafyllidou 2009; Reyneri 1998). Many Senegalese thus turned to 
informal entrepreneurial activities in northern Italy or informal agricultural labor in 
Spain as ways to accumulate the resources they were increasingly unable to find in 
France (Ebin 1992; di Friedberg 1993; Riccio 2001).
Immigration-control policies have thus played an important role in structuring 
the migration strategies and incorporation of Senegalese migrants in France, Italy, 
and Spain. This chapter will trace the evolution of those policies and the mecha-
nisms of external and internal control (Brochmann 1999) they define (see Table 2.1 
for the terms for visas, residence permits, and work permits in France, Italy, and 
Spain). It will examine the consequences policies and mechanisms of control have 
had for trajectories of legal status of Senegalese migrants, and in so doing will 
underline that the legal status that migrants possess is a “relational product” 
(Sciortino 2004): states create the legal parameters that define pathways to regular 
or irregular legal status.
Table 2.1 Terms for visa, residence permit, and work permit in France, Italy, and Spain
Authorization France Italy Spain
Visa Visa Visto Visado
Residence 
permit
Titre de séjour, carte de 
séjour, carte de résident, 
permis de résidence
Permesso di soggiorno, 
carta di soggiorno
Permiso de residencia, 
permiso de estancia
Work permit Titre de travail, carte de 
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2.2  France
2.2.1  Colonial “Assimilation” and Citizenship
Senegalese migrants long benefitted from a special immigration-policy regime that 
traces its roots to the earliest days of the French colonial administration in Senegal. 
The French established their first permanent settlement in what is now Senegal on 
an uninhabited island in the mouth of the Senegal River in 1659. Originally set up 
as a trading post to take advantage of commercial opportunities along the river, 
Saint-Louis—named after King Louis XIV—eventually became the capital of the 
French colony of Senegal (Crowder 1967). A small community of French traders 
and mixed French-African “habitants” developed Saint-Louis into a commercial 
hub. The rights of the habitants as French citizens were recognized by the French 
revolutionary government in 1791, and a law in 1833 guaranteed the civil and politi-
cal rights of all free-born or freed persons born in French colonies (Coquery- 
Vidrovitch 2001). The revolution of 1848 further entrenched these rights by giving 
Senegal a seat in the French parliament and allowing Senegalese born in the quatre 
communes (four towns) of Saint-Louis, Gorée, Rufisque, and Dakar—called origi-
naires (natives)—to vote as French citizens (Coquery-Vidrovitch 2001).
This extension of rights to Senegalese originaires was part of the French policy 
of colonial “assimilation.” Crowder (1967) notes that “assimilation” can have many 
meanings when it comes to French colonial policy, but argues that its application in 
Senegal included political assimilation to France through elected representation in 
the French assembly; administrative assimilation through the creation of a conseil 
général and municipal councils for the governance of Senegal modeled on similar 
structures for departmental and municipal governance in France; and the extension 
of French educational facilities. Assimilation was also extended on the personal 
level by according originaires the status of French citizens. Originaires thus faced 
a much more lenient administration than residents of the rest of Senegal and other 
nations of Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF), who, as sujets (subjects), were 
subject to military rule, violence, cash taxes, and forced labor (Crowder 1967). 
Originaires were subject to French civil law unless they opted to remain under the 
traditional system of Islamic law with reference to civil disputes, matrimony, 
divorce, inheritance and land.
This bifurcation of French citizenship provoked a reaction on the part of the 
French, who felt that to be included in the French polity as a French citizen required 
a submission to French civil law and related institutions, such as monogamous mar-
riage (Crowder 1967). As a result, French legislators and colonial administrators 
often attempted to redefine the boundaries of French citizenship and nationality in 
ways that would exclude the originaires from the full exercise of their rights 
(Coquery-Vidrovitch 2001).
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2.2.2  Link Between Colonial-Era Policies and Migration
The colonial-era policies depriving most Senegalese of political rights directly gave 
rise to migration. French colonization of Senegal was part of the partition of Africa 
by the major European powers. This partition drove expansion of capitalism, facili-
tating the extension of global markets and capital into African societies. Amin (1995) 
argues that this expansion allowed the colonizing countries to achieve the main capi-
talist goal of obtaining cheap export goods. He outlines the development of a system 
of colonial exploitation in various parts of the continent, including the extraction of 
raw materials (gold and diamond mining in South Africa, copper in Northern 
Rhodesia and Katanga) and the production of tropical agricultural products (palm oil 
in the Gold Coast, cacao in the Ivory Coast, and groundnuts in Senegambia).
A key component of these export systems’ functioning was the creation and 
exploitation of labor from the “reserve” of indigenous Africans such as the French 
sujets. Through strategic political alliances, the subordination of traditional com-
mercial relationships, monetary taxation of agricultural products, and forced labor, 
these colonial systems created a proletarianized labor force. Traditional society was 
thus transformed, Amin argues, into a “purveyor of temporary or permanent 
migrants on a vast scale” (1995: 33).
In colonial Senegal, the policies that created the statuses of “originaire” and 
“sujet” also undergirded the system of forced labor and taxation. Findley et  al. 
(1995) argue that the colonial system disrupted the traditional agricultural economy 
of the Senegal River valley by instituting a head tax that induced peasants—the 
“sujets” of the French colonial legal system—to work in the groundnut and cotton 
plantations. Paying the monetary tax meant selling animals or portions of the har-
vest or seasonally migrating to the coastal colonial plantations to earn the money for 
the tax by selling labor. The French colonial regime also resorted to forced labor—
the “navetanat”—to ensure a supply of labor on the groundnut plantations of the 
Sine-Saloum. The French colonial system in Senegal thus accomplished its goals of 
integrating the region into a monetized market economy and producing a surplus for 
export. The introduction of cash crops, the development of rail lines, and the invest-
ment in coastal cities all further eroded the pre-existing peasant modes of social and 
economic organization and contributed to a growing pool of potential emigrants. 
Furthermore, the internal mobility induced by the navetanat would eventually trans-
late into international migration towards France (Findley et al. 1995).
While the status of sujet directly created internal and, eventually, international 
mobility among a portion of the Senegalese population, the status of originaire 
would also lay the foundations for future migration towards France. Blaise Diagne, 
who served as the first African deputy from Senegal to the French assembly from 
1914 to 1937, attempted to reinforce the eroded political rights of originaires during 
World War I.  He shepherded a series of laws through the French assembly that 
allowed Senegalese soldiers, who had heretofore served in the French military in 
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segregated units called the tirailleurs sénégalais, to serve in regular units alongside 
French soldiers. The laws also stipulated that all natives of the quatre communes 
and their descendants would be French citizens subject to mandatory military ser-
vice (Coquery-Vidrovitch 2001).
Senegalese and other natives of French West Africa fulfilled this obligation by 
serving as shock troops in World War I and fighting with General de Gaulle’s forces 
in North Africa and Italy in World War II; West African troops even fought in French 
conflicts in Indochina and Algeria following World War II (Mann 2003). Following 
the wars, many soldiers from Senegal and other African territories enlisted in the 
French merchant marine and settled clandestinely in port cities such as Bordeaux, 
Toulon, Marseille, Le Havre, and Dunkerque (Manchuelle 1997). Although a boon 
for navigation companies looking for low-skill workers on boats and docks, the 
presence of these Africans incited public concern about security and public order 
(Fall 2005).
Despite this “blood debt” incurred by France, the French policy of assimilation 
existed mostly as an imaginary ideal, as colonial administrators consistently made 
attempts to limit claims to French citizenship and reinforce African inferiority 
(Coquery-Vidrovitch 2001; Crowder 1967). Despite these efforts to limit the ability 
of Senegalese to access the full rights French citizenship while burdening them with 
some of the onerous responsibilities, the precedent of political and personal assimi-
lation created a special status for Senegalese that the French would continue to 
acknowledge in the preferential regime that followed independence in 1960 and that 
would directly create the conditions for migration to France.
2.2.3  Post-War Reconstruction and the Importation of Foreign 
Labor
Senegalese migration to France began in earnest following World War II as demand 
for unskilled foreign labor increased during the French economic boom of the 1950s 
and 1960s. France was one of the countries that turned to labor recruitment and 
importation to meet the challenges of post-war rebuilding in the context of labor 
shortages. Although the vast majority of imported laborers came from southern 
Europe, many also came from France’s African colonies. Employers recruited 
workers in the rural Senegal River valley to work in flexible and low-skill jobs in the 
auto, textile, and hotel industries (Fall 2005). A system called noria ensured that 
circularity was the norm: Senegalese workers stayed in France for a number of years 
before returning home to send a family member to take their places (Tall 2008). 
Most migrants were primarily interested not in settling in France but in sending 
funds to their families in Senegal (Fall 2005). This voluntary separation from the 
host society found its residential complement in the foyers de travailleurs migrants, 
lodging provided by employers or municipalities that ensured that migrants were 
kept in close proximity to each other but separated from French society.
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 The General Regime of the Ordinance of 1945
While Senegalese migrants were not initially subject to general immigration policy 
in postwar France, this so-called “general regime” provided the framework for the 
general evolution over more than 50 years of the bilateral accords providing juridi-
cal context for Senegalese migrants’ legal status. The main pillar of postwar French 
immigration policy was the Ordonnance n°. 45-2658 du 2 Novembre 1945, relative 
à l’entrée et au séjour des étrangers en France. This ordinance organized labor 
migration under the auspices of the Office national de l’immigration (ONI) (see 
Table 2.2 at the end of Sect. 2.2 for a synthesis of the evolution of immigration 
policy in France). Employers wishing to hire foreign labor were formally required 
to submit a request to ONI, which would fill the post with a qualified foreigner. The 
ordonnance further stipulated that foreigners entering for work needed to do so 
under cover of a visa and with a government-approved work contract. Upon arrival, 
migrants needed to apply for a permis de résidence (residence permit) from the 
Ministry of the Interior and a permis de travail (work permit) from the Ministry of 
Labor. There were many kinds of residence permits for different types of stay for 
more than 3 months, but obtaining a residence permit for the purposes of a salaried 
activity required the presentation of an official work contract. After obtaining a 
temporary authorization to stay in France, the migrant would then receive a work 
permit (Spire 2005).
In reality, decisions on the granting of residence and work permits were made by 
autonomous bureaucrats and were often not coordinated between Ministries, lead-
ing to permits of different lengths and the possibility of irregularity in either legal 
domain of work or residence (Spire 2005). The 1945 ordinance provided the foun-
dations of immigration in policy in France through the end of the twentieth century, 
and its text was not officially modified until the 1980s. Most changes in immigration 
policy prior to those modifications thus occurred in administrative circulars issued 
by various ministries, a method chosen for its flexibility and lack of oversight in 
representative political bodies (although the Conseil d’Etat could, and occasionally 
did, weigh in on the constitutionality of these measures).
 Decolonization and the Creation of a Preferential Regime
Senegalese were not initially subject to the general regime following the postwar 
reorganization of the French colonial system. This system, with its distinction 
between originaire and sujet, existed until 1946, when, in the aftermath of World 
War II, France promulgated a new constitution. At this point, all residents of French 
colonial territories and protectorates were granted French citizenship, which would, 
in theory, allow free circulation and establishment between the territories of the 
empire. In practice, colonial administrators did not allow colonial subjects to travel 
to the metropole, all the while encouraging intra-colony mobility via cash head 




Table 2.2 Synthesis of major immigration measures in France and consequences for migrant 
irregularity
Date Name of law Consequence for irregularity
November 
2, 1945
Ordonnance n°. 45-2658 du 2 Novembre 1945, 
relative à l’entrée et au séjour des étrangers en 
France
Organized labor migration
Foreigners entering for work 
needed to do so under cover 
of a visa and with a 
government-approved work 
contract
Residence permit conditional 




Constitution of the Fourth Republic French citizenship granted to 
all residents of French 
colonial territories and 
protectorates
Creation of French Union
October 4, 
1958











Convention d’établissement Senegalese free to enter, 
reside, and work in France
January 21, 
1964
Bilateral treaty Senegalese needed only an 
identity card and proof of 
vaccinations to enter France
Formal work was subject to 
an employment contract 
approved by the Ministry of 
















Note du 25 février 1970 de la Direction centrale 
des Renseignements généraux consacrée au « 
renforcement du contrôle des ressortissants 
africains se présentant en qualité de touriste »
Africans entering as tourists 









Bilateral treaty Required residence permit 
for stays greater than 
3 months
(continued)
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Table 2.2 (continued)
Date Name of law Consequence for irregularity
July 3, 
1974
Decision by the Council of Ministers Suspension of labor 
immigration (with 
administrative circulars 
following on July 5)
November 
30, 1974
Circulaire n. 74-628, en date du 30 novembre 1974, 
du Ministre d’Etat, Ministre de l’Intérieur, et la 
circulaire n. 21-74, en date du 30 novembre 1974, 
du Secrétaire d’Etat auprès du Ministre du Travail 
relatives aux conditions de séjour et d’emploi des 
ressortissants des pays d’Afrique au Sud du Sahara 
autrefois sous administration française
Required residence permit 
for all nationals of sub- 
Saharan African states 




Loi Bonnet Tightened entry requirements 
by requiring repatriation 
guarantees
Declared the entry or 
residence of “illegal” 
migrants to be a threat to 
public order




Loi Peyrefitte Allowed preventative identity 




Loi n°81-973 du 29 octobre 1981 relative aux 
conditions d’entrée et de séjour des étrangers en 
France
Eliminated provisions of the 
loi Bonnet allowing the 
expulsion of minors and 





Loi Dufoix Formalized single residence/
work permit
Introduced 10-year 




Loi Pasqua (I): loi n° 86-1025 du 9 septembre 1986 








Avis relatif à la suspension de certains 
engagements internationaux portant dispense de 
l’obligation du visa pour l’entrée en France
Suspended the clauses of 
bilateral treaties exempting 
Senegalese and other 
sub-Saharan Africans from 
visas for entry to France
August 2, 
1989
Loi Joxe Eased some of the restrictive 





Date Name of law Consequence for irregularity
August 1, 
1995
Bilateral treaty Visas and proof of means/
return trip required for entry 
of Senegalese
Long-stay visa required for 
stays of over 3 months
Approved work contract and 
long-stay visa required for 
entry for employment
Required a residence permit 




Loi Pasqua (II) Made acquisition of French 
citizenship more difficult for 
children born in France
Facilitated the expulsion of 
undocumented foreigners
Increased waiting time to 
2 years for family 
reunification
Prohibited the regularization 
of undocumented migrants 
who married a French citizen
Made the issuance of 
residence permits dependent 
on the regularity of entry and 
prior stay
Denied re-entry for 1 year for 
expelled foreigners




Loi Debré Allowed regularization of 
“ni…ni” irregular migrants
Increased the state’s 




Circulaire du ministère de l’Intérieur Case-by-case regularizations 
with provisions for the 
adjustment of status of 
spouses with irregular status 




Loi Guigou: Loi n° 98-170 du 16 mars 1998 
relative à la nationalité
Reinstated limited jus soli 
citizenship provisions
(continued)
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As Senegalese and other African subjects were still part of the French empire and 
were not considered foreigners, the ordonnance of 1945 thus would not have applied 
to them if they had sought to work in France. In reality, the colonial system still 
prevented circulation between the colonies and the metropole, so sub-Saharan 
African workers were not, at this point, considered as a viable source of metropoli-
tan labor even though they had been considered as a viable source of military man-
power during the two World Wars.
Table 2.2 (continued)
Date Name of law Consequence for irregularity
May 11, 
1998
Loi Chevènement/RESEDA Reformed system of 
residence permits to reinforce 
rights of migrant families
Enacted “on the fly” 
regularizations for those 




Loi Sarkozy: Loi n° 2003-1119 du 26 novembre 
2003 relative à la maîtrise de l’immigration, au 
séjour des étrangers en France et à la nationalité
Eased the expulsion process
Increased the period of 
detention for irregular 
migrants to 32 days
Reinstated strict controls on 
marriage with a foreign 
spouse
Increased waiting time for 
permanent residence permit
Made issuance of permanent 
and family-reunification 










Loi Sarkozy (II): Loi n° 2006-911 du 24 juillet 
2006 relative à l’immigration et à l’intégration
Allowed for some kinds of 
immigration choisie 
(high-skilled workers)
Repealed provision for 
regularization of long-term 
residents
Required contrat d’accueil et 
d’intégration for family 




Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République 
française et le Gouvernement de la République du 
Sénégal relatif à la gestion concertée des flux 
migratoires
Allowed issuance of 
residence permits for 
Senegalese with a job offer 
(even those irregularly 




During the post-war era, African political elites were debating the place of their 
societies in the French colonial system: while some leaders favored ongoing federa-
tion with the colonial power and the assimilation to the French polity and nation that 
it implied, others favored the independence of the colonies as sovereign nation- 
states. France decided to put the issue to a vote in 1958, when it proposed a new 
constitution that defined a new Communauté française. France organized a referen-
dum by which colonial territories were free to accept the constitution, and remain 
within the Communauté, or reject it and become an independent nation-state. 
Guinea, under the leadership of the trade unionist Sékou Touré, voted resoundingly 
to reject the constitution and became independent in 1958. Senegal and the other 
colonial territories remained in the Communauté, but the inexorable momentum 
was towards independence, which Senegal achieved in 1960, first as a federation 
with neighboring Mali and subsequently as a fully independent nation-state in 1962.
2.2.4  The 1960s: The Special Regime of the Bilateral Accord 
and Widespread Irregularity
 Senegalese Independence, the Preferential Regime, and “Immigration 
Sauvage”
France did not block its African territories from becoming independent but was 
concerned about protecting its colonial interests, giving rise to a series of bilateral 
treaties with the newly independent countries that defined the legal framework for 
circulation between and residence in the respective countries. One of the most 
important treaties was the “Convention d’établissement,” which stated that French 
nationals resident in Senegal had the same rights as Senegalese nationals, and vice 
versa. This reciprocity, called “assimilation au national”, notably guaranteed bilat-
eral freedom of entry and residence and free exercise of economic activities (Dedieu 
2011). While in some ways these provisions allowed for the continuation of French 
colonial citizenship for Senegalese nationals, the motive for this treaty was to pro-
tect the rights of French citizens in Senegal (Donovon 1988; Marot 1995). The 
practice of “assimilation au national” was enacted in a bilateral treaty signed by 
France and Senegal in 1964 that allowed for free circulation between the two coun-
tries and free establishment and exercise of professions for expatriates residing in 
the foreign country. Senegalese needed only an identity card and proof of vaccina-
tions to enter France, while formal work was subject to an employment contract 
approved by the Ministry of Labor and a medical exam at the French consulate in 
Senegal.
While the provisions of this treaty seem remarkably open, at the time it was seen 
as restrictive: the independence of Senegal and other African colonies had provoked 
what was seen as an “immigration sauvage” to the metropole, and the French 
authorities saw the requirement of identity documents, vaccination cards, and work 
contracts as an effective way to stem this flow (Bergues 1973; Diop 1993). Even 
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Senegalese authorities criticized this new flow of emigrants, and imposed an exit 
visa for Senegalese wishing to travel to France (Kane 2011). Thus, while Senegalese 
did not need a visa to enter France and did not need a residence permit to reside 
there, the requirement of an exit visa and of identity documents created the frame-
work for a kind of irregular status. Senegalese without identity documents would 
often enlist as crew or stow away on France-bound ships and would then enter 
France clandestinely when the ship docked at Bordeaux or Marseille. These migrants 
could be considered to have entered irregularly even though no visa was required 
(Bergues 1973). Senegalese migrants with identity documents would also circum-
vent the exit-visa requirement by traveling to neighboring African countries to other 
European countries before traveling to France (Bergues 1973). Senegalese and other 
former African subjects thus faced legal configurations that created the conditions 
for irregularity even during this early “preferential” regime (Lochak 1997).
There was increasing concern throughout the 1960s in France about the contin-
ued “immigration sauvage” of Senegalese and other sub-Saharan Africans despite 
their limited presence (Tapinos 1965 estimates the total “very low” sub-Saharan 
population at 35,000). Reports to the Conseil économique et social in 1964 and 
1968 highlighted the deplorable conditions under which many of these migrants 
lived, and articles in the popular press “discovered” these migrants and likened their 
situation to modern slavery (Diop 1993). A particular concern was the high rate of 
tuberculosis among sub-Saharan Africans in France; a series of circulars in 1968 
and 1969 thus reinforced the requirements of medical examinations prior to entry 
for work (Bergues 1973).
In addition to concerns about the health and living conditions of these migrants, 
there was a growing realization that many of the limited number of Africans resid-
ing in France arrived as tourists and subsequently found work and regularized their 
status after arrival. While the bilateral treaties only allowed Senegalese to enter 
France for work under cover of a formal work contract, the treaties did not allow 
Senegalese to be refused employment once in France. The treaties also did not 
require Senegalese to have a carte de séjour or a permis de travail. As a result, many 
Senegalese entered France on their identity cards (or those of others if they did not 
have their own) and simply looked for work once in France. The Ministry of the 
Interior thus sought to impose the obligation of a carte de séjour on Senegalese and 
other Africans who were subject to bilateral accords that exempted them from the 
general requirement to possess such an authorization (Spire 2005).
Unable to convince the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to push for the revision of the 
treaties, the Ministry of the Interior thus published a “note” in February 1970 
instructing border-control agents to interrogate Africans arriving at the border as to 
their motives for stay and their means of return to their home countries. If admitted, 
the African “tourist” would then be issued a “notice individuelle pour touriste 
étranger” (individual notice for foreign tourist) with the tourist’s civil status and 
expected length of stay in France. This document had to be presented to police dur-
ing identity checks, and formed that juridical basis for expulsion of the perceived 
increasing number of “clandestine” African migrants (Spire 2005). This immigration- 
control measure, of questionable legal validity because of the exemption of 
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Senegalese from general immigration requirements, thus provided French authori-
ties with a “back door” to combat this unwanted flow and transform migrants who 
were “regular” from the point of view of the treaties governing their status into 
“clandestine” migrants with “irregular” status. The French state thus took concrete 
steps in the 1960s to transform a legal flow of migrants into an irregular one in the 
pursuit of increased control.
 The General Regime: Post-facto Regularization as the Norm
At the same time that pressure was mounting to submit Senegalese and other former 
subjects from sub-Saharan Africa under stricter control, the general immigration- 
control regime started to come under criticism. During the post-war period—known 
in France as les trente glorieuses—irregularity among immigrants was widespread. 
From the end of World War II to the 1970s, illegal immigration was the de facto 
migration policy advocated by the French government. Throughout the 1950s and 
1960s, the ONI had the official monopoly on the introduction of foreign labor into 
France. In reality, however, direct hire of foreigners by employers and subsequent 
regularizations of status were the norm. This arrangement between employers and 
the state has its legal basis in a circular issued by the Ministry of Labor on April 18, 
1956, which put “regular” immigration organized by ONI and post-arrival regular-
ization procedures on the same plane, and encouraged regularization of workers in 
sectors where there were labor shortages (Spire 2005).
This leniency in the introduction of foreign labor was related to an economic 
recovery in 1955–1956 and the start of the war in Algeria, which drained native 
manpower from France and limited the ability of employers to recruit labor from 
North Africa. In the decade following the issuance of this circular, the vast majority 
of foreign workers in France underwent regularization after irregular arrival and 
irregular employment. Laubenthal (2007) reports that 80% of foreign workers in 
France at the end of the 1960s underwent this adjustment of status, and that the 
ONI’s role was effectively reduced to conducting post-arrival regularizations. 
Economic conditions—growth and the demand for flexible labor—thus created 
political tolerance of irregular migration, and the legal framework was adapted to 
allow these employers to hire and adjust the status of these flexible workers. 
Furthermore, most of the beneficiaries of this ongoing regularization regime were 
Portuguese, Spanish, or Italian, and Spire (2005) argues that this legal mechanism 
was motivated, in part, by a desire to counterbalance the ability of racially distinct 
former colonial subjects from Africa to enter and work in France without the need 
for official authorization.
An economic slowdown in 1965 pushed French authorities to reconsider this 
“spontaneous” immigration system that escaped the boundaries of formal immigra-
tion law. Post-arrival regularizations, which had been the lifeblood of French labor 
recruitment, were scaled back by a circular issued on July 29, 1968 by the Ministry 
of Social Affairs. While in legal terms this circular only called for a stricter applica-
tion of the laws already on the books (which did not allow for post-arrival 
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 regularizations), in practical terms it did start to impede regularizations, the rate of 
which dropped from 82% in 1968 to 60.3% in 1971 (CERC-Association 1999). The 
fact that this measure did not completely prevent regularization was due to the fact 
that it continued to allow Portuguese nationals and workers in certain sectors 
(including domestic workers) to be regularized. It is reasonable to assume that many 
Senegalese migrants experienced spells of irregularity during this period given the 
tolerance and even encouragement of unauthorized entry by both the state and 
employers.
 The End of Regularization and the Suspension of Labor Immigration
Further slowing of the economy and an increasing desire on the part of French 
authorities to control “irregular” migration—which was, in reality, produced by the 
administrative interpretation of the 1945 ordonnance—prompted additional restric-
tions on post-arrival regularizations in 1972. The Marcellin and Fontanet circulars, 
issued by the Ministries of Interior and Work, respectively, effectively limited regu-
larizations by requiring employers requesting the regularization of a foreign employee 
to post an offer for the foreigner’s job with the Agence national pour l’emploi 
(ANPE), allowing French nationals to apply for it (Spire 2005). These measures 
seem to have had their intended effect, as the regularization rate dropped below 60% 
in 1972 and 1973, although Portuguese were still exempt from these restrictions.
The 1972 circulars also undertook a major reform in the system of residence and 
work permits, which both reduced the ability of foreign workers to regularize their 
status after arrival and created new kinds of irregularity. The circulars envisaged a 
“guichet unique” where migrant workers would apply simultaneously for residence 
and work permits. These permits were to be issued for the same length of time, 
eliminating the possibility that migrants could have regular status in one legal 
domain and not the other. The circulars also subjected the issuance of a residence 
permit to the possession of a work permit: a foreigner applying for these authoriza-
tions filled out a single form and had to produce a work contract and a certificate of 
an offer of employment endorsed by the ANPE (Spire 2005). Workers without a 
formal work contract were unable to obtain authorization to work or reside in France 
and were ineligible for exceptional regularization procedures; these circulars, in 
attempting to create a system of stricter immigration control, thus transformed for-
merly regularizable workers into irregular migrants (Spire 2005).
2.2.5  The 1970s: The “Closing” of the French Border 
and the Erosion of the Bilateral Accord
Major changes to French immigration policy wrought by the economic crises in 
the 1970s would further erode the special status of Senegalese migrants in France 
granted by the independence-era bilateral accords. After almost three decades of 
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economic growth and relative prosperity, the oil shock of 1973 sent the world and 
French economies into a tailspin. Even before this climactic event, unemploy-
ment had been increasing and there was growing restlessness about the increasing 
number of foreign workers in France and the relative ease with which they entered 
the country and subsequently found jobs and regularized their situations 
(Laubenthal 2007).
In addition, France saw an increasing influx of foreigners from its former colo-
nies in North and West Africa, including Senegal. The economic situation in Senegal 
declined starting in the 1960s. A major drought started in 1969 while the world 
market for peanuts collapsed after the end of French price support; and the 1973 oil 
crisis combined with high population growth to reduce Senegal’s economic pros-
pects (Mezger Kveder 2012). Unlike the Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian immi-
grants of the early post-war period who were seen as having similar cultural values 
and were thus prized not only for labor purposes but also for demographic “re- 
peopling,” former colonial subjects such as those from Senegal were perceived as 
difficult to assimilate into the French polity and way of life (Spire 2005).
The French government responded to these economic and social pressures by 
unilaterally suspending labor immigration through a decision by the Council of 
Ministers on July 3, 1974. Administrative circulars “temporarily” put an end to the 
introduction of salaried workers on July 5 and to the introduction of applications for 
family reunification on July 9 of that year. The circulars officially activated the gov-
ernment’s ability to refuse applications for cartes de séjour based on the national 
employment situation (CERC-Association 1999). The suspension of family reunifi-
cation provisions, formalized in a decree issued on September 27, 1974, was rejected 
by the Conseil d’Etat and reunification procedures, under stricter lodging condi-
tions, were officially reinstated by the government on April 29, 1976 (CERC- 
Association 1999).
While the circulars contained exemptions to allow for the entry of foreign labor 
in sectors where the national labor supply was insufficient (Gokalp 1975), the “tem-
porary” suspension of labor immigration became de facto permanent over the course 
of the 1970s, with recourse to rejections of applications for residence and work 
permits because of the national employment situation increasingly common (CERC- 
Association 1999). Contemporaneous study of the impact of these measures indi-
cated that they had been successful in reducing entries, but also in increasing the 
irregularly resident population (Gokalp 1975).
In addition, in an effort to prevent immigrant workers from entering and working 
in France, all categories of foreigners wishing to enter the country—students, refu-
gees, reunified family members—faced suspicion of being “hidden workers” and 
thus underwent additional scrutiny from enhanced immigration-control systems 
(CERC-Association 1999). These administrative actions also actively created irreg-
ularity of status by denying residence and work authorizations, and the French state 
thus had to identify and deal with these irregular migrants by trying to repatriate or 
regularize them.
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 Establishment of the Carte de Séjour Requirements for Senegalese
The decision to suspend labor immigration further eroded the bilateral regime that 
defined the legal framework of Senegalese migration to France. The stricter control 
on migrant labor enacted in the 1972 and 1974 circulars reflected an increasing 
emphasis on border surveillance and the control of labor flows, which had long been 
marginalized by postwar immigration policy’s de facto tolerance of irregular immi-
gration and post hoc regularization (Spire 2005). The ability of Senegalese and 
other sub-Saharan Africans formerly under colonial control to enter and reside in 
France without authorization clashed with this new emphasis on the “maîtrise des 
flux” (immigration control) and so the Ministry of the Interior finally convinced the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to re-negotiate the treaties that created this preferential 
regime (Spire 2005). Senegal and France signed a re-negotiated bilateral accord on 
March 28, 1974 that required Senegalese staying in France for more than 3 months 
to “possess and produce upon demand” a titre de séjour (residence authorization) 
but did not require a visa for entering the country. Senegalese living in France as of 
January 1, 1974 were issued a renewable residence permit that would be valid for 
not less than 5 years.
While this bilateral accord was not ratified until December 19, 1975, the French 
Ministries of Labor and the Interior issued circulars on November 30, 1974 requir-
ing all nationals of sub-Saharan African states formerly under French administra-
tion to be in possession of a titre de séjour from January 1, 1975 onwards. Senegalese 
and some other African nationals were not required to apply for a separate carte de 
travail, but the circulars specified that the issuance of the titre de séjour was contin-
gent upon presentation of a government-approved work contract issued prior to the 
departure from the origin country. Family reunification was still allowed, but was 
conditional on a certificate of lodging and a medical exam of the family members 
(Gokalp 1975; Marot 1995; Viet 1998).
While the Interior and Labor circulars of 1974 respected some of the elements of 
the Franco-Senegalese treaty of 1974 (such as the issuance of a 5-year residence 
permit for Senegalese already residing in France, as opposed to a 3-year permit 
issued to other African nationals), they went beyond the scope of the accord by 
making a residence permit contingent on a work contract. The Conseil d’Etat can-
celed some of the measures in 1978, including the ability to reject applications 
based on the national employment situation (thus partially reaffirming the special 
status of former colonial subjects), but it reaffirmed the general principles that 
Senegalese and other former colonial subjects were required to have a titre de séjour 
and that this permit could be conditioned on having a formal work contract certified 
by the Ministry of Labor (Marot 1995).
The renegotiation of the bilateral accord and subsequent unilateral abrogation of 
the bilateral treaties previously on the books in 1974 thus moved the “preferential 
regime” for Senegalese much closer in line with the general regime. With labor 
immigration officially suspended, the work contract on which successful applications 
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for a residence permit depended would be almost impossible to acquire, thus effec-
tively limiting the ability of Senegalese to enter France for work. This requirement 
probably had only a small impact on the official flow of Senegalese workers to 
France, however, as their numbers were already limited by the difficulty, even prior 
to 1974, of acquiring a work contract (Bergues 1973).
The main impact of requiring a residence permit and making it conditional on a 
work contract would make it almost legally impossible for Senegalese who entered 
France as “tourists” to stay for more than 90 days. These modifications of the bilat-
eral regime thus created new possibilities for irregular status for Senegalese 
migrants: those entering legally as “tourists” would become irregular by staying 
past 90 days, and those Senegalese already in France as of 1974 would inevitably 
become irregular after the expiration of their first residence permit if unable to pres-
ent a formal work contract to accompany their application for renewal.
It is no coincidence that these modifications to the preferential regime occurred 
in 1974, a moment during which there was political and economic momentum for 
the closing of French borders to foreign workers. These modifications also drew on 
the innovations introduced by the Marcellin-Fontanet circulars of 1972, especially 
the concept of the “guichet unique,” which created a single residence and work 
permit and made residence authorization conditional on a formal work contract. At 
the same time, Senegalese and other sub-Saharan Africans were required to interact 
with the French administration via an “office of foreigners with special status,” 
often staffed by former colonial administrators with “expertise” in dealing with sub- 
Saharan Africans, thus indicating that the integration of these former subjects into 
the general regime was not yet complete (Spire 2005).
The rest of the 1970s saw the general immigration-control regime drift further 
towards policies of exclusion and surveillance. While the 1974 circulars had been 
effective at reducing immigration to France, they did not eliminate it completely, 
and those migrants that remained became more focused on settlement in France as 
the borders closed (Schain 2008). The French government thus decided in 1977 to 
suspend family reunification (reversed the following year by a decision of the 
Conseil d’Etat) and initiated policies to facilitate the “voluntary return” of migrants 
(Schain 2008).
Senegalese migration to France evolved as a result of these changes to French 
immigration policy in the 1970s. Restrictions on labor immigration encouraged 
settlement among formerly mobile Senegalese, and leading some single male 
migrants to bring wives and children via family reunification (although Beauchemin 
et al. 2013 suggest that Senegalese have been quite reluctant to reunify in Europe). 
Qualitative studies have also found visa overstaying among Senegalese to be preva-
lent since 1974 (Tall 2008).
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2.2.6  The 1980s: Immigration Policy as a Political Football 
and Consensus in Border Security
The alternation between right- and left-wing governments in the 1980s led immigra-
tion policy to experience multiple swings between restriction and liberalization but 
led to a convergence on the issue of border control that would eventually serve as 
the foundation for a complete abrogation of the special regime of the bilateral 
accords. The decade saw, for the first time, major revisions of the 1945 ordonnance 
governing the general immigration regime. The decade began with a re-entrenching 
of the exclusionary policies enacted in the 1974 circulars via the Bonnet law. Passed 
by a right-wing government in 1980, the law tightened entry requirements by requir-
ing repatriation guarantees and declared the entry or residence of “illegal” migrants 
to be a threat to public order (Schain 2008). The law also made expulsions of undoc-
umented migrants easier, even if they were minors or had family attachments 
(Schain 2008).
Further measures in the early 1980s targeted migrants resident in France as a 
threat to public order and laid the legal basis for their expulsion. The Peyrefitte law 
of 1981 increased the policing power of the state vis-à-vis migrants by allowing 
preventative identity checks of suspected undocumented migrants. A circular from 
the Ministry of Labor on June 10, 1980 encouraged the labor administration to 
invoke the national employment situation as a motive for refusing the renewal of 
work permits, which would make migrants ineligible for renewal of their residence 
permits; this motivation for refusal was even applied to those migrants who were 
still employed, effectively expelling them from France (CERC-Association 1999). 
Deportation became a primary tool of the French government for both combatting 
“clandestine” immigration and employment and making migrants’ stays in France 
precarious (Miller 1994). As Senegalese were subject to requirements for residence 
permits conditional upon work authorization from 1974 onward, these restrictive 
measures undoubtedly affected them as well.
The arrival of the left-wing Mitterrand government to power in 1981 inaugurated 
an era during which immigration policy was a political football for alternating left- 
and right-wing governments. Between August and October 1981, a series of reforms 
sought to roll back some of the restrictive measures of previous years: incentives to 
return were abolished; the government eliminated the provisions of the Bonnet law 
allowing the expulsion of minors and parents of French children or children born or 
arrived in France before the age of 10; and a vast regularization program adjusted 
the statuses of 132,000 migrants (CERC-Association 1999). The Dufoix law of July 
17, 1984 followed these liberalizing reforms with a complete revision of the system 
of residence permits, reducing their number to two.
The Dufoix law introduced a 10-year carte de résident, which granted work autho-
rization and was automatically renewable; this permit thus removed the obligation of 
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prior work authorization for settled immigrants and implicitly recognized the perma-
nent nature of immigration to France (Weil 1995). The law also defined a temporary 
carte de séjour with a maximum validity of 1 year. Foreigners wishing to work would 
still need a prior work authorization, but a foreigner not wishing to work in France 
could be authorized to stay without working upon proof of adequate means of exis-
tence (CERC-Association 1999). The guichet unique of the 1972 Marcellin-Fontanet 
circulars was thus enshrined in legislation, abolishing the duality of residence and 
work permits while making the former dependent on the latter.
Despite these reforms, some of the previous government’s restrictive measures 
were maintained, including preventative identity checks and the retention and forced 
expulsion of some migrants (CERC-Association 1999). Additional restrictive 
reforms were initiated under the right-wing “cohabitation” government led by 
Prime Minister Chirac from 1986 to 1988. The first Pasqua law of 1986 facilitated 
expulsion procedures and restricted access to 10-year permits (Schain 2008). The 
resumption of a left-wing parliamentary majority in 1988 led to the Joxe law of 
1989 that eased some of the restrictive measures of Pasqua’s law.
Regardless of the political and legislative jousting over immigration, there was 
an increasing convergence between the left and right on issues of border security: 
while opposed on issues of immigrant integration and security of residence, both 
sides seemed to find political utility in securing the frontier through increased exter-
nal controls, rejection of asylum claims, and increased police control and occasional 
roundups of suspected undocumented immigrants (Schain 2008).
2.2.7  Visa Requirements for Senegalese and the Re-negotiated 
Bilateral Accord of 1995
 Unilateral Imposition of Visa Requirements in 1986
The evolution across the political spectrum towards a system of hardline external 
controls led to fundamental changes to the bilateral immigration regime with 
Senegal. Against a backdrop of terrorist attacks in Paris, the French government 
unilaterally suspended, via a notice from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 
September 16, 1986, the clauses of bilateral treaties exempting Senegalese and 
other sub-Saharan Africans from visas for entry to France (Marot 1995). While this 
measure initially applied to Americans, Canadians, and EU nationals as well as 
nationals of former French colonies, the French government would subsequently 
exempt citizens of developed countries, thus creating a system of external controls 
for developing countries deemed to present a “migratory risk.” This measure added 
external control to the Senegalese immigration-control system. Following the 
requirements that Senegalese possess residence and work permits in 1974, the 1986 
abrogation of the treaty and requirement of visas moved the Senegalese immigra-
tion regime yet another step closer to integration with the general regime.
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 New Bilateral Accord
The abrogation of the independence-era accord in 1986 and the establishment of 
entry visas for Senegalese opened the door to further alignment of the bilateral sys-
tem with the general regime. While the Franco-Senegalese treaty of 1974 instituted 
requirements for residence permits, the unilateral imposition of visa requirements 
by the French government in 1986 was at odds with the existing accord. A new 
treaty was thus signed by France and Senegal on August 1, 19951 that codified the 
visa requirements of 1986. Senegalese wishing to enter France for a stay of less than 
3 months had to apply for a visa and show both proof of means of existence during 
the stay and a return-trip ticket to Senegal. For stays longer than 3  months, 
Senegalese had to apply for a long séjour (long-stay) visa. If they wished to work 
upon arrival, the treaty required them to have an approved work contract prior to 
departure in addition to a long-stay visa.
This new system of visas for Senegalese mirrored the visa requirements of the 
Schengen system. An inter-ministerial committee decided on July 10, 1991 to pro-
mulgate as official policy the “control of migratory flows” (maîtrise des flux migra-
toires) in keeping with France’s 1990 accession to the Schengen treaty and its 
stringent border-control requirements. These developments led to a new push to 
revise the bilateral treaties with African states. The Senegalese treaty required a 
residence permit for all stays in France exceeding 3 months. While the exact regula-
tions governing granting of this permit were not specified, it is likely that they were 
subject to the prevailing legislation regarding residence permits (i.e., that they were 
conditioned on having a formal work contract or proof of means of existence). The 
only nod to the formerly privileged status of Senegalese was the provision for grant-
ing a 10-year titre de séjour after continued regular residence of 3 years as opposed 
to 5 years in the prevailing legislation; Senegalese were otherwise subject to provi-
sions in line with the general immigration regime.
2.2.8  The 1990s: Pasqua, Debré, and the Sans-Papiers 
Movement
The 1990s brought both increased emigration pressure to Senegal and further align-
ment of the Senegalese immigration framework with general French policies. 
Senegal agreed to implement a series of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in 
the 1980s and 1990s, which aggravated urban poverty and produced unsatisfactory 
macroeconomic outcomes (Mezger Kveder 2012). The Senegalese currency, the 
CFA franc, was devalued in 1994. Although this move restored some competitive-
ness to the Senegalese economy and improved monetary measures of poverty, 
survey results suggest that the majority of Senegalese perceived their economic 
1 Although signed in 1995, the treaty was not published in the Journal officiel de la République 
Française until March 12, 2002.
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well-being to have stagnated or deteriorated in the late 1990s (Mezger Kveder 
2012). During this mostly negative economic evolution, Senegal became a net 
exporter of migrants.
French immigration policy in the 1990s further increased restrictions on 
Senegalese and other sub-Saharan African migrants via the Pasqua and Debré laws. 
The right-wing cohabitation government headed by Balladur in 1993 overtly pro-
claimed a goal of “immigration zéro” (Hollifield 1999), which was translated into 
legislation by the second Pasqua law. The goal of this law was to roll back proce-
dural and social rights for immigrants in France and limit their ability to settle in the 
country (Hollifield 1999).
The law also created new forms of legal precarity for a number of categories of 
migrants: it made acquisition of French citizenship more difficult for children born 
in France, facilitated the expulsion of undocumented foreigners, increased waiting 
time to 2 years for family reunification, prohibited the regularization of undocu-
mented migrants who married a French citizen, made the issuance of residence 
permits dependent on the regularity of entry and prior stay, and denied re-entry for 
1 year for expelled foreigners (Hollifield 1999; Schain 2008; Wihtol de Wenden 
2002). This law, in pursuing a zero-tolerance strategy on immigration, thus created 
new pathways into irregularity by making it more difficult to gain and maintain 
regular status.
The Pasqua law also created contradictory legal situations for many migrants in 
which they were “ni régularisable ni expulsable” (neither regularizable nor deport-
able). Such migrants were not eligible for renewal of status because of the restric-
tions in the Pasqua law, but also could not legally be deported, often because of 
other provisions in existing laws that protected migrants who had resided in France 
for a long time or those with “attachments” in France from being deported (Hollifield 
1999). Of particular consequence for Senegalese and other African migrants were 
restrictions on accessing and renewing residence permits for polygamous families, 
which forced “secondary” spouses to choose either divorce and “décohabitation,” 
remaining in a polygamous union and falling into irregular status, or returning to 
Africa (Alaux 2001).
Choosing to remain in a polygamous marriage would mean falling into the gray 
zone of being neither regularizable nor deportable for both secondary spouses and 
their husbands: they would not be eligible for renewal of residence permits, but they 
could not be deported since most had minor children who qualified their parents for 
protection. While not all Senegalese families were polygamous, the law certainly 
drew on public anxieties about African polygamy to restrict this family form, echo-
ing the debate from the colonial administration in Senegal that saw polygamy as 
incompatible with French citizenship.
The contradictions inherent in the Pasqua law gave rise to the sans-papiers 
movement of 1996. This movement was made up of Senegalese and other West 
Africans, many of whom were neither regularizable nor deportable because of the 
Pasqua law. More than 300 migrants camped in two different churches in Paris 
between March and August 1996 to bring public attention to their legal plight 
(Marin 2006). They demanded that the government recognize the absurdity of their 
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administrative situations and offer pathways to regular status. The occupation of the 
Saint-Bernard church ended dramatically with the French National Police in riot 
gear chopping down the wooden door and forcibly evacuating the sans-papiers, but 
not before garnering national attention that spurred 10,000 people to march in Paris 
in support of their cause in February 1997 (Marin 2006; Terray 2006).
The government, led by then-President Chirac, responded in April 1997 with 
another modification of the 1945 ordonnance. The Debré law, although it sought to 
resolve some of the “ni…ni” contradictions of the Pasqua law highlighted by the 
sans-papiers movement, actually contained provisions that would make it “impos-
sible for most of the protesters to regularize their status” (Schain 2008: 54). While 
French-born minor children of irregular migrants and foreign spouses of French 
citizens with irregular status could neither receive an adjustment of status under the 
Pasqua law nor be deported because of their family attachments, the Debré law set 
the bar unrealistically high for regularization of these categories of migrants. 
“Foreign” children under the age of 16 would have to demonstrate 10 years of con-
tinuous residence in France before being granted a 1-year residence permit, and 
“foreign” spouses had to have been married for 2 years before being eligible for the 
same 1-year permit (Hollifield 1999; Schain 2008). The law thus prolonged the 
duration of irregularity for these “ni…ni” migrants with strong family links to 
France. The Debré law also increased the state’s surveillance power of suspected 
irregular migrants: it allowed the confiscation of the passports of migrants in an 
irregular situation, the storage of fingerprints of foreigners applying for a residence 
permit, increased police power, and restricted judicial power in matters of retention 
of irregular migrants (Hollifield 1999).
Hollifield argues that one of the underlying intents of the Pasqua and Debré laws 
was to “devise a system for controlling entries by Africans” (1999: 83). The Pasqua 
law’s targeting of polygamous families was clearly aimed at African migrants, and 
its hardening of the barriers to legal stay and acquisition of citizenship for children 
of irregular migrants demonstrated a desire to uproot entire families. Early versions 
of the Debré law required French citizens to report the presence of any foreigners 
hosted in their domicile, with a number of countries exempted except for those in 
Africa (Schain 2008). While these provisions were softened in the final version of 
the law, the intent was clearly to make it more difficult for Africans to reside in 
France. This system allowed the French government to control African immigration 
without resorting to American-style numerical quotas, which would have clashed 
with republican ideals of egalitarianism in visa requirements for citizens of develop-
ing countries and also would have been seen as discriminatory towards former colo-
nies (Hollifield 1999).
The election of a socialist majority to the Assembly in 1997 led to another period 
of political cohabitation, this time with the right maintaining control of the presi-
dency and the left gaining control of the office of Prime Minister. The Jospin gov-
ernment gave a high priority to immigration reform, promising to resolve the 
ambiguities of status created by the legal labyrinths of the Pasqua-Debré laws and 
re-establishing the republican foundations of immigration. The Interior Minister 
issued a circular on June 24, 1997 instructing préfets to proceed with case-by-case 
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regularizations with provisions for the adjustment of status of spouses with irregular 
status and children of migrants with irregular status (Levinson 2005a).
A direct result of the sans-papiers movement and its widespread public support, 
this regularization program attracted 150,000 applications and eventually adjusted 
the status of 90,000 people, 85% of whom were regularized for family reasons 
(Levinson 2005a; Terray 2006). These regularizations, however, only allowed the 
granting of temporary, 1-year permits, thus prolonging the precarity of many groups 
of migrants and imposing the paradoxical burden of having to document their previ-
ous irregular status in order to gain access to more permanent residence permits 
(GISTI 2011).
While the 1997 regularization program sought to quickly resolve some of the 
contradictions of the Pasqua-Debré laws, the Jospin government also passed legisla-
tion to alter those laws. Drawing on the recommendations from a committee headed 
by Patrick Weil, a French historian of immigration, the 1998 Chevènement law (also 
known as the RESEDA law) included broad changes in the system of issuing resi-
dence permits designed to reinforce the rights of migrant families in France: minors 
brought to France for family reunification, foreigners who entered France before the 
age of 10, foreign parents of French children, and foreign spouses of French nation-
als would all receive initial 1-year residence permits (Hollifield 1999). The law also 
included a provision granting a residence permit to any foreigner able to prove resi-
dence in France for 10 years (Hollifield 1999). This provision gave rise to ongoing 
régularisations au fil de l’eau (“on-the-fly regularizations”) during the following 
decade in which migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are over-represented (Lessault 
and Beauchemin 2009). The Jospin government also reformed the nationality code 
with the Guigou law of 1998, which reinstated limited jus soli provisions: individu-
als born in France could obtain French nationality at the age of 18 if they had lived 
in France for at least 5 years after age 11, or parents could request naturalization for 
minors as early as age 13 if the child had lived continuously in France for 5 years 
(i.e., since age 8) (Hollifield 1999).
Despite these changes and the assertions of the Jospin government that immigra-
tion was in keeping with the French republican tradition, the 1997–1998 laws con-
tinued many of the restrictive policies of the 1980s, including tightened visa 
requirements and provisions for detention and expulsion of irregular migrants 
(Schain 2008). Indeed, Schain (2008) argues that the trend in immigration policy in 
France has been towards a commitment to certain forms of control regardless of 
which political party holds office. This commitment has mostly been towards exclu-
sion of immigrants, with right-wing governments tending towards tightening exist-
ing requirements; left-wing governments, on the other hand, have not attempted to 
roll back exclusionary restrictions but have merely increased judicial oversight 
(Schain 2008).
By 1997, then, the former preferential regime allowing free circulation of 
Senegalese had been completely dismantled by successive re-negotiations of trea-
ties, and the general immigration-control system was modified in such a way as to 
limit entries of Senegalese and to make it difficult for them to stay and work legally 
in France. Thus the trend of the immigration-control system vis-à-vis Senegalese 
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towards restriction has paralleled a similar movement in the overall regime. Some 
research points to the decline of the immigration of demographically valuable 
southern European migrants and the increase in racially and religiously distinct 
immigration from the former colonies as a main driver of this exclusionary impulse 
(Hollifield 1999); thus the evolution of restrictions on African migration to France 
cannot be separated from the exclusionary trend in the general immigration-control 
regime.
2.2.9  The 2000s: Selective Immigration and Coordinated 
Migration Management
Reorientation of French policy towards further restriction and selective immigration 
in the early 2000s gave rise to a new round of bilateral accords with Senegal and 
other countries that aimed at cooperative management of “unwanted” immigration 
flows in exchange for the opening of pathways to “wanted” immigration flows. 
Interior Minister Sarkozy pushed for a 2003 law in the wake of Chirac’s 2002 face- 
off with Jean-Marie Le Pen that toughened the provisions of the 1998 Chevènement 
legislation by easing the expulsion process and increasing the period of detention 
for irregular migrants to 32 days (Schain 2008). In addition, it reinstated some pro-
visions of the Pasqua-Debré laws that the Chevènement law had abolished, such as 
the granting mayors the power to refuse entry to foreigners and strict controls on 
marriage with a foreign spouse. It also increased the waiting time for a permanent 
residence permit, and made the issuance of permanent and family-reunification per-
mits contingent on proof of “good integration” (Schain 2008). As the 1945 ordon-
nance regulating immigration to France had seen 23 revisions (including 11 since 
the mid-1990s), the French government decided to consolidate the post-war mea-
sure into the “Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile” 
(CESEDA) in 2005.
A second Sarkozy law was passed by the right in 2006 that reinforced some of 
the restrictive measures of the 2003 law while opening France to new kinds of 
immigration. The law allowed for some kinds of immigration choisie (selective 
immigration), mainly higher-skilled workers. This was paired with further restric-
tions on immigration subie (uncontrolled or non-selective immigration), including 
the requirement of the agreement to a contrat d’accueil et d’intégration (welcome 
and integration contract) for the issuance of family-reunification permits or perma-
nent residence permits and the repeal of the provision for regularization of long- 
term residents and.
The push for selective immigration undergirded a new round “accords relatifs à 
la gestion concertée des flux migratoires et au codéveloppement” (“accords relating 
to the joint management of migratory flows and to codevelopment”), which ostensi-
bly aimed to include developing countries such as Senegal in the coordinated man-
agement of migration flows. The French government founded these accords on the 
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organization of some kinds of legal immigration, the fight against illegal immigra-
tion, and increased co-development efforts (see Kabbanji 2013 for an analysis of 
co-development programs). Senegal and France signed such a treaty on September 
23, 2006 and it came into force on September 1, 2009. The treaty included provi-
sions for issuance of residence permits that would permit a salaried activity to 
Senegalese with a job offer in any of ten listed professions (La Cimade 2009). While 
some of these professions, such as those in information technology, banking, and 
medicine, demanded high levels of skill and training, the list contained other, less- 
skilled professions in industry, agriculture, construction and building trades, and 
services (security, hairstyling, etc.).
In addition, the accord indicated that these residence permits were available to all 
Senegalese with a job offer in these professions, including those irregularly resident 
in France (La Cimade 2009). The treaty included provisions for Senegalese students 
in France and allowed for special categories of visas for business people, academics, 
scientists, artists, and athletes. As a counterweight to these measures to facilitate 
legal immigration, the treaty introduced new mechanisms for fighting illegal immi-
gration. It included a readmission clause, whereby Senegal agreed to facilitate the 
return of Senegalese nationals found to be residing irregularly in France. The treaty 
also promised €2.5 million in funds for development projects and measures to 
encourage Senegalese migrants in France to invest their savings in businesses in 
Senegal (La Cimade 2009).
This new generation of treaties has come under fire for multiple reasons. Many 
of the measures for promoting legal immigration were already part of the CESEDA 
(such as the availability of visas for artists, scholars, athletes and other highly skilled 
professionals and a basic list of professions which were open to foreigners) (La 
Cimade 2009). Of more concern was the linking of increased control of irregular 
migration with development aid: it seemed that France was exchanging relatively 
meager sums and vague promises of co-development for readmission agreements 
that, in many ways, violated human rights (La Cimade 2009). Selective immigration 
as conceived under the 2006 Sarkozy law thus seemed to serve as rhetorical device 
for severely controlling migration from Africa while the bilateral accords paid lip 
service to the “special relationship” between France and her former colonial 
possessions.
2.3  Senegalese Migration to New Destinations in Southern 
Europe
The closing of the French border in the 1970s, high French unemployment, and the 
restructuring of French industries in the 1980s conspired with long-term economic 
decline in Senegal to lead Senegalese migrants to seek out new destinations in 
Southern Europe (Riccio 2008; Schoumaker et al. 2013). Senegalese migrants also 
responded to the demand for inexpensive and flexible workers in the secondary and 
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informal labor markets as well as the relative ease of residential integration into 
Italy and Spain (Fall 2005; Pascual de Sans et al. 2000). These new destinations also 
attracted migrants from different social origins than earlier waves of labor migrants 
to France. Instead of originating in the rural Senegal River valley, migrants to Italy 
and Spain have tended to come from the predominantly Wolof zones of western 
Senegal and its urban areas (Schoumaker et al. 2013). In addition, the social net-
works that amplified this movement were embedded in religious affiliations, with 
the Senegalese Mouride Islamic brotherhood providing spiritual motivation and 
material support to its adherents in the new destinations (Babou 2002; Ebin 1992). 
Figure 2.1 shows the increasing importance of these new destinations: while stocks 
of Senegalese in France remain higher than those in Southern Europe, the number 
of Senegalese resident in Italy and Spain has grown dramatically since the 1990s 
(Mezger Kveder 2012).
Migration flows in general to Italy and Spain were rare prior to the 1970s, and 
neither country had effective immigration policies before the mid-1980s (Laubenthal 
2007; Pascual de Sans et  al. 2000). The accumulation of a large stock of illegal 
immigrants prior to these policies also necessitated a series of legalization pro-
grams, and each country has embarked on six regularization efforts since 1985 
(Kraler 2009). There is some speculation that regularization programs in both coun-
tries actually attracted the first Senegalese migrants to these new destinations (Fall 
2005; Kaag 2008; Tall 2008). These programs have undoubtedly had an impact on 








































Fig. 2.1 Senegalese migrant stocks in France, Italy, and Spain (country of birth). Reproduced 
from Mezger Kveder (2012). Sources: United Nations Global Migration Database (UNGMD): 
France 1982, 1990; Spain 1990; Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques: 
France 1999, 2005, 2007; Istat: Italy 1992–2008; Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración a partir de 
datos suministrados por Ministerio del Interior: Spain 1996–2008
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Spain’s 1991–1992 program were from Africa (Pascual de Sans et al. 2000), and 
Senegalese are among the most numerous participants in Italy’s regularization pro-
grams (de Haas 2008).2 Despite granting legal status, many of these regularization 
programs required renewal every few years, often leaving Senegalese migrants’ 
legal status precarious and temporary.
The next two sections trace the development of immigration policies in Italy and 
Spain.
2.4  Italy
2.4.1  Pre-1986: Italian Emigration and the Fragmentation 
of Immigration Policy
The history of Italy’s immigration-control policies is much more recent than 
France’s and lacks almost all of France’s bilateral relationship with Senegal. Most 
accounts of Italy’s immigration policy emphasize that the country was, up until the 
1970s, a net sender of migrants and thus had little practical need for a well- 
established system to control immigration (Sciortino 1999). Fascist-era laws 
between 1929 and 1931 dealt mostly with political immigration as a public-security 
issue and subsequent measures were fragmentary and mainly in the form of admin-
istrative circulars (Mezger and González-Ferrer 2013; Sciortino 1999).
 Mechanisms of Internal Control
Despite this fragmentation, a law in 1961 (Legge 1961-5) repealing restrictions on 
internal migration allowed for the introduction of foreign labor through employer 
application to a local employment office (see Table 2.3 at the end of Sect. 2.4 for a 
synthesis of the evolution of immigration policy in Italy). If native workers were not 
available, the employment office was to issue a labor permit (autorzzazione al 
lavoro) and the foreigner could apply for a visa to enter Italy. The worker was issued 
a permesso di soggiorno per motivi di lavoro that was linked to a specific contract, 
meaning that residence authorization would end with the expiration of the contract 
(Sciortino 1999). This early law adumbrated some of the features of future Italian 
immigration-control policy, including the state brokerage of labor migration and the 
conditioning of residence permits on work authorizations and formal contracts.
Labor migration to Italy nonetheless remained limited through the 1980s, and 
most internal controls consisted of police checks for the “morality” and public order 
of immigrants (Sciortino 1999). Another law in 1981 was motivated by the 
2 Sub-Saharan Africans were also overrepresented in France’s recent regularization programs 
(Lessault and Beauchemin 2009).
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Table 2.3 Synthesis of major immigration measures in Italy and consequences for migrant 
irregularity
Date Name of law Consequence for irregularity
February 
10, 1961
Legge 1961-5: Abrogazione della legislazione 
sulle migrazioni interne e contro l’urbanesimo 
nonchè disposizioni per agevolare la mobilità 
territoriale dei lavoratori
Allowed for the introduction 
of foreign labor through 




Circolare n. 38, Ministero degli Affari Esteri Exempted Senegalese citizens 
from visa requirements for 
entering Italy
Required Senegalese to 
“regularize their position” if 
they intended to “settle”
April 10, 
1981
Legge 1981-158: Ratifica ed esecuzione delle 
convenzioni numeri 92, 133 e 143 
dell’Organizzazione internazionale del lavoro
Ratified ILO convention on 
rights of migrant workers
March 2, 
1982
Circolare del Ministero del lavoro n. 14194/IR/A: 
Accesso all’impiego di lavoratori extracomunitari




Legge 1986-943: Norme in materia di 
collocamento e di trattamento dei lavoratori 
extracomunitari immigrati e contro le 
immigrazioni clandestine
Created framework for 
introduction of foreign labor
February 
28, 1990
Legge Martelli 1990-39 Introduced visa requirements 
for Senegal and other 
countries
Allowed expulsion for the 
management of irregular 
migration
Continued recruitment of 
labor with yearly quota decree
Required foreigners to apply 





Decreto-legge Dini 1995-489: Disposizioni urgenti 
in materia di politica dell’immigrazione e per la 
regolamentazione dell’ingresso e soggiorno nel 
territorio nazionale dei cittadini dei Paesi non 
appartenenti all’Unione europea
Increased border-control 





Legge Turco-Napolitano 40-1998: Disciplina 
dell’immigrazione e norme sulla condizione dello 
straniero
Organized the entry of foreign 
labor via a yearly quota 
decree
Defined temporary 2-year 
residence permits for work






 ratification of the International Labour Organization convention on the rights of 
migrant workers but did not respond to then-increasing levels of immigration. The 
Ministry of Labor put a freeze on the issuance of work permits in 1982 in an effort 
to clamp down on irregular employment, which ultimately led to an increase in such 
employment (Sciortino 1999).
 Mechanisms of External Control
Italy’s system of external control was likewise limited during most of the twentieth 
century. While visas were technically required for entry to Italy, implementation of 
this requirement seems to have been “lax” into the 1970s (Sciortino 1999). 
Senegalese in particular were exempted from the visa requirement beginning in 
1966. Following an exchange of diplomatic notes between Italy and Senegal, the 
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a circular on September 17, 1966 exempt-
ing Senegalese citizens from visa requirements for entering Italy (Mezger and 
González-Ferrer 2013). This exemption was motivated by Senegal’s previous deci-
sion to extend the regime of free circulation with France to all members of the 
European Common Market, including Italy; the Italian circular was thus reciprocal 
in nature and dependent on the bilateral relationship between Senegal and France. 
Despite exempting Senegalese from visa formalities, the circular still required them 
to “regularize their position” if they intended to “settle” in Italy.
While there is little information on Senegalese in Italy prior to the 1980s, some 
earlier accounts (Bergues 1973) indicate that Italy may have been a stepping stone 
in Senegalese migrants’ journeys to France, perhaps because of this preferential 
visa regime. As mentioned above, Senegalese officials in the 1960s were concerned 
about the effects of emigration given the bilateral regime of free circulation between 
Table 2.3 (continued)
Date Name of law Consequence for irregularity
July 30, 
2002
Legge Bossi-Fini 2002-189: Modifica alla 
normativa in materia di immigrazione e di asilo
Reformed the quota system to 
steer entries towards seasonal 
work
Tied length of residence 
permit to work permit and 
subjected renewal of 
residence permit to a formal 
work contract





Decreto-legge 2011-89 Allowed additional 
governmental discretion in 
case-by-case expulsions of 
migrants found to be illegally 
residing in Italy
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France and Senegal, and thus imposed the requirement of an exit visa for trips to 
France (Bergues 1973; Kane 2011). The same exit visa was not required for trips to 
Italy and other countries, so Senegalese occasionally traveled to Italy, which they 
were able to enter freely, and subsequently entered France under the conditions of 
the France-Senegal bilateral regime (Bergues 1973).
2.4.2  1986–1998: National-Level Immigration Policy 
and “Moral Panic”
Italy passed its first major national-level legislation on immigration in December 
1986. The legge 1986-943 outlined the rights of non-European Community foreign 
workers and formalized the “neo-corporatist” framework (Sciortino 1999) for the 
introduction of foreign labor that the 1961 law had sketched. A specialized division 
within the Ministry of Labor was responsible for keeping lists of both job vacancies 
and non-EU foreigners residing outside of and looking for work in Italy. This divi-
sion would match foreign workers with vacancies if no native workers were avail-
able for the jobs, and provincial labor offices would then issue a work permit 
(autorizzazione al lavoro) that would allow the foreigner to apply for a visa to enter 
Italy. While the law does not specify how migrant workers would obtain residence 
permits, it does specify that work permits were valid for 2 years and that loss of a 
job prior to the expiration of the work permit was not grounds for revoking the resi-
dence permit. Unemployed migrants were encouraged to register on lists of job 
seekers so that they could be matched with vacancies.
This law, while initially seen as a positive step towards the construction of a 
rational immigration policy, ultimately created additional pathways into irregular 
status. The measure allowing unemployed migrants to stay in Italy and register as 
unemployed was motivated by a desire to give migrant workers more autonomy 
from employers, but it actually created a pseudo-legal category for migrants work-
ing in the shadow economy (Sciortino 1999): in an effort to avoid paying taxes and 
social insurance, migrants would register as unemployed and continue working 
informally. The law also contained provisions for the adjustment of status of for-
eigners with ongoing or past irregular employment with employers willing to regu-
larize them (Reyneri 1998); applications initially had to be submitted within 
3  months of the law’s passage, but the deadline was extended into 1988 and 
 eventually regularized the status of more than 118,000 people. Nonetheless, many 
migrants did not qualify for regularization, and new arrivals added to the resident 
population of migrants with irregular status (Sciortino 1999).
The next Italian law on immigration sought to deal with irregular migration by 
tightening external controls and security procedures coupled with numerical plan-
ning of labor entries. Legge 39 of 1990 (the “Martelli Law”), motivated in part by 
Italy’s recent signing of the Schengen agreement and concomitant desire to reassure 
other European countries of the integrity of its borders, introduced visa requirements 
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for many countries and made expulsion a tool for the management of irregular 
migration (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009). Indeed, it was at this time that the visa 
exemption for Senegal and other “immigration-risky countries” was rescinded 
(Sciortino 1999). In addition, the law continued the neo-corporatist recruitment of 
foreign labor by defining a yearly decreed quota of legal entries (Finotelli and 
Sciortino 2009).
In addition to these external controls, the law reformed the system of internal 
control by defining the conditions for access to the residence permit (permesso di 
soggiorno). Foreigners staying in Italy for purposes other than tourism needed to 
apply for a residence permits within 8 days of arrival; the permit, available only to 
those who entered legally, could last for up to 2 years and was renewable. The law 
also included a liberal regularization program open to any foreigners residing in 
Italy before December 31, 1989, which adjusted the statuses of 234,841 migrants 
(Sciortino 1999). This patchwork of restrictive controls on entries combined with 
rigid planning tools and a liberal regularization program led to the law’s ineffective-
ness. With regard to the yearly quota, many employers and foreign workers found 
the process cumbersome, leading to the informal hiring of irregular migrants 
(Finotelli and Sciortino 2009).
Growing “moral panic” (Sciortino 1999) over increasing immigration paralyzed 
further attempts at immigration-policy reform during most of the decade of the 
1990s. The government passed an executive decree (the “Dini decree,” decreto- 
legge 489) in 1995 that included both harsh border-control measures (expulsions 
and rejections) to please the populist right-wing Lega Nord (Northern League) and 
a regularization program to mollify the left (Sciortino 1999). The decree was not 
enacted within 60 days as mandated by the constitution, so it was re-issued several 
times over the following year with the same fate (Sciortino 1999). Nonetheless, the 
government went ahead with the decree’s regularization program, which was stricter 
than the Martelli amnesty: applicants had to prove that they had been residing in 
Italy, regularly employed during the past 6 months or with an employment offer, and 
had paid 3 months of social security contributions (Levinson 2005b). Despite these 
more stringent conditions, the program adjusted the status of 238,000 foreign work-
ers from 1995 to 1996 (Levinson 2005b).
The passage of legge 40 in 1998, also known as the Turco-Napolitano law, put an 
end to the legislative impasse on immigration policy. Motivated in part by the long- 
awaited accession of Italy to the Schengen zone, this law attempted to offer a com-
prehensive framework for both management and control measures (Finotelli and 
Sciortino 2009). The law once again organized the entry of foreign labor via a yearly 
quota decree. Employers would request a work permit (autorizzazione al lavoro) 
and entry visa within the quota system, potentially for a specific foreigner who 
could then apply for the visa abroad. Unlike previous Italian quota systems, though, 
the Turco-Napolitano law did not require proof of the lack of suitable Italian work-
ers (Reyneri 2004). This requirement had effectively limited legal entries under the 
quota system to less than 25,000 per year before 1999, making it extremely difficult 
to enter Italy legally for work (Reyneri 2004).
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In addition to re-establishing the quota system, the law also attempted to pro-
mote the integration of migrants by stabilizing their residence situations. Foreigners 
arriving for work would enter Italy with a visa based on the pre-existing autorizza-
zione al lavoro and apply for a 2-year permesso di soggiono per lavoro subordinato 
after arrival. The law defined different lengths for the permesso depending on the 
motive for the stay: six to 9 months for seasonal work; 1 year for study; and 2 years 
for self-employment, indefinite-contract employment, and family reunification. 
Unemployed workers were allowed to keep their residence permits if they registered 
as unemployed. In addition, the law introduced an indefinite residence permit (carta 
di soggiorno) accessible after 5  years of legal residence (Finotelli and Sciortino 
2009). The implementation of the law also included a regularization program open 
to unauthorized immigrants present in Italy before March 27, 1998, which ulti-
mately adjusted the status of 193,200 of over 300,000 applicants (Levinson 2005b).
While the Turco-Napolitano law promoted the legal entry, residence, and work 
of migrants, it also included measures to strengthen border control, make irregular 
entry more difficult, and facilitate expulsion via readmission agreements (Finotelli 
and Sciortino 2009). Despite these restrictive measures, the law was unable to deal 
with the strategy of visa overstaying, which was overtaking clandestine entry as an 
irregular migration strategy (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009).
2.4.3  The 2000s: “Strong Restrictive Ambition”
The Bossi-Fini law of 2002 (legge 189), passed by the second Berlusconi govern-
ment, was “inspired by a strong restrictive ambition” (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009: 
126). The law reformed the quota and internal-control systems so as to limit legal 
entries. Political discretion in the definition of yearly quotas increased, with the goal 
of steering legal entries towards temporary, seasonal work. The law subjected resi-
dence permits to increased administrative scrutiny through decreased length, and 
also tied the length of the residence permit to the work permit via the contratto di 
soggiorno per lavoro (residence contract for work) (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009). 
This contract, signed by the employer and the employee after recruitment through 
the quota system, required employers to pay housing and repatriation costs and 
allowed foreigners to apply for a permesso di soggiorno per motivi di lavoro (resi-
dence permit for reasons of work), valid 1  year for fixed-duration contracts and 
2 years for unlimited-duration contracts. This law also made renewal of residence 
permits contingent on having a formal work contract, potentially subjecting many 
migrants to spells of irregularity (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009).
In addition to limiting legal entries, the Bossi-Fini law sought to combat irregular 
immigration through the increasing severity of external controls. These included 
granting powers to the Navy to control ships at sea suspected of carrying potential 
clandestine migrants, increasing the maximum detention time for irregular migrants 
to 60  days, and levying steeper sanctions on migrant traffickers and smugglers 
(Finotelli and Sciortino 2009). Despite these increased external controls and the 
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law’s restrictive ambition, the legislation also included yet another massive regular-
ization program. While framed as a “humanitarian” amnesty for undocumented 
caretakers of children and the elderly, the program only required work documenta-
tion in the form of 3  months of pension contributions and proof of continued 
employment (Levinson 2005b). The program adjusted the status of 634,700 of 
700,000 applicants by granting them 1-year residence permits, with a possible 
extension of 6 months if the migrant had lost the job and needed to look for work 
(Levinson 2005b). The Bossi-Fini law thus was unable to reconcile its restrictive 
ambitions with the structural reality of immigration to Italy, and the Berlusconi 
government eventually accepted the need for new workers and increased the yearly 
quota (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009).
Subsequent governments did not pass any major immigration legislation in the 
period under review. A center-left government elected in 2006 campaigned on an 
overhaul of the system but was unable to muster the parliamentary majority neces-
sary to pass legislation. The return of a Berlusconi government in 2008 signaled a 
return to restrictionist policies, this time through the introduction of public-security 
measures designed to facilitate deportation of migrants convicted of certain crimes 
(legge 125-2008). A 2011 law (decreto-legge 89, legge 129) allowed additional gov-
ernmental discretion in case-by-case expulsions of migrants found to be illegally 
residing in Italy. According to Finotelli and Sciortino (2009),these kinds of restric-
tionist measures are in keeping with the trend in Italian immigration policy, which 
has increasingly focused on external control while ignoring the structural mecha-
nisms—such as the size of the Italian informal economy—that sustain irregular 
migration in Italy. In addition, Italy’s quota system acts as a de facto amnesty by 
allowing irregular migrants already present in Italy and working in the informal 
economy to apply for jobs in the formal sector and access legal status via the quota’s 
mechanisms (Fasani 2010).
2.5  Spain
2.5.1  1970s–1999: European Integration
Like Italy, Spain was traditionally a country of emigration and thus little attention 
was paid to legislation regulating immigration before the 1980s. Spain shares a 
number of other factors with Italy in the evolution of immigration policy, including 
the lack of a historical relationship with Senegal and many (although not all, as 
Latin-American migration to Spain attests) of the countries that eventually would 
send it migrants; recourse to frequent regularization programs as a method for deal-
ing with recurrent irregular migration; and the economic underpinnings of large 
secondary and informal sectors (Reyneri 2003).
Much of Spain’s legislation on internal control mechanisms arose prior to the 
increase in the foreign-born population in the 2000s and prior to Senegalese 
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migration in the 1990s. A Franco-era decree3 took some steps to define the regula-
tions governing the entry of foreigners: valid passports were required, and those 
foreigners who were required to have a visa had to apply for it prior to arrival (see 
Table 2.4 for a synthesis of the evolution of immigration policy in Spain). Although 
there is no existing list of nationalities subject to visa requirements at that time, 
experts have stated that Senegalese were certainly subject to this requirement.4 
Unlike both France and Italy, then, Senegalese were always at least formally 
required to have a visa to enter Spain.
The first national-level law on immigration was passed in 1985 in response to 
Spain’s integration into the European Community and the wariness of Spain’s 
European neighbors regarding the permeability of its borders (Calavita 1998, 2003). 
The Ley Organica 7/1985 on “the rights and liberties of foreigners in Spain” 
required all foreigners entering Spain to have an entry visa, with exceptions for 
those nationals exempted under international treaties (which did not include 
Senegalese). Foreigners staying for longer than 90 days were required to have a resi-
dence permit (permiso de residencia), the period of validity of which could not 
exceed 5 years. Foreigners wishing to establish residency for work were required to 
submit a formal work contract from an employer and apply for a work permit (per-
miso de trabajo) in addition to a residence permit.
While issued by separate Ministries, the residence and work permits would be of 
the same duration and in the form of a single document, and both could be renewed 
during a single procedure. Temporary work authorizations for durations of less than 
90 days did not require a residence permit but were still contingent on legal resi-
dence. The law also spelled out the legal grounds for expulsion of migrants, includ-
ing lack of a residence permit or working without a work permit. This law did not, 
however, contain any provisions for family reunification or permanent residence 
(González-Enríquez 2010), although the application decree of 1986 did provide for 
a family-reunification visa. In addition to external and internal mechanisms of con-
trol, the law also defined the rights of foreigners, but conditioned the granting of 
these rights on legal residence in Spain (Calavita 1998).
These measures were thus restrictive in nature, and Calavita (1998) argues that 
the provisions of this law that required visas, residence permits, and work permits 
immediately plunged the majority of immigrants residing in Spain at that time into 
irregular status. The law thus also contained provisions for a regularization pro-
gram, eligibility for which was conditional on migrants being able to have  legitimate 
continuing work contracts or other formal means of support and to have resided in 
Spain before July 24, 1985 (Levinson 2005c). Only 44,000 migrants applied for 
regularization under this program (between 25% and 50% of those eligible to do 
so), and only 23,000 were able to successfully adjust status. The program was also 
criticized for making it difficult for immigrants to renew their regularized status, 
meaning many subsequently fell back into irregularity (Levinson 2005c).
3 A decreto (decree) is an administrative action used by the executive branch to establish regula-
tions that make it possible to carry out existing law and thus has a normative rank below that of a 
ley (law) (Mezger and González-Ferrer 2013).
4 Amparo González-Ferrer, personal communication, November 15, 2012.
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Table 2.4 Synthesis of major immigration measures in Spain and consequences for migrant 
irregularity
Date Name of law Consequence for irregularity
February 
14, 1974
Decreto 522/1974, de 14 de febrero, por el 
que se regula el régimen de entrada, 
permanencia y salida de los extranjeros en 
España
Required valid passport and 
pre-arrival visa for entry
July 1, 
1985
Ley Organica 7/1985 Sobre derechos y 
libertades de los extranjeros en España
Required all foreigners entering 
Spain to have an entry visa and to 
apply for a residence permit for 
stays exceeding 90 days
Required submission of formal 
work contract and work permit for 
employment
Expulsion of migrants possible if 
lacking residence and/or work 
permit
Rights conditional on legal 
residence
Regularization program
1991 Administrative action Regularization program




Real Decreto 155/1996 Defined multiple kinds of entry 
visas
Made the issuance of residence and 
work permits dependent on having 





Ley Organica 4/ 2000: Sobre derechos y 
libertades de los extranjeros en España y su 
integración social
Irregular residence and work not 
grounds for expulsion
Granted social rights to documented 
and undocumented migrants with 
Padrón registration
Increased validity of temporary 
residence and work permits to 
5 years
Created permanent permits for 
foreigners with 5 years of renewals 
of temporary residence or work 
permits
Granted temporary residence 
permits to foreigners with two 
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While no new immigration legislation would be passed before the turn of the 
century, the Spanish government pursued piecemeal reforms through other legal 
mechanisms. Due in part to the failure of the 1985 regularization program, the 
Spanish government, through a decision in the Council of Ministers communicated 
by a resolution, carried out another regularization program in 1991. Although not 
part of a legislative reform, this administrative action recognized the limitations of 
the previous approach by specifically targeting migrants who had previously pos-
sessed a residence permit; the measure thus sought to resolve some of the ambiguity 
introduced by the difficulty in renewing regularized status. Additional requirements 
were an ongoing formal work contract or self-employment in a lucrative enterprise, 
Table 2.4 (continued)
Date Name of law Consequence for irregularity
December 
22, 2000
Ley Organica 8/2000: de 22 de diciembre, 
de reforma de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000, de 11 
de enero, sobre derechos y libertades de los 
extranjeros en España y su integración 
social.
Reinstated expulsion as a sanction 
for irregular residence or work
Increased to 5 years period of 
continuous residence for granting of 
temporary residence permit
Temporary residence permits were 
contingent on possessing the 
appropriate administrative 
authorization to work
Renewal of work permit contingent 
on ongoing work contract
Continued quota system
Regularization program




Ley Organica 14/2003 Required foreigners to renew their 
Padrón registration every 2 years
Required combined work and 
residence visa for entry for work
Eliminated ability to acquire 
residence permit based solely on 




Real Decreto 2393/2004 Laid out in detail the link between 
different categories of visas and the 
residence and work permits
Specified the individual 
regularization procedures associated 
with arraigo
“Normalization” program
July 2006 Plan África Cooperation with migrant-sending 
countries in matters of border 





and residence in Spain prior to May 15, 1991 (Calavita 1998). Almost 110,000 
migrants were regularized by this program, out of an applicant pool of 135,000 
(Levinson 2005c).
The Spanish Council of Ministers again took a non-legislative route to the reform 
of immigration policy when it introduced a quota system for foreign workers in 
1993. This initial foray defined three sectors where local labor was deemed to be 
lacking—agriculture, construction, and basic services—and created mechanisms by 
which foreign workers could be recruited to fill vacancies (Calavita 1998). The 
system only managed to fill 5220 of the 20,600 slots set aside, mostly because of 
administrative hurdles that employers were unable or unwilling to jump over 
(Calavita 1998). Rules were subsequently loosened, and the government continued 
to define a quota for foreign recruitment throughout the 1990s.
In 1996 the Spanish government issued a decree (Real Decreto 155/1996) speci-
fying regulations for the application of the 1985 law. This decree defined multiple 
kinds of entry visas and made the issuance of residence and work permits dependent 
on having entered with the corresponding type of visa. The quota system for the 
recruitment of foreign labor was continued. The internal control mechanisms 
remained similar to those defined in the 1985 law, with the exception of the intro-
duction of permanent residence and work permits, which could be granted to a for-
eigner who had lived and worked in Spain continuously and in a regular situation for 
at least 5 years. These permanent permits were valid for 5 years and automatically 
renewable. Solé and Parella (2003) argue that the introduction of these permits was 
an important step towards recognizing the permanent nature of immigration to 
Spain in that it recognized migrants’ rights to settle and improve their working con-
ditions. Finally, the decree also included a regularization program targeted specifi-
cally at foreigners who had fallen into irregularity after having gained residence and 
work permits through previous regularization programs (Reyneri 2003), which suc-
ceeded in adjusting the statuses of 21,300 foreigners (Levinson 2005c).
2.5.2  2000–2008: Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners, Alien 
Affairs, and Plan África
The start of the twenty-first century saw a flurry of immigration legislation in Spain, 
and the initial trend was towards increased tolerance of irregular migrants. A new 
Organic Law (Ley Organica 4/2000) on the “Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners 
and their Social Integration” was passed by the opposition left-wing coalition in 
January 2000 and was mostly concerned with protecting the rights and facilitating 
the integration of migrants in Spain. The law recognized the enduring presence of 
migrants with irregular status in the country: although it defined irregular residence 
and work as serious infractions punishable by a fine, they were not grounds for 
expulsion (Calavita 2003). Additionally, the law granted a wide array of social 
rights to education, political participation, and health care to both documented and 
2 Evolution of Immigration-Control Policies in France, Italy, and Spain
67
undocumented migrants as long as they were registered in the Padrón municipal 
(González-Enríquez 2010). This provision meant an end to the statistical invisibility 
of irregular migrants in Spain. Huge numbers of irregular migrants registered with 
the Padrón, leading to the realization that upwards of 50% of non-EU foreigners 
were in Spain illegally as of 2003 (González-Enríquez 2009).
For internal control, the law maintained the system of temporary residence and 
work permits for stays of longer than 90 day, but increased their length of validity 
to up to 5 years. In addition, the law created a permit for permanent residence for 
foreigners with 5 years of temporary residence and a permanent work permit for 
foreigners who had renewed temporary permits for 5 years in a row. Any foreigner 
with two uninterrupted years of residence in Spain could be granted a temporary 
residence permit, conditional on registration with the municipal authorities. In addi-
tion, the law prescribed another regularization program, open to foreigners residing 
in Spain before June 1, 1999 who had either possessed or applied for a residence or 
work permit in the three previous years. The program eventually regularized 153,463 
foreigners (Levinson 2005c). The law also formalized the quota system introduced 
in the 1996 decree, making legal immigration for work possible, in theory.
A counter-reformation of this law came quickly, however, in the form of another 
Organic Law (Ley Organica 8/2000) on “alien affairs,” which was approved in 
December 2000 and came into effect in January 2001.The center-right Popular 
Party had won an outright parliamentary majority in March 2000 and made the 
reform of the liberal immigration law from January a public issue. The reform law 
succeeded in rolling back some of the more lenient provisions of its predecessor: 
expulsion was reinstated as a sanction for irregular residence or work, and the period 
of continuous residence after which irregular migrants could gain a temporary resi-
dence permit was increased to 5 years from 2. There were also changes to the sys-
tem of internal control: temporary residence permits were contingent on possessing 
the appropriate administrative authorization to work (autorización administrativa 
para trabajar), while the law also stated that a residence permit was required in 
addition to a work permit. In addition, renewal of the work permit was only possible 
with an ongoing work contract.
These provisions made it more difficult for migrants, often working in the infor-
mal economy, to access residence permits and also made gaps in legal residence 
possible for migrants possessing a work permit. The law reaffirmed the continuation 
of the quota system and called for a new amnesty program targeted at those who 
were denied regularization during the 2000 amnesty because they had not resided in 
Spain prior to June 1, 1999. This re-examination resulted in the regularization of 
232,674 foreigners (Kraler 2009). The law also allowed the regularization of status 
for reasons of “arraigo” (rootedness), and an additional regularization program 
between June and August adjusted the status of 13,735 foreigners, who had to prove 
residence in Spain prior to January 23, 2001 (Lorenzo 2002).
By 2003, the proportion of foreigners residing in Spain without a residence per-
mit is estimated to have reached over 50%, and public concern about irregular 
migration was growing (González-Enríquez 2009). The center-right ruling party 
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and the leftist opposition agreed to another reform of the 2000 law on foreigners. 
This reform law (Ley Organica 14/2003) translated concerns about irregular migra-
tion into new restrictive measures. It allowed the Interior Ministry to access the data 
on foreigners contained in the Padrón for police purposes (although the Ministry 
has not yet done so), and required foreigners to renew their Padrón registration 
every 2 years (González-Enríquez 2009). The law specified new categories of visas, 
including a residence visa that precluded work and a work and residence visa for 
foreigners wishing to work in Spain. A work and residence visa would be necessary 
for the granting of an autorización administrativa para trabajar, which would allow 
a migrant to reside in Spain for its duration, effectively creating a single permit 
(even though migrants were still required to obtain residence permits). The possibil-
ity of acquiring a residence permit based on the amount of time spent in Spain 
(2 years in Law 4/2000, and 5 years in Law 5/2000) was eliminated completely; 
ongoing regularization was available only through a provision for arraigo 
(González-Enríquez 2009).
The socialist party won the general election in March 2004 and issued additional 
regulations for the application of the Foreigners Law in August of the same year 
(Real Decreto 2393/2004). The regulations laid out in detail the link between dif-
ferent categories of visas and the residence and work permits to which they were 
linked. Employers wishing to hire a foreigner were required to submit applications 
for work permits while the foreigner was abroad; the foreigner could then apply for 
a work and residence visa, which would allow temporary residence in Spain. The 
law specified the individual regularization procedures associated with arraigo, 
which could be for either social or work reasons. For regularization for social 
attachment, foreigners had to live in Spain for 3 years and prove that they had either 
a work contract or “social insertion” in their place of residence as certified by a 
report from city hall or from legal migrants to which the foreigner was related. 
Another provision for workplace rootedness allowed foreigners to adjust their sta-
tus after living in Spain for 2 years with a labor relationship with an employer for 
at least 1 year.
Both of these individual regularization procedures would result in the issuance 
of temporary residence permits. In addition to these individual regularization 
 mechanisms, the regulations included a “normalization” program designed to 
address Spain’s large underground economy (González-Enríquez 2009). 
Employers had to apply for the regularization of their foreign workers with the 
guarantee of a formal contract with a validity of at least 6 months; foreigners had 
to be registered with the municipality and have resided in Spain for 6 months prior 
to the passage of law 2000/4. Carried out between February and May 2005, the 
program received 700,000 applications, of which 578,000 were accepted, with 
550,000 signing up to begin paying into social security (Levinson 2005c). Finally, 
the regulations reformed the quota system once again: it emphasized hiring 
migrants in their country of origin and published a quarterly list of openings by 
province (González-Enríquez 2009).
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 The Arrival of the Cayucos in the Canary Islands and Spain’s “Plan 
África”
The year following this regularization program saw the arrival in rickety fishing 
boats of over 30,000 clandestine migrants on the shores of Spain’s Canary Islands. 
The boats departed from locations on the coast of West Africa in Mauritania, 
Senegal, and Guinea-Bissau and carried sub-Saharan Africans as well as, in far 
lesser proportion, Pakistanis, Indians, Afghans, and Iraqis (Charles 2007). Spanish 
authorities quickly became concerned about the possibility of a massive “invasion” 
of undocumented Africans and rushed to put into place an “Africa Plan” (Plan 
África) in early 2006 that would stop this unwanted flow (Charles 2007; Gagrielli 
2008). This plan included increased cooperation with migrant-sending countries in 
matters of border surveillance and readmission of irregular migrants in exchange for 
development assistance (Gagrielli 2008). An initial agreement between the 
Senegalese and Spanish governments in May 2006 paved the way for the repatria-
tion of 623 Senegalese nationals identified in the Canary Islands.
The first flight containing 99 deported Senegalese migrants in handcuffs landed 
in Dakar in early June, and the press coverage of this event forced the Senegalese 
government to temporarily stop repatriations (Gagrielli 2008). The Spanish govern-
ment promised a €20 million loan to Senegal on June 16, and additional deporta-
tions of 189 Senegalese migrants took place between June 19 and 24. In addition, 
Senegal agreed to cooperate with Spain in patrols of Senegalese territorial waters. 
Dakar and Madrid signed a series of formal bilateral accords in December 2006 on 
the emigration of minors and the fight against criminality, but were unable to con-
clude treaties on cooperative migration management or readmission of irregular 
migrants (Gagrielli 2008). The Spanish quota for 2008 included provisions for 
Senegalese workers, and at least 140 Senegalese were selected for 12-month work 
contracts in Spain between 2006 and 2007 (Charles 2007).
2.6  Conclusion
The evolution of immigration policies in France, Italy, and Spain demonstrates that 
contexts of reception for Senegalese migrants in Europe have varied widely both 
within these destinations over time and between these destinations. It may be useful 
to recall Portes’s typology of negative, neutral, and advantaged contexts of recep-
tion (Portes and Böröcz 1989; Portes and Rumbaut 2006) to make sense of this 
variation. In France, there has been an evolution from colonial-era political and 
personal “assimilation” of Senegalese originaires into the French nation alongside 
and exclusion of other Senegalese “subjects” from the French nation; to a post- 
independence preferential regime that put few restrictions on the ability of 
Senegalese to enter, reside, or work in France; to an alignment of the bilateral rela-
tionship with Senegal with the general immigration-control regime via the gradual 
erosion of the preferential regime. Contexts of reception in France for Senegalese 
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have thus varied from somewhat advantaged in the colonial (for originaires) and 
immediate postcolonial periods, to neutral with the first erosions of the preferential 
regime, to negative when Senegalese were fully subject to the restrictive general 
system of immigration control. This restrictive system has furthermore been marked 
by discrimination against and stigmatization of Africans (Adida et  al. 2010) and 
somewhat blatant attempts to limit flows of migrants from Africa (Schain 2008). 
While France seems to have acknowledged the formerly privileged status of 
Senegalese in its most recent bilateral migration-management accord with Senegal, 
the basic parameters of the context of reception remain restrictive and negative.
The contexts of reception in Italy and Spain have differed from those in France, 
especially in their timing and in the imposition of immigration restrictions. Attitudes 
of the host society towards irregular migrants have also varied over time and between 
countries. These southern European contexts of reception were never advantaged 
for Senegalese migrants, with the possible exception of the pre-1990 period in Italy 
when Senegalese were exempt from visa requirements. Contexts of reception in 
these two countries have thus mostly been negative with regard to Senegalese 
migrants, in that they faced the same set of increasingly restrictive immigration- 
control measures as most other migrants. These differences underscore the impor-
tance of incorporating multiple contexts of reception into analyses of the production 
and consequences of irregular migration.
Recent research on the broader evolution of immigration policy across many 
countries can shed light on the general evolution towards restrictiveness in the three 
main contexts of reception of Senegalese migrants. The DEMIG project analyzed 
the long-term evolution of migration policies in 45 countries between 1945 and 
2014 and found that border control policies have become more restrictive, while 
entry and integration policies have become less so (de Haas et al. 2016). Analyses 
of policy evolution in OECD countries by the Immigration Policies in Comparison 
(IMPIC) project revealed similar trends: between 1980 and 2010 migration policies 
became more liberal for labor, humanitarian, and family policies but more restric-
tive for control measures including border crossing and irregular migration (Helbling 
and Kalkum 2017). These comparative projects confirm the trend towards increas-
ing restrictiveness in some facets of the contexts of reception facing Senegalese 
migrants in France, Italy, and Spain.
This chapter has shown that variations in contexts of reception have produced a 
variety of socio-legal configurations that give rise to different pathways of irregular-
ity. Senegalese in France had de facto regular status for much of the 1960s and 
1970s in that they did not need explicit authorization to enter or reside in France and 
were able to take advantage of common post facto regularization procedures. 
Irregularity became more common among Senegalese as this preferential regime 
crumbled, and the massive participation of Senegalese and other Africans in the 
sans papiers movement in the mid-1990s highlighted the extent to which changes in 
immigration-control legislation had created precarity in their legal statuses.
Irregularity seems to have been a consistent component in contexts of reception 
in Italy and Spain, as their frequent and massive regularization programs demon-
strate. Much of this irregularity seems to stem from the mismatch between restric-
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tive immigration-control measures and structural demands for cheap, low-skilled 
labor (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009; González-Enríquez 2009; Reyneri 2003), echo-
ing similar dynamics in the US (Massey et al. 2002; Portes 1978).
These dynamics illustrate that irregularity is very much a manufactured state 
rather than a characteristic of the migrants themselves. It is produced when govern-
ments impose rules and regulations on flows that arose largely for economic reasons 
and were extended by social mechanisms of network formation. These legal imposi-
tions are undertaken mostly in response to shifts in domestic political sentiment 
over time and are uninformed by any understanding of migratory processes them-
selves, yielding policies and regulations that are inconsistent over time and often 
contradictory at any given moment, thus producing irregularity. Migration that is 
judged legal at one time can thus become illegal at a later date not because of any 
change among migrants or the basic process of immigration, but because of arbi-
trary shifts in policy made without regard to the practical realities of international 
migration.
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Chapter 3
Pathways into Irregular Legal Status 
of Senegalese Migrants France, Italy, 
and Spain
“Illegal” migration is a major concern in most immigrant-receiving countries, yet most 
policy and much research on the topic is hampered by a lack of data and a misunder-
standing of the origins and trajectories of so-called undocumented migrants’ legal sta-
tuses. Irregular migration is difficult to measure empirically, as it, by definition, escapes 
the detection of most states’ immigration-control bureaucracies. In addition, many 
surveys have difficulty in sampling what is a mostly hidden population. This lack of 
data has undoubtedly contributed to an even bigger problem in the study of irregular 
migration: the conflation of undocumented border crossing with the broader phenom-
enon of irregularity of legal status. In reality, clandestine border crossing is but one 
pathway among many into irregular legal status and may not even be the most impor-
tant one in many countries. Furthermore, immigration policies actively produce these 
pathways into irregularity through restrictive control mechanisms. A more thorough 
understanding of the implications of irregularity for both destination societies and for 
the migrants themselves must therefore study multiple pathways into irregular status.
An approach that is sensitive to the multiplicity of pathways and the role of immi-
gration policies in producing them is especially crucial for understanding irregularity 
in European destinations. Restrictive immigration-control policies with an emphasis 
on border control have become the norm in Europe, yet the continent hosts an 
increasing population of irregular migrants and many countries embark on repeated 
regularization programs to adjust irregular migrants’ legal status. The contradictions 
inherent in this system may stem from a misapprehension of the nature of irregular 
migration: research has shown that overstaying after legal entry may be a more 
important pathway to irregularity than illegal entry, and other policies may facilitate 
transitions to irregular status while the state pursues regularization programs.
Portions of Chapter 3 were previously published as: Vickstrom, E. (2014). Pathways into irregular 
status among Senegalese migrants in Europe. International Migration Review, 48(4), 1062–1099. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/imre.12154.
The original version of this chapter was revised: Footnote was inserted in the chapter opening 
page. The correction to this chapter is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12088-7_7
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Migration from sub-Saharan Africa in particular has fallen victim to the confu-
sion surrounding the multiplicity and legal production of irregularity. Highly media-
tized arrivals of African migrants in leaky fishing boats on European shores in 2006 
prompted fears of an “African invasion” and a flurry of restrictive measures to stop 
it, yet the image of Africans as clandestine migrants both hides the heterogeneity of 
African migrants’ legal situations and obscures the role of European states’ immi-
gration policies in producing these situations.
This chapter will analyze the multiple pathways into irregular status for Senegalese 
migrants. It will argue that irregularity is “legally produced” by immigration policies 
and will advocate for a conceptualization of legal status that is context- dependent, 
multidimensional, and longitudinal. The empirical focus will be on the pathways of 
entry without a visa, overstaying following a legal entry, and “befallen irregularity,” 
or transitioning from regular to irregular legal status. The chapter will analyze the 
administrative trajectories of Senegalese migrants in France, Italy, and Spain. As 
Chap. 2 demonstrated, these contexts of reception display variation both within and 
between countries and over time in their immigration- control mechanisms.
This chapter capitalizes on variation in the forms of irregularity and contexts of 
reception to ask the following questions: What are the correlates of each of these 
pathways for Senegalese migrants in France, Italy, and Spain? What role does con-
text of reception play in shaping the pathways of irregularity? Are the pathways 
linked, i.e., to what extent is irregularity “sticky” or path dependent? Given the 
diversified profile of Senegalese migrants in these different destinations, what role 
do various forms of capital play in steering migrants into the various pathways of 
irregularity? Given the role of policies making regular status contingent on links to 
family or the formal labor market, what role do these social institutions in the des-
tination country play in structuring these pathways?
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 reviews the literature on defini-
tions and conceptualizations of migrant irregularity and outlines the empirical path-
ways into irregular status to be studied. Section 3.2 offers hypotheses: pathways will 
be structured by contextual variation, and migrants will navigate them with the help 
of access to forms of capital and links to other social institutions. Section 3.3 
describes the data and methods. Section 3.4 presents the chapter’s findings: context 
and forms of capital are more strongly related to pathways that occur more closely 
in time to the act of crossing a border, while changes in legal status are more closely 
related to links to social institutions and prior legal statuses. Section 3.5 discusses 
these results and Sect. 3.6 concludes.
3.1  Conceptual Approaches to Irregularity
In addition to these lexical nuances surrounding irregular migration described in 
Chap. 1, the concept of irregularity is plagued by lack of precision in its categorical 
and temporal dimensions. Figure 3.1 illustrates the common conceptual problems. 
Much media, policy, and even academic attention to “irregular” migration actually 
focuses solely on the legal domain of entry. This may be due in part to the influence 
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of the U.S. case on perceptions of migration: unauthorized border crossing dominates 
popular and academic discussions of irregularity in the U.S., and this concept is 
exported to other contexts. Thus, irregular entry comes to stand for irregular migra-
tion, and irregular migrants are those that entered without the required authorization.
In reality, as Fig. 3.1 illustrates, irregularity of legal status is both categorically 
and temporally more complex. Irregularity can arise not only from the legal domain 
of entry but also from the legal domains of residence and work; lack of authoriza-
tion in any of these legal domains can generate irregular status. A proper under-
standing of irregularity thus must pay attention to multiple legal domains that give 
rise to categorical complexity of statuses, and also to the mechanisms of immigra-
tion control (e.g., documents such as visas and residence permits) that mark migrants 
as irregular (Brochmann 1999). Furthermore, these multiple legal domains intro-
duce temporal complexity: while irregular entry is defined at one point in time, 
irregularity of residence and work authorizations is defined at multiple points in 
time during a migrant’s trip. Irregularity as a concept must thus include multiple 
legal domains and multiple statuses over time.
The categorical and temporal complexity of irregularity illustrated in Fig. 3.1 
demonstrates that there are multiple possible pathways into irregular status. Unlike 
the U.S. context, where irregular entry is the predominant pathway into irregular 
status, the European context displays a variety of pathways, including unauthorized 
entry, work in violation of residence conditions, refused asylum application, and 
irregularity by birth. In addition, “status flows,” or transitions between various kinds 
of statuses are common and include overstaying and befallen irregularity (Düvell 
2008, 2011b; Triandafyllidou 2010a). Furthermore, unauthorized border crossing, 
while it garners a fair share of public and policy attention in Europe, is far from the 
Fig. 3.1 Temporal and categorical complexity of irregularity of legal status
3.1 Conceptual Approaches to Irregularity
78
most common pathway into irregular status. Instead, research has shown that over-
staying is by far the predominant pathway in most European countries (Finotelli and 
Sciortino 2013; Kraler 2009), underlining the need for a theoretical and analytical 
approach that accounts for transitions between legal statuses over time.
3.1.1  The Legal and Social Production of Irregularity
While the preceding discussion highlights the multidimensionality of irregularity 
and the multiple pathways by which migrants access irregular status, many socio-
logical investigations of irregular migration rely on a simple dichotomy of legal 
status. This is especially true in the United States, and even though the American 
research tradition has produced useful findings regarding undocumented migration 
in the US context of reception (Alba and Nee 2003; Borjas and Tienda 1993; 
Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2000; Phillips and Massey 1999; Portes and Rumbaut 
2001), scholars have recently begun to argue for more nuanced conceptualizations 
of irregularity. Research focusing on the social construction of legal-status catego-
ries allows both an understanding of how irregularity is produced by historical and 
sociolegal processes (De Genova 2002) and an expanded conceptualization of irreg-
ularity that includes both precarious categories and the dynamism of irregularity 
over time (Goldring et al. 2009).
Scholars researching the “legal production of illegality” (Goldring et al. 2009) 
have argued that the notion of irregularity is meaningless without reference to the 
legal framework in which it is defined: irregular status as a transgression is impos-
sible without the legal framework defining it as such (Sciortino 2004). Research on 
the production of illegality has shed light on how the seemingly common-sense 
notion of migrant irregularity is embedded in concrete historical processes and 
institutions such as laws, policies, labor markets, and other social institutions in 
destination countries (Calavita 1998; De Genova 2002). Immigration-control poli-
cies dictate the channels of legal entry, residence, and work in the destination coun-
try and the bureaucratic mechanisms that regulate both these channels and access to 
other social institutions (such as health care, education, and the possibility of family 
reunification). These policies and their translation into concrete bureaucratic mech-
anisms of control (such as visas, residence permits, and work permits) thus set the 
parameters for the irregular statuses that migrants may experience and the pathways 
by which they access them. Irregular status thus entails a social relation to a state 
and its policies and control mechanisms, which themselves have a history within the 
political process of the state (Sciortino 2004).
Contextual variation is thus crucial in elucidating how different forms of irregu-
larity emerge from different social, legal, and political configurations, especially in 
a policy context as turbulent as the one in Europe, where frequent changes in immi-
gration legislation and policy are the norm. For example, Düvell (2011a) reports 
that at least 52 separate laws, codes, decrees, and circulars define French immigra-
tion law, and turnover in political leadership has led to 20 immigration laws being 
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adopted since 1980 (Wihtol de Wenden 2010). While some of this turbulence in 
policy has accompanied the transposition of treaties or European Union directives 
into national laws (as was the case with major Italian and Spanish immigration leg-
islation in the 1990s), individual countries have also fought to maintain sovereignty 
in much immigration policy making; consequently, there is no commonly accepted 
definition of irregularity across European countries (Düvell 2011a). This policy tur-
bulence can change the parameters of regularity by making renewal of statuses more 
difficult or by revoking some forms of status altogether. As a result, migrants may 
experience categorically complex legal statuses (e.g., legal residence without legal 
right to work) along with complex trajectories of legal status over time arising from 
frequent transitions.
The in-depth review of the evolution of immigration policies in France, Italy, and 
Spain in Chap. 2 highlighted the turbulence of immigration policies in these three 
countries. Table 3.1 sketches these evolutions and illustrates how policy variation 
over time and across destinations variation in irregularity over time and across des-
tinations creates different pathways of irregularity. As Chap. 2 showed, France, for 
example, established a preferential bilateral immigration control regime with 
Senegal that allowed for free circulation and establishment in each country for 
nationals of the other. While this was at heart an attempt to maintain French colonial 
privilege (Donovon 1988), it allowed Senegalese to enter, reside, and live in France 
without the need for explicit authorization (Marot 1995). Over time, France aligned 
its bilateral agreements with Senegal with the common immigration-control regime, 
thus creating irregularity among Senegalese migrants who had not previously been 
subject to restrictive policies (Lochak 1997).
Table 3.1 also highlights the important variation that exists between destinations 
at any historical moment. Whereas all three countries have experienced a general 
evolution towards restrictive immigration-control policies, the features and timing 
of these policies have not been uniform. France’s stiffening of immigration control, 
for example, occurred at the same time that the southern European countries were 
dealing with growing foreign-born populations via regularization programs, which 
may have created new pathways of irregularity in all countries.
The literature on the legal production of irregularity also highlights the role that 
other social institutions play, either independently or in interaction with immigration- 
control policies, in creating forms of irregularity. Social institutions are symbolic 
blueprints that organize people’s roles in major areas social life, including the polity 
and the economy (Portes 2010). In addition to the state’s immigration-control appa-
ratuses, social institutions such as the work and the family are likely to have impacts 
on migrants’ legal statuses. State immigration control policies can obviously regu-
late access to the formal labor market, but the existence of widespread informal 
employment opportunities may make it easier for migrants to circumvent formal 
mechanisms of control (Reyneri 1998); the structure of the labor market is thus 
another contextual factor that can influence the pathways of irregularity. Other 
social institutions in the destination society can also help create frameworks for 
irregularity: the ability of migrants with irregular status to access health care and 
educational systems may make some forms of family irregularity more likely. This 
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has been suggested in the Spanish case, where legal protection of social rights for 
migrants with irregular status has made irregular residence and work less risky 
(González-Enríquez 2009; González-Ferrer 2011a). The social institution of the 
family itself may also shape pathways of irregularity. Some contexts might promote 
irregular forms of reunification of family members of migrants, as in Spain where 
waiting periods imposed on work authorizations for reunified spouses may incentiv-
ize bypassing legal reunification channels (González-Ferrer 2011b). Still other pol-
icy regimes might facilitate accessing regular status on the basis of “entitlements” 
in immigration legislation (Kraler 2009) such as familial links, as is the case for 
parents of minor children born in France since the passage of the Chevènement law 
in 1998 (Lessault and Beauchemin 2009).
3.1.2  Multidimensionality of Irregularity
It is clear from the literature that policies and institutions in the destination society 
constitute a legal and social framework for the pathways of irregularity. The litera-
ture also emphasizes that these frameworks create the conditions for a multiplicity 
of forms of irregular status, and thus responds to a call for research that acknowl-
edges a continuum of legal statuses and studies transitions between different kinds 
of legal status (Coutin 1998; Massey and Capoferro 2004; Menjívar 2006).
In disaggregating binary oppositions of regular/irregular status (Donato and 
Armenta 2011), research has shown that there are a multitude of “precarious” or 
“liminal” statuses in between the two poles of documented and undocumented and 
a variety of pathways into these statuses (Düvell 2008; Goldring et  al. 2009; 
Menjívar 2006). Much of this research has focused on non-US contexts of recep-
tion where undocumented border crossing is not the only, or even the most impor-
tant, pathway to irregularity. Goldring et al. (2009, Goldring and Landolt 2011), for 
example, propose the concept of “precarious legal status,” which highlights the 
multiple forms of impermanent and insecure status that migrants in Canada face. 
They find that Canadian immigration policy offers several avenues for authorized 
entry and that migrants often become irregular by losing this authorization once in 
the country. Their research has also examined transitions between legal statuses 
and suggests that some pathways of irregularity are more difficult to escape than 
others (Goldring and Landolt 2011). Canadian immigration-control policy thus 
produces multiple pathways into irregularity via a multiplicity of precarious sta-
tuses. This research echoes findings in other contexts of reception, particularly 
those of southern Europe where “irregularizing” policies are the norm (Calavita 
1998; Schuster 2005).
Other studies offer different typologies but retain the emphasis on complex and 
multidimensional trajectories of legal status that reflect the contextual specificities 
of different destinations. Kraler (2009) outlines 13 different “dimensions of illegal-
ity” stemming from lack of entry, residence, or work authorization across countries 
of the European Union. Jandl (2004) employs distinctions between entry, residence, 
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and work to generate a typology that includes six categories of clandestine existence 
and argues that no accurate accounting of illegal migrant flows and stocks can occur 
without such a fine-grained conceptualization. Ruhs and Anderson (2010) distin-
guish between compliance, semi-compliance, and non-compliance in examining the 
labor-market participation of immigrants in the United Kingdom. These studies 
illustrate that authorizations in different legal domains can combine to create mixed, 
precarious, semi-irregular, or in-between statuses and that migrants can experience 
transitions over time between a variety statuses (Düvell 2011a, b). Instead of a 
bright, stable boundary between regular and irregular status, there is a fuzzy thresh-
old that shifts over time. The categorical multidimensionality and temporal instabil-
ity of irregular statuses allow an examination of multiple pathways into irregularity 
over the course of migrants’ trajectories.
3.1.3  Incomplete State Control and Migrant Agency
This expanded conceptualization of irregularity that is both dynamic and contingent 
on contextual factors such as legal frameworks and policies allows a more refined 
understanding of how irregularity is produced. At the same time, much recent 
research has also insisted on migrants’ agency in navigating the laws and policies 
that set the parameters of their legal statuses. As Sciortino (2004) points out, state 
claims of control of immigration are never complete: strong policies can fail when 
the social infrastructure of immigration is robust enough to offer migrants ways of 
circumventing control mechanisms. This social infrastructure includes individual 
and collective resources, such as financial, human, social and migration-specific 
capital (Massey and Espinosa 1997). Research has shown access to these resources 
to be important at many points in the migration process, including the mode of 
migration and the legal integration into the destination society (Massey et al. 1998; 
Massey and Espinosa 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Singer and Massey 1998).
Migrants can draw on different kinds of resources in their interactions with legal 
institutions and bureaucracies to influence the process of categorization and docu-
mentation. Coutin (1998) argues that migrants, far from being passive in the face of 
immigration laws and policies, actively interpret and react to such contextual con-
straints. This engagement allows migrants not only to shape their own legal identi-
ties but also to influence the very legal categories that the law presents to them. 
Spire (2005) demonstrates this agency via the “paper careers” of foreigners in 
France: migrants were often able to influence their own statuses as a result of 
bureaucratic agents’ institutional autonomy vis-à-vis immigration legislation. Mass 
movements of migrants can also use political capital to feed back into the policy 
process and create new legal categories: the sans papiers movement in France in the 
1990s at least partially succeeded in forcing legislators to create a legal solution for 
migrants who were neither regularizable nor deportable (Lochak 1997). While 
these studies have emphasized the role of forms of capital in accessing regular legal 
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 status, Sciortino (2004) argues that access to resources is also a precondition to 
irregular migration, which is an inherently risky and expensive endeavor.
3.1.4  Pathways into Irregularity
These conceptual approaches to the production of multidimensional forms of irreg-
ularity make the case for important heterogeneity hidden by a binary conceptualiza-
tion of irregularity, but they also lend themselves to a potentially unending array of 
typologies of different kinds of legal statuses. This chapter draws on this literature 
to examine a limited set of three concrete pathways into irregularity for empirical 
examination. This section reviews the pathways of no-visa (“irregular”) entry, over-
staying, and befallen irregularity. The discussion will focus on the concrete policy 
mechanisms of control that define each pathway and the evolution of these control 
mechanisms in France, Italy, and Spain, both in general and vis-à-vis Senegalese 
migrants in particular.
 Geographic Flows into Irregularity and Mechanisms of External Control: 
No-Visa Entry
Entering a country without the proper documentation is a “geographic flow” 
(Triandafyllidou 2010a) into irregular status: migrants move from one place and 
enter another without the proper authorization or documentation. While research in 
the European context has shown that this pathway to irregular status is more limited 
in its extent than in the US, European countries have invested in restrictive border 
control and their political discourses around irregular migration focus heavily on 
undocumented entry (Vollmer 2011).
The main mechanism of control regulating the pathway of irregular entry is the 
entry visa. In France, visas were nominally required for entry by the 1945 ordinance 
that organized post-war immigration, but French external control policy was porous 
until the 1980s. This was particularly true for Senegalese: as a result of a series of 
bilateral agreements that defined the conditions of entry, residence, and work for 
Senegalese in France and took precedence over national immigration legislation, 
Senegalese citizens did not need a visa to enter France between 1960 and 1986 
(Marot 1995; Mezger and González-Ferrer 2013). As part of an effort to “close the 
borders” following economic crises in the 1970s (Lochak 1997), France unilaterally 
declared entry visas necessary for all non-EU foreigners, including Senegalese, in a 
governmental circular in 1986 (refer to Chap. 2 for additional details on the evolu-
tion of this mechanism of control).
While French policy subsequently lifted visa requirements for nationals of EU 
and other developed countries, foreigners from many less-developed countries, 
including Senegal, are still required to have visas to enter France. Despite this evo-
lution towards increased external control, including increased border policing and 
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stricter guideline for visa issuance, there are no widely accepted estimates of the 
number or characteristics of irregular entries to France (Courau 2009). Some 
research suggests, however, that migrants from France’s Mediterranean neighbors 
(Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria) and former colonies (Senegal, Mali, and 
Mauritania) are more likely to enter with falsified documents (Wihtol de Wenden 
2010).
Irregular entry has long been perceived by northern Europeans to be a more 
pressing problem in southern Europe, particularly in Italy and Spain. Indeed, both 
countries are infamous for images of clandestine migrants arriving by boat from the 
coasts of North or West Africa (Fasani 2010; González-Enríquez 2009, 2010; 
Pastore et al. 2006) and only developed national-level immigration legislation in the 
1980s in response to pressure from other Schengen and EU members concerned 
about these porous Mediterranean borders. Spain, while having previously estab-
lished visa requirements via administrative circular or royal decree, instituted 
Schengen-style visa requirements in an organic law in 1985. Italy allowed Senegalese 
nationals to enter the country without a visa between 1966 and 1990 (Mezger and 
González-Ferrer 2013), but abolished this provision in 1990 as part of a general 
reform of entry policy in accordance with Schengen regulations.
These visa requirements have been part of a general evolution in both southern 
European countries towards stiffer external controls to combat the perceived threat 
of irregular entries (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009; González-Enríquez 2009; Sciortino 
1999). In reality, unauthorized geographic inflows represent a small proportion of 
irregular residents in Italy: Fasani (2010) estimates that as few as 4% of irregular 
migrants entered without authorization by sea, and as few as 15% by airport or land 
borders. Irregular entry to Spain was a significant pathway to irregularity in the 
1990s with many clandestine migrants arriving in boats from Morocco, but this 
pathway has decreased in significance with increased high-tech surveillance of 
coastlines and bilateral readmission agreements with origin and transit countries 
(González-Enríquez 2010).
 Status Flows into Irregularity and Mechanisms of Internal Control: 
Overstaying and Befallen Irregularity
In contrast to geographic flows, status flows involve migrants who are already in a 
destination country and change legal status (Triandafyllidou 2010a). Status flows 
towards irregularity can involve overstaying a tourist visa and becoming irregular 
with regard to work and/or residence; or losing regular residence/work status during 
a stay in a destination country (otherwise known as “befallen irregularity”). 
Residence and work permits, which define a foreigner’s authorization to reside and 
work in a destination country, are the main mechanisms of internal control in France, 
Italy, and Spain; these permits thus define these status-flow pathways of irregularity. 
Research on irregularity in Europe has demonstrated that status flows are by far the 
predominant pathway into irregular status (Triandafyllidou 2010a).
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Overstaying—legal entry (with or without a visa and usually for tourism) fol-
lowed by remaining in the country after the expiration of the visa or entry authoriza-
tion—represents the most prevalent pathway to irregularity in Europe, and is 
common in all three countries in this study (Düvell 2011b; Finotelli and Sciortino 
2013; Sciortino 2004). While this pathway is often referred to as “visa overstaying,” 
there are many cases in which migrants can be authorized to enter a destination 
without a formal visa.
In France, many overstayers enter with visas for tourism, studies, family visits, 
or business and become irregular once their visa/entry authorization has expired and 
they stay in the country without a valid residence permit (Courau 2009; Wihtol de 
Wenden 2010). As many of these entry visas are issued under the Schengen rules, 
they are courte durée (short duration): they allow for a stay in France of only 
3 months and do not allow the holder to apply for a residence permit (GISTI 2011). 
The preferential bilateral regime between France and Senegal also created condi-
tions for overstaying. While Senegalese did not need visas to enter France prior to 
1986, “false tourism” was a common strategy for migrating to France: obtaining a 
work contract in Senegal prior to departing for France was difficult, so many 
Senegalese entered France without a visa as ostensible tourists and subsequently 
found work (Bergues 1973). This can only be considered overstaying after 1974, 
though, which was when France first started requiring Senegalese to obtain resi-
dence permits after arrival.
Overstayers are also numerous in Italy: according to the Italian Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, upwards of 70% of irregular migrants in Italy between 2000 and 
2006 became irregular by overstaying legitimate visas (Fasani 2010). Even though 
Senegalese migrants were exempt from visa requirements from 1966 to 1990, they 
were expected to regularize their status after arrival (Mezger and González-Ferrer 
2013), leaving them open to irregular status after authorized (although not formally 
documented) entry. Subsequent Italian immigration laws specified that foreigners 
had to apply for residence permits within 90 days of arrival, but also made obtaining 
a residence permit dependent on having a work contract. Those migrants entering 
on tourist visas thus had little recourse to legitimate regular status once in Italy.
In Spain, overstaying is the main pathway to irregular status, with “false tour-
ism” particularly common for migrants from Spain’s former Latin American colo-
nies (González-Enríquez 2010). As in Italy, secure residence status has been linked 
to employment, but a toleration of irregular work and the provision of some govern-
ment benefits to irregular migrants has made it possible for migrants to overstay 
tourist visas (González-Enríquez 2010).
“Befallen irregularity” refers to a situation where migrants lose regular authori-
zation for residence and/or work in a destination and thus fall into irregularity 
(Triandafyllidou 2010b). In general, this pathway is linked to immigration policies 
that define residence and work permits of limited duration in an effort to limit legal 
migration; the expiration of these permits without renewal leads to irregular status. 
Migrants may not be able to renew their permits for many reasons, but the most 
frequent obstacle they face is the fact that renewal of residence permits is often 
linked to proof of legal employment (Triandafyllidou 2010b). Loss of regular status 
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may also, seemingly paradoxically, be linked to amnesty or regularization programs 
through similar employment provisions: migrants who temporarily gain legal status 
may fall into irregularity if they are unable to fulfill the employment conditions for 
renewal (Triandafyllidou 2010b). There is also evidence that bureaucratic ineffi-
ciencies in processing renewal application can lead to befallen irregularity (Düvell 
2011b; Kraler 2009).
Befallen irregularity is a distinct risk for Senegalese migrants under the immigra-
tion laws in France, Italy, and Spain. Loss of regular status in France is linked to the 
limited duration of residence and work permits: most migrants with regular status 
possess a temporary permit with a maximum duration of 1 year, and they must apply 
for renewals while still in regular status; a permanent resident permit is only obtain-
able after years1 of continuous regular residence in France (GISTI 2011). Frequent 
changes in immigration law have been common and tightened renewal procedures 
have increased the risk of losing regular status (Lochak 1997). The experience of 
Senegalese sans papiers in France in the 1990s illustrated this risk: the Pasqua law 
of 1993 made renewal of permanent residence permits more difficult, thus creating 
many irregular migrants who were nonetheless not deportable because of family ties 
to France (Lochak 1997).
In Italy, legal employment is a prerequisite for legal residency, thus migrants 
who are unemployed or who are working in the underground economy can easily 
fall into fully irregular status because of lack of a formal work contract (Fasani 
2010). Spain’s approach to dealing with befallen irregularity has evolved over time: 
prior to 2000, migrants could lose regular status because of bureaucratic delays, but 
the immigration laws of that year specified that non-response by the administration 
3  months after the submission of a renewal application constitutes a renewal of 
regular status (González-Enríquez 2010). Still, Spain has similar employment pro-
visions to Italy, and many migrants thus lose regular status when they are unable to 
prove legal employment; this is especially true following extraordinary regulariza-
tions, the requirements of which are less strict than for subsequent renewals 
(González-Enríquez 2010). These inconsistencies in Spanish immigration law have 
led scholars to conclude that maintaining regular status is almost impossible in 
Spain (Calavita 1998; Donato and Armenta 2011).
3.2  Hypotheses
The geographic and status flows discussed above represent the most important path-
ways—in either numeric or political terms—into or out of irregular status in France, 
Italy, and Spain. These pathways are ideal types, and the goal of this chapter is to 
determine how Senegalese migrants in the main contexts of reception in Europe 
1 The required waiting period has varied over time and is currently 5 years (GISTI 2011).
3 Pathways into Irregular Legal Status of Senegalese Migrants France, Italy, and Spain
87
navigate these pathways. The theoretical literature reviewed above offers several 
hypotheses regarding variation in pathways of irregularity:
Legal and Social Production of Irregularity Variation in immigration-control poli-
cies and related social institutions over destinations and time will produce variation 
in the pathways of irregularity for Senegalese migrants in France, Italy, and Spain.
• Pathways of irregularity will be positively associated with more-recent periods 
as restrictive immigration-control policies create more pathways to irregular 
status;
• Migrants in Italy and Spain will experience more forms of irregularity as a result 
of contextual factors such as later establishment of restrictive immigration pol-
icy, longer borders with migrant-sending regions, and greater social tolerance of 
irregularity;
• Links to other institutions: unemployment may lead to increased risk of irregular 
status because the renewal of permits is often linked to having a formal work 
contract, especially in Spain and Italy; spousal or parental connections in the 
destination country may be associated with decreased probability of experienc-
ing irregular pathways because of provisions that grant legal status for family 
reunification, being the parent of a minor child, or marrying a citizen of the des-
tination country.
Migrant Capital and Strategic Action Migrants’ access to different forms of capital 
will influence their navigation of pathways of irregularity. In particular, migrants 
with greater access to human, financial, and social capital will be less likely to expe-
rience irregularity, but some forms of migration-specific capital (e.g., previous 
irregular experience) may increase the probability of other forms of irregularity.
Linkages Between Pathways of Irregularity Forms of irregularity can be temporally 
interrelated and difficult to escape, and can also provide migrants with skills and 
knowledge that make subsequent circumvention of immigration-control mecha-
nisms more likely.
3.3  Data and Methods
3.3.1  Sample
This chapter uses longitudinal life-history data from the Migrations between Africa 
and Europe (MAFE)-Senegal project, described in detail in Chap. 1. The project 
collected retrospective data that included complete year-by-year residential and 
administrative histories of each respondent, along with a host of other socio- 




The sample for the analysis in this chapter includes individuals who have 
migrated at least once to Italy, France or Spain while they were greater than 18 (see 
Chap. 1 for more details on the MAFE sampling and selection scheme). Returned 
migrants interviewed in Senegal are included if they spent at least a year in at least 
one of the destination countries. Approximately 14% of the migrants spent time in 
multiple destinations within the three main contexts of reception; this chapter con-
siders migration “spells” or individual trips of 1 year or greater by grouping the 
years that an individual migrant spent in an individual country. This yielded 768 
individual- and destination-specific trips that form the basic unit of analysis: 305 in 
France, 239 in Italy, and 224 in Spain. Descriptive statistics for this sample by coun-
try of destination, calculated with probability sampling weights, are available in 
Table  3.2. These descriptive statistics show important differences between 
Senegalese migrants in the different contexts of reception. Men account for more 
than 80% of the person-years spent by Senegalese migrants in Italy and Spain, but 
only 59% in France. Human capital varied across destinations: Senegalese migrants 
in France tend to be more highly educated with an average of 11 years of formal 
schooling, compared to 9.8  years in Italy and 6.7  in Spain. More than half of 
Senegalese migrants in Spain (63%) and Italy (56%) reported not speaking the host- 
country language before arrival, while proficiency in French was almost universal 
prior to arrival in France. Contexts of reception also varied: almost half of migrants 
in France arrived before 1990, while most in Italy (48%) and Spain (66%) arrived 
after 2000.
3.3.2  Legal Status Variables
Administrative histories provided information on migrants’ statuses in the legal 
domains of entry, residence, and work authorization. Table 3.3 provides the wording 
of the questions that elicited these statuses and the coding of responses. A dichoto-
mous variable captures entry status as visa (V) or no visa (NV) based on migrants’ 
responses about whether or not they had a visa when they entered the destination 
country; this variable is thus defined for the year of arrival for each trip. Senegalese 
nationals did not need visas to enter France between 1960 and 1985 or Italy between 
1966 and 1990; migrants who entered those countries during those periods are 
coded as having a visa since they effectively had an authorized entry status.
For residence and work permits, the questionnaire asked about migrants’ autho-
rization in each year in a given destination, and allowed migrants to respond that 
they had, did not have, or did not need a permit; migrants were additionally able to 
specify if the work permit was “selective” (i.e., a permit limited to a specific activ-
ity). A dichotomous residence authorization variable captures residence permit (RP) 
or no residence permit (NRP) for each year in the trip, with those migrants who 
declared not needing a residence permit coded as having authorized residence status 
(RP) because of their effectively authorized status. A dichotomous variable for work 
status results in statuses of having/not needing a work permit (WP) and not having 
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a work permit (NWP) for each year in the trip; those migrants who declared a selec-
tive work permit were collapsed into the work permit (WP) category.
A composite categorical variable for legal status in each year in the trip combines 
the indicators of residence and work permits. The combinations of these two forms 
of authorization were coded as: RP_WP (ego has both residence and work permits), 
NRP_WP (ego has no residence permit, but a work permit), RP_NWP (ego has a 
residence permit but no work permit), NRP_NWP (ego has neither a residence per-
mit nor a work permit). This chapter will refer the RP_WP status as “fully regular,” 
while NRP_NWP status is “fully irregular.” This chapter uses a variety of terms to 
describe RP_NWP and NRP_WP statuses, including “precarious,” “semi- 
compliant,” “semi-irregular,” and “mixed.” These indicators of legal status serve as 
both dependent and independent variables reflecting the pathways into irregularity 
under examination. This basic typology will serve as the main framework for legal 
status in this and subsequent chapters. The descriptive statistics in Table 3.2 show 
that migrants experience a variety of post-entry legal statuses, and that these sta-
tuses vary by destination. Migrants spend 56% percent of their person years in fully 
regular (RP_WP) status across all destinations, and 29% of their person years in 
fully irregular (NRP_NRP) status. They spend about 15% of person-years in semi- 
irregular statuses, with lack of work authorization (RP_NWP) the most common 
precarious status. Migrants in France are most likely to have both a residence and a 
work permit (60% of person-years), while migrants in Spain are most likely to have 
fully irregular status (40% of person-years). Both kinds of precarious status are 
more prevalent in Italy than in other destinations. While these descriptive statistics 
are once again suggestive of systematic differences in irregularity by context, they 
do not allow examination of disaggregated pathways.
Table 3.3 Legal-status variables and coding, MAFE-Senegal survey
Legal 
domain Question Modalities Codes
Entry “When you arrived in [destination 
country], did you have a visa? And then? 
Did your situation change?”
Yes V: Visa
No NV: No visa
Residence “When you arrived in [destination 
country], did you have a residence permit? 
And then? Did your situation change?”
Yes RP: Residence permit/
Did not needDid not 
need
No NRP: No residence 
permit
Work “As for work, when you arrived in 
[destination country], did you have a work 
permit? And then? Did your situation 
change?”
Yes WP: Work permit/special 




No NWP: No work permit
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3.3.3  Predictor Variables
The main predictors of interest in the model are indicators of legal and social con-
texts of reception. Called contextual variables below, these include indicators for 
destination country (France, Italy, or Spain, with France serving as the reference 
category), period of arrival (prior to 1991, 1991–1999, and after 2000), and an indi-
cator for whether or not a regularization program took place in the destination in the 
migrant’s year of entry (see Kraler 2009: 37–39 for a comprehensive list of regular-
ization programs).
The second set of predictors indicates a migrant’s access to various forms of 
capital. Migration-specific capital or prior migration experience varies by model 
and includes prior no-visa entry and previous legal-status category. Human capital 
includes years of education and competence in the language of the destination. 
Financial capital includes participation of the family in financing the migration and 
the migrant’s subjective economic status before migration. Social capital is captured 
by the number of contacts the migrant reports knowing at the destination prior 
(either prior to arrival or during the year of the outcome, depending on the model).
The third set of predictors captures a migrant’s links to social institutions. 
Dummy variables indicate if the migrant has a spouse or children in the destination 
country, and a categorical variable indicates the migrant’s labor-market status 
(working, unemployed, or inactive).
Models also include variables capturing individual sociodemographic character-
istics, including age at migration and dummy variables for sex (male), ethnicity 
(Wolof), religion (Mouride), geographic origin in Senegal (Dakar), father’s level of 
education (less than secondary school), migration plans (definitive stay), and migra-
tion motivation (work/better life).
3.3.4  Models
I model each of the three main pathways into irregular status reviewed above. The 
model for no-visa entry examines determinants of the dichotomous indicator for 
starting a trip with a visa and is thus a cross-sectional model at the time of arrival. 
The model for overstaying uses a cross-sectional multinomial logistic regression to 
study migrants’ residence and work authorizations during the first year of residence 
in a destination. A final model for befallen irregularity examines transitions over 
time into fully irregular status and uses discrete-time survival methods.
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 No-Visa Entry
For the model of the pathway of no-visa entry, the dependent variable is the dichoto-
mous variable that indicates whether or not the migrant declared having a visa at the 
time of entry into the destination country, with values of 1 corresponding to “no 
visa” and values of 0 corresponding to “visa.” All 768 trips and their entry-status 
indicators are included in the analytic sample for this model. I estimated the follow-
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where X1 is a vector of contextual variables, including an interaction between des-
tination and period. X2 is a vector of variables indicating prior migration experi-
ence: a categorical variable encodes a previous migration spell beginning with or 
without a visa (with no previous migration spell as the reference category), and a 
dummy variable indicates whether ego was a returned migrant at the time of the 
survey. X3 is a vector of variables indicating access to forms of capital, with subjec-
tive economic status and number of contacts measured before the trip. X4 is a vector 
of variables representing links to institutions, with employment measured in the 
year prior to the trip. X5 is a vector of individual variables.
 Overstaying
The analytic sample for the model of the pathway of overstaying again included all 
768 trips. The dependent variable is the categorical variable indicating a migrant’s 
legal status (combining indicators of residence and work authorization) during the 

















÷÷ = +a X X X X X1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5b b b b b+ + + +  (3.2)
where i indexes the following values of the categorical legal-status variable for the 
first year at a destination: RP_WP (1), RP_NWP (2), NRP_WP (3); the reference 
category for this regression is NWP_NWP (4). Predictors are identical to those for 
Eq. (3.1), with the following exceptions: X2 is a dichotomous indicator of entry 
status during the same trip, coded as “1” for entry with a visa and “0” for entry 
without a visa; X3 includes the number of previous migration spells as an indicator 
of migration-specific capital and measures self-reported economic status during 
year 1 of the migration spell; and the labor-market indicators in X4 are measured 
during year 1 of the migration spell. Overstaying is indicated in this model by hav-
ing entered with a visa and subsequently having a fully irregular legal status during 
the first year of residence at the destination.
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where predictors are the same as in Eq. (3.2), except that X3 t now contains a tri-
chotomous variable indicating ego’s legal status at time t, which can take the values 
of RP_WP, NRP_WP, or RP_NWP. In addition, variables that are time-varying—
number of contacts at the same destination, presence of family members at the same 
destination, and labor-market participation—are measured at time t (a lag of −1 
compared to the outcome variable).
 Estimation and Presentation of Models
All models correct standard errors for clustering at the level of the individual, which 
allows the inclusion of multiple trips per individual. The results of the nonlinear 
multivariate models are in the form of average marginal effects. In ordinary least 
squares (OLS) models, regression coefficients represent marginal effects, or the 
expected change in the outcome variable for a one-unit change in the predictor vari-
able. For nonlinear models, however, the use of a transformation that allows linear 
modeling of the dependent variable renders interpretation of coefficients less 
straightforward as the probability of the modeled outcome depends, in part, on the 
values of the predictors.
While some studies present results for nonlinear models as log-odds or odds 
ratios, presentation on the same scale as the original data, as is the case with marginal 
(also called partial) effects, is arguably easier to interpret. For example, computation 
of marginal effects after a logistic regression model would show how the probability 
of the outcome changes with a one-unit change for a given predictor variable. 
Marginal effects also allow for interpretable summaries of interactions between pre-
dictors that would be difficult to construct with odds ratios. Average marginal effects 
are calculated by computing a marginal effect for each case and averaging the value 
over all cases. If predictors are categorical, the AME represents the expected change 
in the outcome with a discrete change in the value of the categorical variable (see 
 Befallen Irregularity
Befallen irregularity is indicated in this model by a transition into fully irregular 
(NRP_NWP) status. As a dynamic model, it follows individuals over the course of 
their stay in a destination until they fall into irregular status or are censored. The 
analytic sample for the model thus includes only those person-years during which a 
migrant had a fully regular status or a semi-irregular status (i.e., not NRP_NWP). 
This risk set thus includes 6731 person years. The outcome is a leading dichoto-
mous variable indicating whether the migrant’s legal status at time t + 1 changed to 
fully irregular (NRP_NWP). I estimated a discrete-time survival model to study the 
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Cameron and Trivedi 2010 for more information on average marginal effects). 
Standard errors for AMEs are calculated using the delta method. Tables of untrans-
formed coefficient estimates are available in this chapter’s Appendix.
3.4  Results
3.4.1  No-Visa Entry
Descriptive statistics suggest initial support for the hypothesis that context of recep-
tion plays an important role in shaping the pathway of no-visa entry. Table 3.2 pres-
ents descriptive statistics for the sample under study and shows that 37% of the 
migration spells of Senegalese migrants in the MAFE sample started without a visa 
across all three destination countries. The probability of no-visa entry varies a great 
deal by destination: while only 25% of migration spells in France started without a 
visa, 46% did so in Italy and more than half (53%) did so in Spain. Figure 3.2 shows 
further variation by destination and period. Across all three countries, the probabil-
ity of no-visa entry has increased since the beginning of the 1990s. No-visa entry 
was most common during the 1990s in both France and Italy, while it was most 
prevalent in Spain during the 2000s. This figure also makes it clear that no-visa 
entry has been more common in all periods in both Italy and Spain than in France.














Visa/No Need No Visa
Fig. 3.2 Entry status by destination and period. (Source: MAFE-Senegal. Weighted proportions. 
Vertical line represents mean of entry with visa)
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Model 1 confirms that no-visa entry is more common in Italy and Spain and in 
earlier periods. Table 3.4 displays the results of the logistic regression of no-visa 
entry described by Eq. (3.1) in the form of average marginal effects (AMEs). This 
model reproduces the main insights of the descriptive statistics regarding context, 
while adjusting estimates for a host of other contextual and individual variables. 
Compared to migrants in France, migrants are 14 percentage points more likely to 
start a migration spell in Spain without a visa, and 18 percentage points more likely 
to do so in Italy. The relationship between period of arrival and the probability of 
no-visa entry is even greater: compared to those migration spells starting before 
1991, migrants arriving in the 1990s experienced a 24-point increase in the proba-
bility of no-visa entry, while for arrivals in the 2000s the increase was 26 points. 
Perhaps counterintuitively, migrating during the year of a regularization program is 
negatively associated with entering without a visa (but only at p < .10).
Because the model includes an interaction between destination and period (which 
is taken into account when calculating average marginal effects), it is also possible 
to examine how destination and period work together to shape this pathway. 
Figure 3.3 shows the predicted probability of no-visa entry for each combination of 
destination and period and confirms that the probability of no-visa entry to Italy has 
been almost 60% since 1991, statistically significantly higher than all periods in 
France and the pre-1991 period in both Spain and Italy. While there is no statisti-








AME se AME se AME se
Context
  Period (ref.: pre-1991)
  1991–2000 0.24*** 0.044 0.10* 0.046 0.0022 0.0030
  2000–2008 0.26*** 0.047 0.21*** 0.045 −0.0018 0.0024
  Destination (ref.: France)
  Spain 0.14** 0.051 0.12* 0.052 0.00063 0.0023
  Italy 0.18*** 0.050 0.083 0.054 0.0032 0.0026
  Regularization year (ref.: no) −0.067+ 0.036 0.078* 0.035 0.0022 0.0014
Previous migration experience
  Previous mig. exp.(ref.: none)
  Previous mig. exp. w/visa −0.0056 0.075 – – – –
  Previous mig. exp. w/out visa 0.34** 0.12 – – – –
  Entry status (ref.: no visa) – – 0.11** 0.036 0.0014 0.0014
  Origin legal status (ref.: RP_NWP)
  Mixed (NRP_WP) – – – – 0.0012 0.0057
  Fully regular (RP_WP) – – – – −0.0061* 0.0030
  Return migrant (ref.: no) 0.20** 0.065 −0.14* 0.062 0.00027 0.0030
(continued)









AME se AME se AME se
Forms of capital
  Years of education −0.008* 0.003 −.01*** 0.003 0.00011 0.0002
  Speaks language of dest. (ref.: yes) −0.066+ 0.036 0.012 0.041 −0.0029+ 0.0017
  Financial help of family (ref.: no) −0.052 0.039 −0.084* 0.038 0.00046 0.0022
  Self-reported economic status (ref.: 
bad)a
−0.13* 0.057 0.052 0.086 −0.0027 0.0023
  Number of contacts at dest. 0.0025 0.016 −0.014 0.009 −0.00041 0.0007
  Number of trips – – −0.1*** 0.021 0.0012* 0.0005
Links to social institutions
  Kids at dest. (ref.: no)a −0.019 0.054 −0.14* 0.060 −0.0027 0.0020
  Spouse at dest. (ref.: no)a 0.022 0.049 −0.13** 0.047 0.00049 0.0025
  Economic activity (ref.: inactive)
  Unemployeda 0.028 0.068 0.19* 0.076 0 .
  Employeda −0.039 0.041 0.11* 0.047 −0.01*** 0.0017
  Definitive plans to stay (ref.: no) 0.059+ 0.034 0.011 0.033 0.00017 0.0018
  Migration motive: work (ref.: not 
work)
−0.021 0.036 0.026 0.038 −0.00029 0.0020
Individual sociodemographic 
characteristics
  Age at migration 0.0056* 0.002 −0.0036 0.003 0.000052 0.0001
  Sex: male (ref.: female) 0.046 0.044 −0.066 0.041 0.00029 0.0025
  Ethnicity: Wolof (ref.: other) 0.031 0.035 0.043 0.037 −0.0045* 0.0020
  Religion: Mouride (ref.: other) 0.13*** 0.036 0.062 0.038 −0.0017 0.0017
  Geographic origin: Dakar (ref.: other) −0.019 0.035 0.087* 0.035 0.0046+ 0.0027
  Father’s education: < secondary (ref.: 
>)
−0.040 0.035 0.053 0.036 0.00020 0.0018
  Status duration (years) – – – – −0.001* 0.0004
  Num. of status spells – – – – −0.0080* 0.0031
  N 763 763 6731
  Log likelihood −395.37 −690.40 −1577.11
  Pseudo R2 0.2045 0.2262 0.2290
Source: MAFE-Senegal
Notes: +p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Average marginal effects displayed. Models 
include interaction between destination and period
aVariable measured prior to migration for model I
bLogistic regression of no-visa entry
cMultinomial logistic regression of four legal-status categories
dDiscrete-time survival model (logistic regression) of status change to NRP_NWP (fully irregular)
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cally significant difference in the predicted probability of no-visa entry in Spain 
between periods, the pattern found in the descriptive statistics of a monotonic 
increase over time remains. No-visa entry seemed to peak in France in the 1990s, 
but both later periods have predicted probabilities of no-visa entry that are statisti-
cally significantly higher than the pre-1991 period. It is thus clear that context, both 
in terms of destination and period of arrival, plays an important role in shaping 
access to the no-visa pathway to irregularity, and that this pathway is more common 
in Southern Europe (especially Italy).
While the indicators for destination country and period could capture the effects 
of a number of factors, such as economic conditions, there is reason to suspect that 
the increase in entry without a visa over time and in southern Europe is related prin-
cipally to the evolution towards increased restrictiveness in the legal context. 
France’s immigration policy evolved in a restrictive direction, and the southern 
European countries went from a complete lack of a national-level immigration 
framework to a system designed to plug perceived holes in Mediterranean borders. 
The increase in no-visa entry over time, especially in southern Europe, is indicative 
of the creation of this pathway of irregularity by immigration policy.
In addition to shedding light on the contextual factors shaping no-visa entry, 
Model I of Table 3.4 suggests other factors associated with this pathway to irregu-
larity. There is a strong link to previous irregular experience: having entered a 
 destination without a visa during a previous migration spell is associated with an 
increase in the probability of no-visa entry of 34 points. Indeed, this is the strongest 
predictor of no-visa entry in terms of magnitude, and thus offers evidence of the 
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Predicted probability
pre-1991 1991-1999 2000-2008
Fig. 3.3 Predictive margins of no-visa entry, by destination and period, with 95% confidence 
intervals. (Source: MAFE-Senegal. Vertical line represents average predictive margin)
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migration-specific capital: migrants draw on knowledge and skills gained on previ-
ous trips starting with an unauthorized entry to make future unauthorized entry 
more likely. Returned migrants are also 20 percentage points more likely to have 
started their trips without a visa.
In addition to migration-specific capital, other forms of capital are also associ-
ated with no-visa entry as hypothesized. Financial capital plays a role in irregular 
entry: while there is no association between family resources, social class (as mea-
sured by father’s education), or employment prior to migration with no-visa entry, 
good subjective economic status is associated with a lower probability of no-visa 
entry. This suggests that visas are selective of the economically successful, but 
research has also shown that resources of many kinds are necessary for irregular 
entry (for travel, passeur fees, etc.). There is also evidence of other forms of capital: 
belonging to the Mouride Islamic brotherhood is associated with an increase of 13 
points in the probability of migrating without a visa; this brotherhood is well known 
for facilitating the migration of its members by providing social and economic sup-
port (Kaag 2008; Riccio 2008), and this finding suggests that its members can draw 
on the social capital in this network for resources to circumvent entry restrictions. 
There is no evidence in the model of associations between links to family in destina-
tion and the probability of no-visa entry, which indicates those migrants who have 
families in the destination country do not attempt to rejoin them via this pathway 
and suggests that families wishing to reunify have access to channels that permit 
legal entry.
3.4.2  Pathway: Overstaying
Results for overstaying suggest once again the importance of context and access to 
forms of capital for this pathway to irregularity, and also show the importance of 
links to institutions at the destination. Figure  3.4 shows the first legal status of 
Senegalese migrants’ migration spells by both destination and entry status. This 
figure suggests that migrants in France are more likely to transition to fully regular 
(RP_WP) status following arrival than migrants in Italy or Spain; the proportion of 
migrants transitioning to this status in France is close to half regardless of entry 
status, while it is much lower in both Spain and Italy. Most of this difference seems 
to be explained by higher probabilities of transition to fully irregular first status 
(NRP_NWP) in the southern European countries. In addition, a higher proportion of 
migrants entering with a visa transition to fully irregular first status in Italy and 
Spain than in France. Indeed, in France, entering without a visa seems to be associ-
ated with increased probability of transitioning to irregular status, indicating that 
irregular entry is more closely associated with irregular status in the first year. Thus, 
irregular first status is higher overall in the southern European countries and in par-




Table 3.4 shows selected results for the multinomial logistic regression of model 
2. While the model includes all four legal-status categories in the dependent 
variable,2 Table 3.4 only displays average marginal effects for the probability of 
fully irregular (NRP_NWP) first status as the pathway of interest concerns transi-
tion from having an entry visa to fully irregular status. The model confirms the 
descriptive results: on average, entering with a visa is associated with an increase of 
11 percentage points in the probability of having a fully irregular first legal status. 
This result, while seemingly counterintuitive, suggests that irregularity is not merely 
the result of irregular entry and, conversely, that illegal entry does not lead to per-
manent irregularity.
The probability of irregular status during the year of arrival also varies by desti-
nation: the model confirms that irregular first status is more common in southern 
Europe: the probability of first-status irregularity is 14 and 11 percentage points 
higher in Italy and Spain, respectively, than France. The effects of period of arrival 
are also evident: arrival in the 1990s is associated with an increase of 11 percentage 
points in the probability of transition to irregular first status, while the increase is 26 
points for the 2000s. Arriving during the year of regularization is positively associ-
ated with the probability of having irregular status upon arrival, suggesting that 
Senegalese migrants may have sought out destinations for the regularization oppor-
tunities they offered at certain points in time.
2 While “NRP_NWP” was identified as the base category for modeling purposes, it is possible to 
calculate the average marginal effects related to the probability of this category since the probabili-
ties of all categories must sum to unity.











Fully Irreg. Mixed (no RP) Mixed (no WP) Fully Reg.
Fig. 3.4 First legal status by destination and entry status. (Source: MAFE-Senegal. Weighted 
proportions)
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The model allows an examination of how the effect of entering with a visa varies 
by context. Figure 3.5 displays the predicted probabilities of NRP_NWP first status 
by entry status and destination and shows that the probability of transitioning to 
irregular status after arrival is higher for migrants with visas in Italy and Spain than 
in France. Conversely, there is no statistically significant difference in the probabil-
ity of this transition between the three countries for migrants entering without 
visas. The positive effect of entering with a visa on the probability of being irregu-
lar during the year of arrival is thus concentrated in the southern European destina-
tions, and the effect is strongest in Italy, as Fig. 3.6 shows. There is thus ample 
evidence that this pathway is produced by variation in context, both geographically 
and over time.
Social, migration-specific, and financial forms of capital are negatively associ-
ated with becoming irregular during the first year of residence. As Model II of 
Table 3.4 shows, the probability of first-status irregularity decreases with the num-
ber of contacts at destination, the number of previous migration spells, the financial 
participation of the migrants’ family, and the migrants’ self-reported economic sta-
tus before the trip. Access to a variety of resources thus protects against first-status 
irregularity. Having children in the destination country is also associated with 
reduced probability of first-status irregularity, as is having a spouse at destination 
(although the effect is not statistically significant), indicating that family links at 
destination help protect migrants from irregularity. Returned migrants are also less 
likely to have been in fully irregular status during their year of arrival despite having 
a higher probability of having entered without a visa. Other factors are positively 
associated with this pathway: being from Dakar and migrating for work/a better life 
No Visa
Visa/No Need
.2 .4 .6 .8
Predicted probability
France Spain Italy
Fig. 3.5 Predictive margins of NRP_NWP first status, by entry status and destination, with 95% 
confidence intervals. (Source: MAFE-Senegal. Vertical line represents average predictive margin)
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are positively associated with the probability of first-status irregularity, and belong-
ing to the Mouride brotherhood is marginally positively associated with this out-
come (p = 0.051).
3.4.3  Pathway: Befallen Irregularity
Unlike the pathways of no-visa entry and overstaying, the determinants of the path-
way of befallen irregularity are prior legal status, while there is little evidence of 
contextual variation or relationship to forms of capital. The overall probability of 
transition from fully regular or semi-irregular statuses to fully irregular status is 
quite low: a basic life table (not reported) indicates that less than 4% of migrants at 
risk for this transition ever actually experience it. This provides descriptive evidence 
that migrants with fully regular or semi-irregular statuses are unlikely to transition 
to fully irregular status. This finding is borne out by the graphical transition matrix 
of Fig.  3.7, which shows that transitions into full irregularity are rare among 
migrants who change status; indeed, the most common transitions seem to be into 
fully regular status (RP_WP).
Model III of Table 3.4 displays results from the discrete-time survival analysis of 
befallen irregularity, and indicates that origin legal status—the status from which a 
migrant may transition into fully irregular status—is one of the strongest sets of 
predictors in the model. Migrants with fully regular status are less likely to transi-
tion to irregular status than those with either semi-irregular status. Figure 3.8 depicts 
predicted probabilities of befallen irregularity and shows that the predicted proba-
bility for fully regular migrants of transitioning to fully irregular status is less than 
half of the average predicted probability for migrants with semi-irregular statuses. 
Fig. 3.6 Average marginal effect of entry with visa on NRP_NWP first status, with 95% confi-
dence intervals. (Source: MAFE-Senegal)
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There is thus evidence that fully regular status is quite “sticky,” i.e., transitions from 
it into full irregularity are rare. The low (close to 1%) predicted probabilities of 
befallen irregularity for migrants with semi-irregular legal status suggest that transi-
tions into full irregularity are rare from any prior status.
Fig. 3.7 Legal status transitions. (Source: MAFE-Senegal. Horizontal line represents average pre-
dictive margin)




Unlike previous pathways, context—destination and period of arrival—does not 
have a statistically significant relationship with befallen irregularity. While origin 
legal status is strongly related to the probability of transitioning to fully irregular 
status, entry status is not. Forms of capital are also not significantly related to this 
transition, with the exception of the number of previous migrations. The positive 
relationship between number of migrations and the probability of befallen irregular-
ity suggests that previous migration experience may help navigate a destination’s 
institutions and labor market in an irregular status. Among predictors indicating 
links to destination institutions, only the employment variable is associated with 
befallen irregularity: being unemployed is negatively related to this transition. 
Surprisingly, neither having a spouse nor having children in the same destination is 
protective of falling into irregularity.
Among the remaining predictors, the duration of the legal status before transi-
tion, the number of legal-status spells, and Wolof ethnicity are all negatively related 
to the probability of transitioning to fully irregular status. The duration and number 
of spells variables indicate that transitions to irregularity, if they occur, happen early 
in migrants’ stay in a destination country, and that experiencing multiple kinds of 
legal status help migrants avoid fully irregular status. While indicators of context 
are not statistically significantly related to befallen irregularity, the ethnicity and 
employment variables are suggestive of contextual effects. Non-Wolof migrants are 
concentrated in France, and literature suggests they are mainly Soninké from earlier 
migration flows (Timera and Garnier 2010); this may be indicative of transitions to 
irregularity under France’s somewhat lax immigration regime of the 1960s and 
early 1970s.
3.5  Discussion
Literature on the pathways into irregular legal status has drawn on insights from 
research on the “legal production of illegality” to insist on the importance of context 
in setting the parameters that shape the pathways in a given context of reception. 
This literature has also challenged dominant binary conceptualizations of legal sta-
tus by examining multiple forms of irregularity and changes in these often-fuzzy 
statuses over time. This chapter has drawn on these insights to study three pathways 
into irregular status among Senegalese migrants in France, Italy, and Spain: no-visa 
entry, overstaying, and befallen irregularity.
In keeping with the literature on the legal production of illegality, this chapter 
hypothesized that context—both destination country and period—would play a pre-
ponderant role in structuring all of the pathways by setting the legal parameters of 
irregularity. The results, however, showed that context was more important in struc-
turing pathways that occur early in the migrant’s trajectory—no-visa entry and over-
staying—than subsequent transitions to irregularity. The pathway of no-visa entry 
was more likely in Spain and Italy than in France, and the prevalence of no- visa entry 
rose monotonically over time in the southern European countries, while it peaked in 
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France in the 1990s. Context likewise had a strong association with the pathway of 
overstaying: irregular first status more likely for those entering with visa in Italy and 
Spain than in France, with the strongest relationship in Italy. The probability of irreg-
ular first status also increased monotonically over time by period of arrival.
The effects of context were less clear, however, for changes in legal status once 
migrants were established at the destination. There was virtually no direct relation-
ship between context and befallen irregularity. This contrasts with research that 
shows that status transitions are common in southern Europe (Fasani 2010; 
González-Enríquez 2010) or with the review in Chap. 2 that outlines the multiplica-
tion of various pathways into irregularity. These findings suggest that context is 
more important in shaping the pathways that occur closer in time to the act of cross-
ing a border.
The political discourses (Vollmer 2011) and resources devoted to border control 
in all three destinations (Courau 2009; Fasani 2010; González-Enríquez 2010) may 
help make sense of the stronger relationship that contextual indicators have to these 
earlier pathways. The policy and legal parameters surrounding entry have varied the 
most between destinations and over time, with a pronounced evolution towards 
restrictiveness and a resultant externalization of control mechanisms (Brochmann 
1999). Increased border surveillance and tighter visa requirements are common 
responses in France, Italy, and Spain to political pressures at both the national 
(Freedman 2004; González-Enríquez 2009; Sciortino 1999) and EU level (Finotelli 
and Sciortino 2009) to appear “in control” of migration.
As many studies of immigration control have shown, though, policies often have 
unintended consequences (Brochmann 1999). Increased external controls have cre-
ated irregular entry flows directly by definition, and have, as a result, transformed 
regular flows into irregular ones. At the same time, these restrictive entry policies 
will make migrants less likely to depart once in destination because of increased 
risk and costs of entry; this may favor the production of irregularity in the first legal 
status at destination. These dynamics resemble features of the Mexico-United States 
migration system, where increased border control has done little to prevent undocu-
mented migration as measured by apprehension probabilities and has instead led to 
longer stays of undocumented migrants because of the increased price and risk of 
undocumented border crossing (Massey et al. 2002, 2016). The increases of no-visa 
entry and overstaying thus underline that irregularity is a manufactured state rather 
than a characteristic of the migrants themselves.
In contrast, policy attention given to border control and controlling geographic 
flows has often meant a relative negligence of frameworks governing migrants’ inte-
gration once at destination (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009; Freedman 2004; González- 
Enríquez 2009; Sciortino 1999). This is borne out by the MAFE-Senegal data: 
changes of status are somewhat rare (less than 50% of the sample changed status), 
and they are not tightly linked to context. This suggests that those transitions that do 
take place may not be systematically produced by sociolegal frameworks that vary 
over destination and time, but instead are embedded in logics of integration that 
have not been major policy concerns, perhaps because of general acceptance or 
ignorance of migrants’ irregular status once they are established at a destination.
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This chapter also drew on the literature on expanded conceptualizations of irreg-
ularity to hypothesize that there would be systematic links between various path-
ways of irregularity. Prior no-visa entry was strongly predictive of current no-visa 
entry. Previous undocumented border crossing could thus be considered as a form 
of migration-specific capital that makes future undocumented trips more likely, a 
finding that is common in the US context (Massey and Espinosa 1997). Entering 
with a visa on the current trip, on the other hand, was strongly predictive of transi-
tion to fully irregular first legal status in Italy and Spain. For these migrants, a visa 
may simply be a springboard into informal employment in societies that have a 
higher tolerance of irregularity; in France, on the other hand, even migrants with 
visas have a fairly low predicted probability of transitioning to fully irregular status, 
implying that there may be more stable paths to regularity or more intolerance of 
irregularity there. In contrast, there was no association between entry status and 
subsequent transitions to irregularity, indicating that befallen irregularity later in 
Senegalese migrants’ stays at destination is not related to the mode of entry. At the 
same time, the results from the transition model suggest that legal statuses are 
sticky: migrants with fully regular status were less likely to transition to irregular 
status than those with semi-irregular statuses, indicating that fully regular status is 
difficult to lose once gained. Once again, this could be interpreted as a form of capi-
tal, this time in the legal domain: Senegalese migrants are able to convert their 
experience in regular status into a lower probability of falling into irregularity.
Taken together, these results paint a picture of interlinked pathways of irregular-
ity with complex relationships between different pathways. Entry with a visa, not 
irregular entry, is closely related to first-status irregularity in southern Europe, while 
it is unrelated to later transitions into irregular status. While policies focus on pre-
venting irregular entry, these results show that this externalization of control may 
simply be deferring Senegalese migrants’ irregularity to after arrival and creating 
demand for regularization mechanisms, either through formal programs or 
entitlement- based adjustments of status. Externalization of control, while able to 
curb some irregular flows, seems to do little to prevent other forms of irregularity; 
indeed, it creates a robust pathway into irregularity in the form of overstaying.
Forms of capital, identified in much previous research as important correlates of 
both migration and integration, seem to be similar to context in that they are impor-
tant for access to pathways that occur early on in the migration spell, and fade in 
importance for subsequent transitions. Entry without a visa was less likely for those 
migrants who self-reported good economic status prior to the migration, indicating 
that those who perceive themselves as better-off have easier access to visas. Indeed, 
the requirements for proof of resources and the financial means or ticket for the 
return trip that exist in most countries’ visa policies are a built-in method of select-
ing potential migrants on economic lines, and they must mobilize significant 
resources to meet these requirements (Sciortino 2004). Previous no-visa entry and 
belonging to the Mouride brotherhood were positively associated with the probabil-
ity of no-visa entry, pointing to the importance of migration-specific and social 
forms of capital in this pathway. Transition to first-status irregularity was the path-
way the most strongly related to forms of capital: financial (family financial help 
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and self-reported economic status), social (number of contacts at destination), and 
migration-specific (number of previous migrations) forms of capital all reduced the 
probability of irregular first status. While entering with a visa is resource-intensive, 
gaining regular legal status once in destination is even more so.
In contrast, there was almost no relationship between these indicators of access 
to resources and the probability of falling into fully irregular status. Instead, this 
transition seems to be more related to the migrant’s connection to institutions in the 
destination country. Having children in the destination country is associated with a 
reduced probability of first-status irregularity, as is having a spouse at destination. 
These family links thus seem to be protective against transitions into less-secure 
irregular statuses. While this chapter has not examined the timing of the formation 
of unions or the birth of children and thus cannot speak to the exact mechanism 
behind these associations, migrants may be accessing regular status through legal 
provisions for family attachment, such as family reunification or marriage to 
citizens.
In addition to the family, the labor market is another institution that plays a role 
in structuring transitions between legal statuses. Unemployment is associated with 
a lower probability of befallen irregularity. Thus, holding a job is not necessarily 
protective against befallen irregularity. While somewhat paradoxical from the point 
of view of the literature that argues that unemployment can lead to irregularity 
through the loss of a formal job contract that would allow renewal of work and resi-
dence permits, the association between employment and befallen irregularity could 
be an indication that Senegalese migrants who lose regular legal status are concen-
trated in informal labor markets. The fact that previous migration experience is also 
associated with befallen irregularity suggests that this form of migration-specific 
capital may help migrants navigate institutions such as the informal labor market 
(Reyneri 1998). Thus, befallen irregularity might be part of a logic of accumulation 
at the expense of documentation, which research suggests might be common among 
Senegalese migrants in Spain (van Nieuwenhuyze 2008).
3.6  Conclusion
Irregular migration is a controversial topic in most migrant-receiving countries 
around the world. Recent estimates put the undocumented population of the US at 
over ten million (Passel and D’Vera Cohn 2011), while Europe’s irregular popula-
tion is estimated to be somewhere between three and five million (Düvell 2011b). 
Unfortunately, understanding of this phenomenon in Europe is hampered by policy 
discourses and political processes that use “numbers games” (Sciortino 2004; 
Vollmer 2011) to placate public outcry over irregular migration by increasing bor-
der controls at the expense of the integration of migrants already in destination 
countries. While academic research has sought to improve methods of “counting the 
uncountable” to better frame policy debates, many studies have used a simplified 
dichotomous conceptualization of irregular status that both privileges examinations 
3.6 Conclusion
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of only one pathway to irregularity (undocumented border crossing) and hides het-
erogeneity in legal statuses.
This chapter has attempted to contribute to the growing literature calling for a 
more complex conceptualization of irregularity by examining the pathways into a 
set of irregular statuses among Senegalese migrants in Europe. Context plays a 
strong role in shaping no-visa entry and overstay, pathways that occur early in the 
migration trajectory. These pathways are likely to be the most responsive to varia-
tion over time and across destination of the sociolegal parameters of legal status 
since most of these parameters have increasingly converged on preventing irregular 
entry. These early pathways of irregularity are also responsive to migrants’ various 
forms of capital: migrants who have greater access to financial, human, and social 
capital are less likely to follow these paths into irregularity; migration-specific 
social capital in the form of prior no-visa entry facilitate current no-visa entry, but 
an increase in the number of previous trips protects against first-status irregularity. 
On average, then, access to resources gives migrants more options in terms of legal 
channels.
Transitions in legal status, such as overstaying and befallen irregularity, are more 
responsive to links to institutions in the destination country, suggesting that migrants 
participate actively in seeking pathways out of irregularity as part of a project of 
integration (van Nieuwenhuyze 2008). Employment is, somewhat paradoxically, 
related to increased probability of loss of regular status, which suggests that the link 
between labor market participation and legal status depends crucially on whether or 
not the migrant works in the formal sector.
In addition to findings on context and links to institutions, this study found that 
previous legal status was an important predictor of all of the pathways. This sup-
ports the emerging view in research on legal status that a static binary measure of 
legal status is not sufficient to capture the complexity of legal status categories and 
transitions over migrants’ life courses. This study thus contributes to the call for 
disaggregating legal status (Donato and Armenta 2011) and examining connections 
between different kinds of legal status. Furthermore, these findings present an 
important point of articulation with research that sees legal status as an increasingly 
important axis of stratification (Donato and Armenta 2011; Massey 2007) and could 
open the door to studies that examine status mobility in the same vein as studies of 
traditional social mobility. Understanding the potential structuredness and path- 
dependency of forms of irregularity could shed new light on the impact of irregular-
ity on migrants’ life chances.
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Chapter 4
Legal Status, Gender, and Economic 
Incorporation of Senegalese Migrants 
in France, Italy, and Spain
The economic integration of migrants is a major concern for policy makers, as is the 
legal status of immigrants in the labor market. While immigration-control legisla-
tion that confers residence and work authorization should theoretically mediate 
migrants’ access to the labor force, the presence and economic activity of millions 
of undocumented migrants in different receiving countries indicates that irregular 
legal status is often not a barrier to work. Indeed, some research suggests that immi-
grants are able to find work precisely because of their irregular status, which 
removes most legal recourse against exploitation by unscrupulous employers (Portes 
1978). Migrants are thus assumed to have economic motivations for their migration 
and to work in the destination economy regardless of their legal status.
This common perception of the link—or lack thereof—between migrants’ legal 
status and their economic incorporation fails to consider the role of gender. While 
post-war labor migration, both regular and irregular, to the U.S. and Western Europe 
was mostly male, flows of immigrants since the 1970s have seen an increasing share 
of women, many of whom entered through legal channels of family reunification 
(Kofman 1999). Although research has underlined the heterogeneity of these 
migrant women’s legal and economic situations, family-reunification policies have 
been highly gendered and have largely consigned women to economic and admin-
istrative dependency on their male sponsors. In addition, countries award different 
configurations of authorizations to reunified family members, thus creating a variety 
of forms of dependency (González-Ferrer 2011b).
Despite possessing a form of regular legal status, then, migrant women may ini-
tially be less likely to work than their male counterparts. While this has provoked 
The original version of this chapter was revised: Footnote was inserted in the chapter opening 
page. The correction to this chapter is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12088-7_7
Portions of Chapter 4 were previously published as: Vickstrom, E.  R., & González-Ferrer, A. 
(2016). Legal status, gender, and labor market participation of Senegalese migrants in France, 
Italy, and Spain. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 666(1), 
164–202. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716216643555.
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concerns about the growing numbers of inactive and “unproductive” migrants in 
some countries (Constant and Zimmermann 2005), the initial gendered asymmetry 
of economic integration may obscure subsequent mobility among women into the 
labor market. The impact of legal status on migrants’ economic integration thus 
seems to depend crucially on gendered channels created by immigration policies.
This chapter will draw on the literature on the gendering of immigration policies 
to examine the link between legal status and economic incorporation of Senegalese 
migrants in France, Italy, and Spain. It argues that the effect of legal status on 
Senegalese migrant’s labor-market participation will vary differ for men and women 
because of gendered immigration policies. The chapter is organized as follows. The 
next section reviews the literature on gendered immigration policies and the cre-
ation of migrant women’s economic and administrative dependency. The third sec-
tion lays out the chapter’s hypotheses. The fourth section reviews the data and 
presents the methods. The fifth section presents the results, and the sixth section 
discusses the findings and concludes.
4.1  Gendered Channels of Migration: Family Reunification, 
Legal Status, and Dependency
Research since the 1980s has increasingly focused on the exclusion of women from 
studies of the economic incorporation of migrants (Kofman 1999, 2004a). One of 
the main insights of this body of research is that immigration policies, while offi-
cially gender-neutral, have differential impacts on the mobility and subsequent eco-
nomic integration of male and female migrants (Lesselier 2008). Men were the 
primary beneficiaries of labor-recruitment policies in both the US and Western 
Europe up through the 1960s and 1970s (Lesselier 2008; Mahler and Pessar 2006). 
Governments, especially those in Western Europe, severely restricted these legal 
channels of labor immigration after the mid-1970s but continued to allow migrants 
legally residing in destination countries to bring close family members under family 
reunification schemes.
Indeed, family reunification has become the main channel of legal entry to most 
Western European countries (Kofman 1999). In France, for example, 70% of entries 
in 2008 were for family reasons, and family reunification with long-term foreign 
residents make up between 90,000 and 150,000 entries per year since 2000 (Lesselier 
2008). Research has shown, though, that family reunification is highly gendered: 
women, mostly spouses, make up the majority of reunified family members (Kofman 
1999). Fully 80% of the aforementioned annual entries for family reunification in 
France were women (Lesselier 2008). While not all women are reunified spouses—
research has increasingly pointed to a growing “feminization” of autonomous 
migration (Kofman 2004b)—family reunification remains the dominant channel of 
entry for women into most destinations and structures their legal and economic 
incorporation.
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4.1.1  Reunification and Gendered Economic 
and Administrative Dependency
Research has shown that family reunification policies create economic and admin-
istrative dependency for women, and that these forms of dependency have implica-
tions for women’s economic participation in destination-country labor markets 
(Boyd 1997; Lesselier 2008). Economic dependency among reunified spouses may 
arise from the legal requirements of demonstration of means of support by the spon-
sor. Family reunification policies often define male migrants as the primary bread-
winners through the economic conditions imposed for reunification (Kofman 2004a; 
Mahler and Pessar 2006), creating economic dependency of women on their hus-
band’s income (Lesselier 2008). Reunified spouses may thus be less likely to work 
because of their sponsors’ relatively high socioeconomic status (Toma 2012).
Economic dependency of reunified spouses may also arise because of legal bar-
riers to their labor-market participation. Legislation may formally prevent women 
from accessing the labor market by imposing waiting periods on the ability of reuni-
fied spouses to apply for and receive work permits, as is the case in Italy and Spain 
(Kofman 1999). The separation of residence and work permits that is common in 
Europe thus means that the legal right to reunify is not always synonymous with the 
legal right of reunified spouses to enter the labor force (Boyd 1989). Indeed, research 
on the “admission category” of migrants has generally found that refugees and 
reunified family members have worse labor-market outcomes than those of eco-
nomic migrants (Constant and Zimmermann 2005); these findings demonstrate the 
barriers that admissions policies impose rather than the motivations or unobserved 
characteristics of the admitted migrants (González-Ferrer 2011a). Reunified women 
who are excluded from the labor force as a result of legal waiting periods are thus 
dependent on their spouses for economic support, or they are forced to work ille-
gally. Indeed, reunified women who have economic in addition to family motiva-
tions for migration may bypass the legal reunification channel because it is, in 
effect, no different from irregular channels of reunification in terms of accessing the 
labor market (González-Ferrer 2011a).
In addition to economic dependency as a result of family reunification, women 
are often subject to administrative dependency. Immigration legislation makes the 
possibility of reunification conditional on the sponsor’s regular legal status (Lesselier 
2008). Women wishing to rejoin their husbands legally are therefore dependent on 
his acquisition of regular legal status. In addition, the legal status of reunified 
spouses after arrival is dependent on the primary migrant’s continued possession of 
regular legal status and the continuation of the marriage (Lesselier 2008). Women’s 
geographic mobility is thus subject to dependency both in relation to the state and 
within the household (Kofman 2004b). These asymmetric power relations may 
reduce women’s autonomy in making decisions about labor-market participation by 
tying them administratively to a husband’s legal situation. This dependency can 
decrease women’s bargaining power within the household, giving them less voice in 
their husbands’ decisions in the allocation of their labor to either productive or 
reproductive efforts (Kofman 1999). In countries such as France where there is no 
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waiting period for applying for a work permit, administrative dependency can still 
hamper reunified wives’ labor participation by tying women’s legal right to work to 
men’s regular status (Lesselier 2008).
The administrative dependency fostered by family reunification also creates a 
gendered pathway into irregular status. Family reunification is not an automatic 
right conferred on migrants; on the contrary, states have imposed increasingly 
restrictive conditions that primary migrants have to meet before being allowed to 
bring family members to the destination country (Kofman 2004a). These conditions 
often require the sponsor to have a minimum period of prior residence, a stable 
income, and adequate housing in addition to regular legal status. The reunification 
of women whose husbands lack regular status or any of the other legal conditions 
must take place outside of the formal legal channel of reunification—for example, 
by overstaying an entry for tourism or other purposes (Lesselier 2008). Empirical 
research has shown that restrictive conditions do indeed lead to the incentivization 
of reunification outside or on the fringes of the legal system, especially among 
reunified wives who work upon arrival (González-Ferrer 2011b).
4.1.2  Family Reunification Regimes and Configurations 
of Legal Status
The specific legal rights granted to reunified migrants varies across destinations, 
giving rise to different configurations of legal status corresponding to different types 
of migrants in different countries. For the purposes of this chapter, it is useful to 
examine the configurations of legal status granted to reunified spouses in France, 
Italy, and Spain. In France, the legal reunification channel has consistently con-
ferred the legal right to reside and work to reunified spouses (Lesselier 2008). Thus, 
women who follow the legal channel in France have legal authorization to work 
upon arrival. In Italy and Spain, however, immigration legislation has imposed a 
waiting period on reunified spouses’ access to the labor markets; reunified spouses 
are thus likely to possess a residence permit but lack a work permit (González- 
Ferrer 2011b; Kofman 1999). The legal status granted to migrants in the category of 
“reunified spouses” and the concomitant legal access to the labor market thus varies 
across destinations. This variation is captured in the typology presented in Table 4.1.
Identical configurations of legal status can signal different types of migrants 
under different legal regimes, as is evident in Table 4.1. For example, migrants in 
France who lack a work permit—the legal status afforded to reunified spouses in 




France Reunified spouse Student Multiple
Spain Worker Reunified spouse Multiple
Italy Worker Reunified spouse Multiple
4 Legal Status, Gender, and Economic Incorporation of Senegalese Migrants…
119
Italy and Spain—are likely to be students. In contrast, migrants in Spain and Italy 
with both a residence permit and a work permit—the legal status afforded to reuni-
fied spouses in France—are most likely labor migrants. There is thus substantial 
heterogeneity in the formal rights accorded to different admissions categories, mak-
ing it imperative to examine both family context and legal status when considering 
the effect of family reunification on women’s economic integration.
4.2  Reunified Women and the Labor Market
The economic and administrative dependency created by legal channels of family 
reunification may thus constrain women’s legal participation in the labor force. 
Women have been marginalized in labor migration in part because many immigra-
tion policies implicitly assume that women are passive followers who do not seek 
employment (Kofman 2004a). Early research on the link between family ties and 
women migrants’ economic participation tended to confirm this image. The “family 
migration model” (Sandell 1977) has traditionally seen migration as a disruptive 
event in women’s work lives: women are assumed to move as part of a family migra-
tion unit, and thus will still migrate even if they are expected to have lower partici-
pation rates after arrival because the net benefit of a move for the family unit as a 
whole is positive (Mincer 1978; Sandell 1977).
Nonetheless, while the predominance of the family reunification channel for 
women has limited their ability to migrate and work independently, reunification does 
not necessarily preclude participation in the labor force. Research has shown that fam-
ily migration, far from hampering a tied mover’s economic participation, can often 
lead to women’s employment: the “family investment model” contends that women 
whose spouses have the highest expected earnings in a destination may actually be 
more likely to participate in the labor force and to be employed as a way of supporting 
their husbands’ investments in destination-specific human capital (Duleep and Sanders 
1993). Women’s family context and the potential labor-market success of a spouse 
thus emerge as important determinants of their labor-market performance.
Given that admission category/type of migration is not necessarily synonymous 
with the often-multifaceted motivations for migration, it is also important to be 
attentive to transitions over time in both legal status and labor-force participation 
after the year of arrival. Immigration policies with waiting periods build into their 
reunification regimes eventual transitions from the initial status defined by this entry 
category: reunified spouses can eventually apply for formal permission to enter the 
labor force. Women’s and households’ preferences about the allocation of female 
labor may also shift over time, meaning that even reunified spouses who do not 
initially work despite a legal authorization to do so may eventually end up in the 
labor force. Transitions into the labor market have been observed among reunified 
spouses, leading to the observation that family migration does not mean the end of 
labor migration, only its transformation because many family migrants eventually 
end up as de facto labor migrants (Kofman 1999). Indeed, women may have 
 economic motivations for “associational” moves, and may use family reunification 
4.2  Reunified Women and the Labor Market
120
strategically to enter labor markets while at the same time following socially sanc-
tioned channels of mobility (Kanaiaupuni 2000).
When women do work, a gendered labor market funnels women into specific 
jobs, mostly in the informal sector (Kofman 1999; Lesselier 2008). An example is 
the increasing demand for domestic workers, especially in Southern Europe, 
which draws women into low-skill, low-wage work (Kofman 1999, 2004b). Some 
countries, such as Italy and Spain, actively recruit female workers via employment 
quotas for low-skill domestic work (Kofman 2004b), while immigration legisla-
tion has also pursued high-skill migrants who tend to be male (Lesselier 2008; 
Raghuram 2004). Thus, when immigration policies allow female migrant labor, 
they actively channel women into specific low-wage sectors of the economy (with 
the exception of some female high-skill healthcare professionals, see Raghuram 
2004). In countries such as France where legal channels of labor immigration do 
not include such gendered occupations, women migrating autonomously for work 
are especially likely to do so irregularly (Lesselier 2008). Immigration policies 
thus conspire with gendered labor demand to create differential legal immigration 
channels and pathways of irregularity for men and women.
4.3  Limitations of Existing Research
It is thus clear that the labor-market participation of female migrants is heteroge-
neous and is linked to their family context and the legal opportunities afforded by 
family-reunification policies, but much existing research on the legal status and 
immigrant economic incorporation has been blind to the gendered nature of immi-
gration policies and the legal statuses they create. Most studies in the US context do 
not examine the possibility that the effect of different legal statuses might differ for 
men or women, nor do they consider alternative measures of economic incorpora-
tion such as labor-market participation or employment. Research in Europe has con-
sidered employment as an outcome in a context with institutional variation in labor 
markets across multiple contexts of reception but has not been able to measure legal 
status or its differential effects for men and women.
4.3.1  Assuming Participation: Undocumented Status 
and Wages in the US
Most studies of the link between legal status and migrant economic incorporation in 
the US find that undocumented status is associated with lower wages. Much of this 
research has used data from the Legalized Population Survey (LPS), conducted with 
a sample of undocumented migrants who were legalized by the 1986 Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA), to show that legalization was associated with an 
improvement in the economic opportunities among migrants whose status was 
adjusted (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2000, 2002; Rivera-Batiz 1999); gaining regu-
lar legal status thus contributed positively to economic outcomes for migrants. 
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At the same time, research has found that undocumented migrants faced additional 
deterioration in their earnings as a result of the stiffer penalties of this legislation, 
with employers passing on to them the costs and risks of unauthorized hiring 
(Donato and Massey 1993; Phillips and Massey 1999). Recent research, using 
recent longitudinal data with a larger comparison group and growth-curve modeling 
techniques, has continued to uncover disparities in earnings between documented 
and undocumented migrants (Hall et al. 2010).
The assertion of a negative effect of undocumented status must be re-examined 
in light of the gendering of both migration policies and labor-market participation. 
Unfortunately, the studies cited above focus only on the United States and almost 
exclusively on Mexican men. While undoubtedly an important case to study given 
high share of all immigrants in the US that this group makes up, it is also a case with 
a distinct history and social and economic infrastructure (Massey et al. 2002) that, 
in some ways, might limit its generalizability. In looking almost exclusively at 
wages, these studies implicitly select only migrants who are both active in the labor 
market and employed. While some studies do attempt to model the effect of selec-
tion into the migrant labor force on wages (Donato and Massey 1993; Massey 
1987), the issue of differential migrant participation in the labor market is not 
addressed as a main topic of concern.
The assumption of both activity and employment might have held for earlier 
migration flows that were dominated by single, male workers (Piore’s (1979) “birds 
of passage”), but most migration streams, even among Mexicans to the US, have 
diversified in recent years. Women have made up larger shares of both documented 
and undocumented Mexican migrants since 1986, and accounted for 45% of all 
Mexican migrants in the US in 2004 (Donato et  al. 2008). Research has shown, 
though, that Mexican men and women in the US have different motivations for 
migration: men tend to be motivated by employment and often move alone, while 
women almost always follow another family member and thus tend to have family 
motivations for their migration (Cerrutti and Massey 2001). The gendered nature of 
work means that these female migrants have different labor profiles than their male 
compatriots (Donato et al. 2008). Cultural understandings of women’s role in the 
family have limited Mexican migrant women’s ability to work: only 47% of 
Mexican-born adult women in the US were in the labor force in 2006, compared to 
88% of Mexican-born adult men (Donato et al. 2008). Motivations and value sys-
tems thus combine with reunification policies to limit women’s participation in the 
labor market. Migrant women’s economic integration in destination countries thus 
differs from that of men, and a focus on wages as the principal indicator of integra-
tion as in the US case excludes many women from the analyses.
4.3.2  Ethnic Penalties on Employment in Europe, but Limited 
Measures of Legal Status
The European research on immigrant economic incorporation helps to fill some of 
the blind spots in the American literature. Unlike in the US, studies of immigrant 
labor-market incorporation in Europe, where unemployment has historically been 
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higher among both native-born and foreign workers, take the explanation of the 
likelihood of employment as a point of departure. This research has found, in gen-
eral, that immigrants can often face an “ethnic penalty” (Heath and Ridge 1983) that 
translates into lower rates of employment compared to similar native-born workers 
(see Reyneri and Fullin 2011 for a review).
This general finding is tempered, however, by an insistence on cross-national 
variations in both the composition of migrant flows and institutional factors in the 
destination countries such as immigration policies, labor-market structures, and 
welfare regimes. Kogan (2006) finds that male migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in 
fourteen European countries are substantially disadvantaged in their probability of 
employment compared to native workers even after adjusting for human-capital 
endowments, while migrants from Asia and Latin America have lower rates of 
unemployment than natives. This study also finds significant institutional variation 
across countries in the employment penalty: migrants face a lower penalty in coun-
tries with high demand for low-skilled labor, in countries with more flexible labor 
markets, and in countries with “liberal” welfare regimes, such as the UK and Ireland, 
that emphasize mobility and flexibility (Kogan 2006).
These cross-national institutional differences make a strong case for the impor-
tance of studying employment as an indicator of the labor-market incorporation of 
migrants (González Ferrer 2006). Earnings assimilation is a good measure of adap-
tation in countries with a flexible labor market and a low minimum wage, where 
immigrants can compensate for initial lower host-country human capital by accept-
ing lower pay (González Ferrer 2006); time spent in destination can help immi-
grants build human capital and “catch up” to natives in earnings, as has been found 
in the US (Borjas 1985, 1995; Chiswick 1978). Institutional features such as labor- 
market flexibility, however, vary cross-nationally, and in countries with less-flexible 
labor markets there has been little evidence of earnings assimilation. These are the 
labor markets identified by the cross-national research as subjecting immigrants to 
an employment penalty, and additional years in the destination might reduce earn-
ings because of lack of initial attachment to the labor market (González Ferrer 
2006). Assimilation in the probability of employment is thus the process of primary 
concern in understanding the labor-market performance of immigrants in highly 
regulated countries (González Ferrer 2006).
Unfortunately, the European cross-national research is hampered by a number of 
issues that limit its applicability to the study of the impact of legal status on immi-
grant economic incorporation. The biggest limitation is the inability of many studies 
to include direct measures of migrants’ legal statuses. While comprehensive mea-
sures of legal status are increasingly available in a variety of surveys such as the 
Immigrant Citizen Survey (Huddleston et al. 2012), many studies simply compare 
legal immigrants to natives because more detailed data on legal status are not avail-
able. Study designs either precluded sampling irregular migrants (Kogan 2006) or 
did not include questions on legal status (Bernardi et al. 2011). Even though study-
ing the impact of legal status might not be the principle aim of these studies, they 
either acknowledge that the absence of unauthorized migrants in the sample may 
bias results (Kogan 2006) or point to the presence of unauthorized migrants as 
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potential explanations for their findings (Bernardi et al. 2011). It is thus implicitly 
assumed that the legal limitations faced by migrants who lack regular status relegate 
them to temporary, low-skilled jobs in the informal sector that offer little opportu-
nity for mobility, and that this unobserved heterogeneity contributes to the poor 
outcomes observed for all migrants (Bernardi et al. 2011).
The lack of direct measures of legal status also hamper European studies’ ability 
to examine the interaction between gendered family reunification policies, the legal 
statuses they create, and the differential economic outcomes of men and women. 
Those studies that do include measures of legal status often do not consider the 
gendered family and legal context of women’s work. Studies in Spain using the 
Encuesta Nacional de Inmigración (ENI) show that lack of regular status consti-
tutes both a barrier to employment and a brake on earnings for immigrants in Spain 
(Amuedo-Dorantes et al. 2013; Bradatan and Sandu 2012), but do not consider how 
the effect of legal status might vary for men and women nor do they differentiate 
between different types of migrants based on family context.
The literature reviewed above demonstrates that gender is a crucial factor to take 
into account when studying migration. While men certainly display a wide variety 
of motivations for migration, women’s migration is extremely heterogeneous. 
Women are overrepresented in legal family-reunification flows, indicating that they 
face legal and social constraints on their mobility arising from the gendering of 
migration policies. At the same time, women also migrate outside of legal reunifica-
tion channels, either as informal reunifiers or as autonomous migrants and with a 
wide variety of legal statuses. This diversity in types of female migration creates a 
variety of labor-market trajectories. The existing literature on migrant economic 
incorporation is largely unable to deal with this diversity as it does not account for 
either differential labor-force participation or the interaction between legal status 
and gender. This chapter will adopt an approach that is sensitive to the diversity of 
female migration types while also comparing women to men.
4.4  Gender Norms, Family Reunification, and Work 
Among Senegalese Migrants
Senegalese society is strongly stratified along gender lines, and this stratification 
has implications for Senegalese women’s geographical mobility and economic inte-
gration. Toma (2012) reviews the literature on gender norms in Senegal and argues 
that gender strongly determines life prospects there. The “traditional conjugal con-
tract” subordinates women to the authority of a breadwinner husband within the 
household and, by assigning women to household tasks, places them outside of 
public life (Toma 2012). The Senegalese nuptial system is patrilocal, with women 
residing with her husband’s parents after marriage and providing labor to that 
household. Polygamy is also widespread in Senegal, and women must often inhabit 
the same household as their co-wives (Toma 2012). As a result of these gender 
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norms, women’s work outside the home is stigmatized. In addition, women tend to 
be less educated than men and thus less likely to participate in the labor force: 
according to Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data, only 38% of Senegalese 
women were working in 2006, compared to 66% of men (Toma 2012).
Research on family reunification among Senegalese migrants in Europe has 
found that Senegalese are reluctant to reunify wives of male migrants and has linked 
relatively low levels of reunification to traditional gender norms. Multi-sited fami-
lies and conjugal distance are common in Senegalese society, meaning that spouses 
are used to physical separation (Beauchemin et al. 2013). While early Senegalese 
migration to France was based on a model of circular mobility wherein male 
migrants could regularly travel home to visit family and wives, increased state regu-
lation and economic crisis in the mid-1970s (see Chap. 2) made this mobility more 
complicated. Some Senegalese migrants responded by reunifying their wives in 
France, but reunification was never a universal objective of Senegalese migrants 
partly because of the difficulty of reunifying polygamous households (Beauchemin 
et al. 2013). In the new destinations of Italy and Spain, different social origins meant 
that Senegalese migrants were not subject to the same traditional authority as 
Senegalese migrants in France, but Senegalese in new destinations also tended to be 
members of the Mouride Islamic brotherhood; combined with economic consider-
ation, this religious adherence has made Senegalese migrants in new destinations 
also reluctant to bring their spouses from Senegal (Beauchemin et  al. 2013). 
Evidence from the MAFE project indicates that only 13% of Senegalese migrants in 
Europe are a part of totally reunified families, while almost half live in a different 
country from their spouse(s) and child(ren) (Beauchemin et al. 2013).
Despite the reluctance of Senegalese migrants in Europe to reunify, research has 
also shown that family reunification remains an important channel for the migration 
of Senegalese women to Europe. Approximately 40% of women in the MAFE sam-
ple reunite with a partner at destination, and having a partner abroad is associated 
with substantially increased odds of migration among Senegalese women (Toma 
2012). While female autonomy is low in Senegal and independent migration of 
Senegalese women is socially discouraged, there is some evidence of increasing 
migration of single women from Senegal (Beauchemin et al. 2013). Nonetheless, 
even single Senegalese women are unlikely to migrate without having ties to close 
family members at destination, indicating that even they face a degree of social 
control (Toma 2012).
The occupational profile of Senegalese migrants has varied over time and desti-
nations. Senegalese men were commonly employed in low-skilled manual jobs in 
France, especially as garbage collectors in Paris (Barou 1993). Senegalese women 
started migrating to France in the 1970s under the auspices of family reunification 
as Senegalese men responded to the imposition of the requirements of residence 
permits in 1974 (see Chap. 2). (Timera 1997). The Senegalese women who came to 
France as reunified spouses eventually found work in unskilled service jobs (Barou 
1993). In addition, high-skilled migrants and students from Senegal increasingly 
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chose to go to France because of language ties and the similarities in the educational 
systems of the two countries (Toma 2012). These migrants often occupy white- 
collar jobs in the public administration.
Senegalese migrants first started settling in Italy in the late 1980s and worked as 
informal street peddlers in Rome and on the beaches of Italy’s tourist areas (Schmidt 
di Friedberg 1993). While this occupation is associated with irregular legal status 
and inability to find a better job in the Italian labor market (Riccio 2001; Schmidt di 
Friedberg 1993), other Senegalese migrants may embrace this occupation as a part 
of a “transnational livelihood” (Kaag 2008). After Italian regularization campaigns 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Senegalese also moved to the north of Italy to 
work for wages in manual jobs in small industry, construction, and food processing 
(Riccio 2008; Tall 2008), while many others remain traders.
In Spain, Senegalese, like other African migrants, are concentrated in unskilled 
jobs in agriculture, construction, and services (Pascual de Sans et al. 2000). Jobs in 
Spanish agriculture tend to be seasonal and pay low wages; construction work tends 
to pay better but it also temporary (Toma 2012). In addition to these manual jobs, 
Senegalese also work in street peddling in Spain (Toma 2012). Quantitative research 
on Senegalese occupational trajectories has confirmed that Senegalese migrants 
experience a drop in occupational status after arrival in Europe (Obucina 2013).
These descriptions indicate diversity in the contexts of reception, legal statuses, 
and socio-demographic characteristics among Senegalese migrants in Europe. 
While some research has suggested that sub-Saharan Africans living in Europe face 
difficulties in finding a job because of their low levels of qualifications (González- 
Enríquez 2009), other studies have found that work is relatively easy to come by, 
partly as a result of the rejection of manual labor among native-born workers, but 
that the wages are low and the working conditions poor (Pascual de Sans et  al. 
2000). This inconsistency, while undoubtedly related to differences in timing of the 
studies, likely reflects a difference in labor-market regulations and the extent of 
informal economies, as Senegalese migrants tend to face higher unemployment in 
France (Tall 2008), but tend to have worse jobs when employed in southern Europe.
These variations are also related to legal statuses: Senegalese migrants have ben-
efitted from multiple amnesty programs in southern Europe that have allowed tran-
sitions between formal and informal work, while they have been increasingly 
subject to restrictive immigration-control policies in France, which has likely made 
such mobility difficult. Finally, the characteristics of Senegalese migrants differ 
across these countries: Senegalese migrants in France tend to be more educated than 
those in Italy and Spain, where they may have the greatest ability to convert their 
human capital into employment (Castagnone et al. 2013). There is also an extreme 
gender imbalance across these countries: 45% of Senegalese migrants in France are 
women, compared to only 23% in Spain and 15% in Italy (Toma 2012). This imbal-
ance partly reflects differential preferences for family reunification across countries 
(Baizan et al. 2011; Kaag 2008) and thus has implications for both the legal statuses 
and the economic incorporation of Senegalese migrants.
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4.5  Hypotheses
The legal parameters governing family reunification and social parameters of the 
family context of individuals’ migration are thus important determinants of both 
legal status of reunified spouses and their economic integration at destination. Given 
the gendered nature of family-reunification flows, these legal and social parameters 
are likely to be more important for women than for men. The economic and admin-
istrative dependency associated with family-reunification policies suggest that 
Senegalese women migrating for family reasons in the context of legal family reuni-
fication will be less likely to work upon arrival than either women migrating auton-
omously or men.
Cross-national variation in the rights accorded to reunified migrants suggests 
that different configurations of legal status in different countries will be related to 
both family reunification and economic integration (see Table 4.1). Regular status 
(having both a residence permit and a work permit) among Senegalese women in 
France is likely to indicate family reunification and thus be associated with lack of 
labor-market participation upon arrival. In contrast, mixed status (possessing a resi-
dence permit but lacking a work permit) among Senegalese women in Italy and 
Spain is likely to indicate family reunification and thus be associated with lack of 
labor-market participation upon arrival.
In contrast to Senegalese women who migrate for family reunification, Senegalese 
women who migrate autonomously will be more likely to be employed upon arrival. 
This category includes women with fully regular status in Italy and Spain. While 
women with mixed status in France are likely to be students, their relative autonomy 
may also make them more likely to seek to enter the labor market. Women with 
irregular status in all three countries may also seek to participate in the labor market; 
women with irregular status may be autonomous or non-formal family reunifiers, 
either of which could be consistent with economic motivations for migration.
Senegalese men’s economic integration at destination, in contrast to that of 
Senegalese women, will not be as closely linked to channels of family reunification. 
Men’s employment upon arrival will be more closely associated with cross-national 
variation in labor-market segmentation and demand for low-skilled labor as research 
has found that immigrants, even the undocumented, do not necessarily face an 
employment penalty in such economies; thus Senegalese men in Italy and Spain will 
be more likely to work than Senegalese men in France. Given the size of the infor-
mal economy in southern Europe, irregular status may also be associated with 
increased employment among men.
The empirical analysis will also focus on employment dynamics for both women 
and men. While family reunification may be related to inactivity among women dur-
ing the year of arrival, it does not necessarily preclude eventual labor-market par-
ticipation. Women who lack the legal authorization to work upon arrival can 
eventually apply for it, and those who possess work authorization from the begin-
ning of their stay may also eventually work. Thus, Senegalese women who possess 
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both a residence and work permit after the year of arrival are likely to make a 
transition into employment.
As Senegalese men are likely to be in the labor force from the beginning of their 
stay at a destination, the dynamic analysis will focus on transitions out of employ-
ment (or, equivalently, into unemployment). Senegalese men with regular status are 
likely to be the least likely to transition into unemployment because of provisions in 
immigration legislation that link continued possession of legal status to formal 
employment and vice versa, especially in southern Europe (see Chaps. 2 and 3). On 
the other hand, demand for low-skilled labor and the extent of the informal econ-
omy in southern Europe also make informal employment easier to access and irreg-
ular status less burdensome, meaning that irregular status may also be negatively 
associated with transitions to unemployment.
4.6  Data and Methods
This chapter uses the MAFE-Senegal data described in Chaps. 1 and 3. This chapter 
draws on the retrospective biographical data on Senegalese migrants’ economic 
activities, union formation, child bearing, and administrative history. While the ear-
lier chapters outline the sampling and data collection procedures, it is useful to note 
for the purposes of this chapter that women were oversampled in all locations to 
ensure sufficient numbers for separate gender analyses.
4.6.1  The Analytic Sample
The sample for the analysis in this chapter includes individuals who have migrated 
at least once to Italy, France or Spain while they were greater than 18 (see Chap. 1 
for more details on the MAFE sampling and selection scheme). Returned migrants 
interviewed in Senegal are included if they spent at least a year in at least one of the 
destination countries. Individuals can have multiple periods of residence in or 
“trips” to one or more of these destination countries. The analytic sample thus com-
prises 7881 person-years and 727 trips: 3548 person-years in France (287 individual 
trips), 2258 person-years (221 individual trips) in Italy, and 2075 person- years (219 
individual trips) in Spain. Sixty-five percent of respondents had only one trip, and 
an additional 21% had two trips.
The MAFE-Senegal data are well suited to this investigation because the multi- 
sited nature of the data collection reduces potential biases stemming from selective 
emigration and return (Massey 1987) through the inclusion of current and returned 
migrants. The data, in addition to reconstructing migrants’ family and labor-market 
trajectories, also include extensive information on migrants’ legal statuses during 
each year of residence abroad. Lack of such data on legal status has been a major 
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impediment to investigations of the effect of legal status on labor-market perfor-
mance of immigrants in Europe (Amuedo-Dorantes et  al. 2013; González-Ferrer 
2011a). The MAFE project also interviewed both women and men, allowing inves-
tigations of differential incorporation by gender. The sample includes 376 (57%) 
men and 286 (43%) women, although the weighted share of men is 70%.
4.6.2  Outcome Variables
The analysis examines Senegalese migrants’ labor-market performance in France, 
Italy, and Spain by focusing on three different outcomes: economic activity status 
during the year of arrival, transitions into (for women) or out of (for men) employ-
ment, and occupational category conditional on being employed.
 Economic Activity
The MAFE questionnaire asked respondents to identify their principal activity for 
each period of their lives. Respondents could answer that they were studying, eco-
nomically active, unemployed, homemaking, retired, or otherwise inactive. For this 
analysis, a categorical variable indicates whether migrants were working, unem-
ployed, or economically inactive, with the last category including students, home-
makers, retirees, and other inactive individuals. Table  4.2 presents weighted 
descriptive statistics for the sample and shows statistically significant bivariate gen-
der disparities in economic activity during the year of arrival: 2.7% of women and 
8.5% of men were unemployed (p < .01), 38% of women and 76% of men were 
employed (p < .001), and 59% of women and 15% of men were inactive (p < .001) 
during the first year in destination.
Although this last category is heterogeneous across the entire sample, it is 
strongly gendered: 85% of men who were inactive during the year of arrival were 
students and 91% of all economically inactive person-years among men were spent 
studying, while 73% of women who were inactive during the year of arrival were 
homemakers and 77% of all economically inactive person-years among women 
were spent homemaking. Men never declared being a homemaker and were retired 
or otherwise inactive during 9% of person years. Twenty-three percent of inactive 
women were students during the year of arrival but studying only made up 16% of 
all inactive person-years among women.
The analysis uses two additional variables based on the economic activity vari-
able: a variable capturing transitions into unemployment, if the categorical employ-
ment variable equaled “unemployed” at time t  +  1; and a variable capturing 
transitions into employment, if the categorical employment variable equaled 
“employed” at time t + 1. These indicators serve as dependent variables in models 
for dynamic transitions into unemployment for men and into employment for 
women.
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4.6.3  Predictor Variables
 Legal Status and Context of Reception
The key predictors in each model are variables measuring legal status. The analyses 
use the same typology of legal-status categories as presented in Chap. 3 and briefly 
restated here. A dichotomous variable indicates if a migrant entered the destination 
country at the start of the current trip with or without a visa. Annual indicators of 
residence and work permits combine to form a categorical variable capturing both 
forms of authorization. This categorical variable takes the values of “NRP_NWP” 
for migrants who lack both a residence permit and a work permit (“fully irregular 
status”), and “RP_WP” for migrants who possess both a residence permit and a 
work permit (“fully regular status”). “RP_NWP” indicates that migrants have a resi-
dence permit but lack a work permit (“mixed status”), a situation common among 
students and reunified family members in France, Italy, and Spain (Mezger and 
González-Ferrer 2013). While the combination of lacking a residence permit and 
possessing a work permit is theoretically possible and is declared in 4% of person 
years by Senegalese migrants, the immigration policies of the receiving countries 
have almost always made work permits conditional on possessing a permit to reside 
lawfully or possession of work permits have automatically made such residence 
lawful (see Chap. 2), and migrants may have declared this status because of recall 
bias or incomplete understanding of their statuses. The analyses thus exclude 
person- years in which migrants declared “NRP_WP” status from the analytic sam-
ple for this investigation.
Table 4.2 indicates that, during the first year in destination, Senegalese women 
are more likely to have fully regular status than men, while men are more likely to 
have fully irregular status; the proportions of women and men with mixed status 
during the first year are not statistically different. Approximately 17% of all person- 
years among both men and women display fully irregular status, with no significant 
gender difference. Women are significantly more likely to spend time in mixed sta-
tus, accounting for 12% of their person-years compared to 9.3% of men’s. Women 
spend a slightly higher proportion of person-years in fully regular status. The 
 fully- regular category serves as the reference category in regression models. 
Regarding visa status, there is no statistically significant difference in the proportion 
of men and women arriving without visa.
The other key predictor variable is the context of reception, as captured by indi-
cators for country of residence. Table 4.2 shows that women tend to be concentrated 
in France during the year of arrival: 76% of Senegalese women migrants live in 
France, as compared to 11% in Italy and 13% in Spain. Only 43% of trips for men 
start in France, with 26% starting in Italy and 22% starting in Spain. A similar pat-
tern for women holds across all person years: they are overwhelmingly concentrated 
in France (83% of person-years). Men also tend to spend more time overall in 
France across all person-years (52%), while they spend 31% of person-years in Italy 
and 17% in Spain.
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 Location of Spouse/Partner
A dichotomous variable indicates whether or not the migrant has a spouse and/or 
children living in the same destination. According to Table 4.2, 64% of Senegalese 
women declared having a spouse and/or a child in the same destination at the year 
of arrival, while only 10% of men declared the same. A similar variable indicates 
whether or not the migrant has a spouse and/or children residing in Senegal: 42% 
of women and 47% of men declared having these family members at origin. An 
additional dichotomous variable indicates whether or not the migrant has at least 
one parent still alive in Senegal. All of the family variables are time-varying 
(Obucina 2013).
 Human, Social, and Migration-Specific Capital
Variables indicating human capital during the year of arrival include years of educa-
tion, ability to speak the language of the destination country (does not speak vs. 
speaks well or gets by), age at the time of the start of the trip, and years of work 
experience in Senegal prior to migration. Time-varying human-capital indicators 
include the number of years spent in the destination, the cumulative years of educa-
tion acquired in the destination, and the cumulative years of work experience 
acquired in the destination; language ability can also vary over time. A variable 
measuring the number of family members and other close members of the migrant’s 
personal network that live in the same destination country captures social capital 
and can vary over time. The number of trips a migrant has made indicates migration- 
specific capital. Other variables capture migrants’ motivations, which could be con-
sidered a kind of cognitive capital: a dichotomous variable indicates whether or not 
work was the main motivation for migration, and another dichotomous variable 
indicates whether or not the migrant plans to stay definitively in the current 
destination.
 Context of Exit
Variables indicating the migrant’s social and cultural context of exit include ethnic-
ity (Wolof vs. other), religion (Mouride vs. other), and geographic origin (Dakar vs. 
other). Variables indicating the migrant’s economic context of exit include self- 
reported economic status prior to migration (more than sufficient for daily needs 
and better than others in the same place vs. other), father’s educational level (less 
than secondary school vs. secondary school or more, which is proxy for social 
class), and financial participation of family members in the financing of the current 
trip (yes vs. no).
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4.6.4  Models
Separate models for men and women are estimated for the outcomes of economic 
activity status and transitions to and from employment. Due to sample-size restric-
tions, separate models by gender for the occupational status outcome are not esti-
mable; this model will thus include interactions between the gender and other key 
predictors.
 First-Year Economic Activity
I estimate multinomial logistic regression models predicting economic activity sta-
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(4.1)
where i indexes activity states unemployed, employed, and inactive at time t = 1. X1 
is a vector of indicators of legal status (visa and residence/work authorization), X2 
is a vector of indicators of country of residence, and X1 × X2 represents the interac-
tion between legal status and country of residence. X4 is a vector of variables indi-
cating human, social, and migration-specific capital. X5 is a vector of variables 
indicating family links, and X6 is a vector of variables capturing the migrant’s con-
text of exit. All variables in this model are measured at time t = 1, the year in which 
the migrant arrives at the destination. I estimate separate models for men and 
women.
 Transitions into and out of Employment
Discrete-time survival models estimate the risk of transitions either into or out of 
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where the outcome variable is a dichotomous indicator of unemployment at time 
t + 1. All of the predictor vectors are as in the first model, except that some can vary 
over time; these are thus measured at time t. X4 additionally includes the number of 
years spent at the destination, the cumulative time spent in employment or in formal 
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studies at the destination, the prestige score of the migrant’s current job, and a 
dichotomous variable indicating the activity status of the migrant in year t (inactive 
vs. employed). X7 is a vector of time-counting variables indicating the duration at 
risk for falling into unemployment (number of years) and the number of activity 
spells. Only men who are employed or inactive are subject to the risk of falling into 
unemployment, and exit the risk set either through censoring or becoming 
unemployed.
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where the outcome variable is a dichotomous indicator of employment at time t + 1. 
The predictors are identical to those in model 2, with the exception of the 
employment- related variables, which are unmeasured for women because this 
model examines the risk of first entry into employment; the model for women does, 
however, include a variable indicating cumulative work experience in Senegal. Only 
women who are inactive or unemployed are subject to the risk of becoming 
employed, and exit the risk set either through censoring or becoming employed.
4.7  Results
4.7.1  Gender, Partner Location, and Legal Status
The MAFE data show a clear connection between partner location and the varying 
legal status configurations across countries as outlined in Table 4.1 that are indica-
tive of family reunification for women in different. Figure 4.1 shows the legal status 
of Senegalese men and women during the year of their arrival in Europe, by their 
destination and the location of their partners. Women who rejoin a partner in France 
are overwhelmingly likely to have fully regular legal status during their year of 
arrival: 63% of women with a partner in France possess this status, compared to only 
33% of women in France without a partner in that location. Senegalese women with 
fully regular status in France and a spouse in that destination are thus likely to have 
accessed this status through legal channels of family reunification as France’s immi-
gration policies allow both residence and work authorizations for reunified spouses.
In contrast, Senegalese women going to Spain or Italy to rejoin a partner are 
likely not to have fully regular status, and results are indicative of the operation of 
both legal and irregular channels of reunification. Mixed status—possessing a resi-
dence permit but lacking a work permit—is the most common for Senegalese 
women with a partner in Italy, indicative of family reunification in a legal context 
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that imposes a waiting period. Irregular status is also common among women 
 joining a partner in Italy, which suggests the operation of an irregular-reunification 
pathway. In Spain, more than half of Senegalese women rejoining a partner report 
having either mixed or fully irregular status upon arrival, indicating the prevalence 
of both the legal channel of family reunification that imposes a work-authorization 
waiting period (giving rise to mixed status) and an irregular pathway of reunifica-
tion. The figure suggests that the distribution of legal statuses during the year of 
arrival among Senegalese men conditional on partner location does not vary as 
much as for women.
Examination of women’s motivations for migration along with the location of 
their partner and elucidates the link between family-reunification policies and wom-
en’s first-year legal status. Figure 4.2 shows that women who migrate for family 
reasons and join a partner at destination are likely to have the configurations of legal 
status indicative of family reunification (fully regular status in France and mixed 
status in Italy and, to a slightly lesser extent, Spain). In contrast, women with a 
partner at their destination who migrate for work reasons are far more likely to have 
fully irregular status in all destinations, indicating a willingness to circumvent legal 
channels of family reunification that may inhibit their ability to work upon arrival. 
These descriptive findings are suggestive of the link between women’s legal status 









































No partner in dest. Partner in dest. No partner in dest. Partner in dest.
Fr Sp It Fr Sp It Fr Sp It Fr Sp It
Women Men
Fully regular Mixed Fully irregular
noitcarf
Fig. 4.1 Legal status at arrival by gender, destination, and location of spouse. (Source: MAFE- 
Senegal. Notes: Weighted data)
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4.7.2  First-Year Economic Activity
Legal status was hypothesized to have different effects for Senegalese men’s and 
women’s economic status during the year of arrival at destination. Descriptive sta-
tistics largely support this view, with much greater variation in economic activity 
across women’s legal statuses than men’s.
The descriptive statistics in Table  4.2 demonstrate differences in Senegalese 
men’s and women’s labor-force participation during their year of arrival at destina-
tion: women are more likely to be inactive, and, among those in the labor force, men 
are more likely to be unemployed. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show additional variation in 
labor-force participation and employment among both men and women by their 
legal status upon arrival and their destination country. The first figure shows that 
Senegalese men in France across all legal statuses tend to be inactive more fre-
quently than Senegalese men in Italy or Spain, reflecting the fact that there is a 
significant flow of Senegalese students to France given the colonial and linguistic 
links between the two countries. Male migrants also tend to have a higher rate of 
inactivity in Spain and Italy when they have a mixed status upon arrival. A very 
small proportion of Senegalese men with fully regular status are inactive in Italy or 
Spain. Unemployment rates among men are quite low across countries and legal 
statuses. Having fully irregular legal status is positively associated with unemploy-
ment in Italy during the year of arrival, while a higher risk of unemployment is 









































No partner in dest. Partner in dest. No partner in dest. Partner in dest.
Fr Sp It Fr Sp It Fr Sp It Fr Sp It
Motive: family/other Motive: work
Fully regular Mixed Fully irregular
noitcarf
Fig. 4.2 Legal status among Senegalese women during year of arrival, by destination, partner 
location, and migration motivation. (Source: MAFE-Senegal. Notes: Weighted data)
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Figure 4.4 shows a different pattern for women: rates of labor-force participation 
and employment vary strongly by country of residence and legal status. Senegalese 
women with mixed status (RP_NWP) have the highest rates of inactivity, and these 
rates are higher in Spain and Italy than in France. Among Senegalese women in 
France, those with fully irregular status have the lowest rate of inactivity, while 















Fig. 4.3 First-year activity status by legal status and country of residence, Senegalese men. 
(Source: MAFE-Senegal. Weighted data)















Fig. 4.4 First-year activity status by legal status and country of residence, Senegalese women. 
(Source: MAFE-Senegal. Weighted data)
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those with fully regular status have the highest rates of inactivity. The pattern for 
Italy and Spain is reversed: female migrants with fully irregular or fully regular 
statuses have the lowest rates of inactivity. As with male Senegalese migrants, hav-
ing fully irregular status in Italy during the year of arrival seems to increase the risk 
of unemployment for those women in the labor market, especially compared to 
female migrants with fully regular status in Italy, who experience little unemploy-
ment during the year of arrival. Female migrants in Spain and France seem to face 
low levels of unemployment across legal statuses.
Results from the multinomial regression models for men and women also sug-
gest that the effect of legal status on first-year economic activity is gendered. 
Table 4.3 displays results from the separate multinomial logistic regressions of first- 
year activity status for Senegalese men and women. For Senegalese men, having 
mixed legal status (RP_NWP) is positively associated with being inactive: com-
pared to male migrants with fully regular status, male migrants who lack only a 
work permit are six percentage points more likely to be inactive. Conversely, legal 
status does not have a statistically significant association with probabilities of work-
ing or being unemployed during the year of arrival for men.
While the effect of legal status on men’s first-year activity is limited, legal status 
is more consistently associated with first-year activity for Senegalese women. 
Having mixed (RP_NWP) status is positively associated with being inactive com-
pared to having fully regular status (RP_WP), although only at p < .1, and this effect 
is offset by a negative association between mixed status and the probability of 
employment. Women with fully irregular (NWP_NRP) status face a higher risk of 
unemployment compared to women with fully regular status (RP_WP): lacking 
both residence and work authorization is associated with a five-percentage-point 
increase in the probability of being unemployed compared to being inactive or 
employed. Entering the country without a visa has no effect on any of the outcomes 
for either men or women. The effect of legal status on first-year economic activity 
thus varies by gender. Lacking only a work permit increases the probability of being 
inactive for both men and women, indicating the role of student migration for men 
and family reunification for women. Other predictors in this model lend credence to 
this interpretation. Years of education is significantly positively related to inactivity 
and negatively related to employment for men, while years of work experience in 
Senegal is associated with increased employment and decreased inactivity. Acquired 
human capital thus has opposite effects: those male Senegalese migrants that are 
more highly educated tend to be economically inactive students during their year of 
arrival, while those with acquired employment experience tend be economically 
active and working.
Other predictors in the model are also suggestive of distinctive profiles of labor- 
market participation in keeping with family reunification for women. Among 
women, those who indicated work as the primary motivation for their migration are 
17 percentage points less likely to be inactive than those women who indicated fam-
ily as the primary motivation. In addition, women who intend to stay definitively at 
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the destination and those whose families contributed financially to the trip1 are more 
likely to be inactive and less likely to be working. These associations between moti-
vations, intentions, family financial participation and the likelihood of inactivity are 
indicative of family reunification. Interestingly, having a spouse and/or children at 
the destination had no direct effect on women’s first-year economic activity net of 
legal status and other predictors, suggesting that direct measures of women’s legal 
status and motivations are more important predictors of economic participation.
Other predictors were indicative of autonomous-migration profiles. Those 
women with a spouse or children in Senegal are less likely to be inactive and more 
likely to be working, indicating that they are probably independent pioneer migrants 
who migrated, in part, to support family in Senegal through working in Europe; for 
men, having a spouse or child in the same destination is positively predictive of 
employment and negatively predictive of both inactivity and unemployment. While 
legal status and other predictors define distinctive profiles for inactive migrants 
among both men and women, legal status is not related to employment for active 
men. It does seem, however, to structure women’s employment chances: female 
migrants with fully irregular status are more likely to be unemployed.
The effects of legal statuses vary across destinations, but more so for women 
than for men. Table 4.3 also shows significant variation in the probabilities of first- 
year activity status between contexts of reception. For both men and women, com-
pared to their compatriots in France, Senegalese in Italy and Spain are less likely to 
be inactive and more likely to be employed during their first year of residence. 
Country of residence does not have a significant relationship with unemployment 
for either men or women. Given the variation in first-year activity status by both 
legal status and country of residence, the model includes an interaction between 
these predictors that can help us examine how the effect of legal status varies by 
country of residence. Table 4.4 displays the average marginal effects of legal status 
by country of residence for both men and women. The top panel of the table shows 
that this interaction does not produce statistically significant variation in the effects 
of legal status for men.
For Senegalese women, on the other hand, variation in the effect of legal statuses 
on first-year economic activity across destinations is consistent with different con-
figurations of legal status for reunified migrants in different countries. The bottom 
panel of Table 4.4 shows that the effects of legal status do vary by destination for 
women. For women in France, not having fully regular legal status is associated 
with a decrease in the probability of being inactive: women with mixed (RP_NWP) 
status are 21 percentage points less likely to be inactive than women with fully regu-
lar status, and women with fully irregular status are 24 percentage points less likely 
to be inactive than women with fully regular status. These lower inactivity rates for 
women without fully regular status in France are offset by a relative increase in the 
1 Previous empirical research with the MAFE data has shown that husbands overwhelmingly par-
ticipate in the decision-making for their wives’ migration (Toma 2012). Family financial contribu-
tions to women’s migration also come mostly from husbands: 74% of Senegalese women who 
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probability of employment: women with mixed or fully irregular status have 
employment probability roughly 22 percentage points higher than fully regular 
women in France, while legal status has no effect on unemployment for women in 
France. These findings are indicative of their migration via the legal reunification 
channel, which confers fully regular legal status. The lower activity rate of these 
likely reunifiers supports previous findings that reunified women are less likely to 
participate in the labor force because of administrative and economic dependency.
The association between legal status and inactivity among Senegalese women in 
Italy and Spain is also consistent with legal channels of family reunification. Women 
with mixed legal status in Italy and Spain are more likely to be inactive than women 
in those countries with fully regular status. These higher inactivity rates translate 
into a negative effect of mixed legal status on employment in both of these coun-
tries. As in the case of France, these results are consistent with the channel of 
family- reunification in these countries. Italy and Spain differ from France in the 
specific configuration of legal status associated with the family reunification chan-
nel: they both impose a waiting period on the reunified spouses’ applications for a 
work permit. The lack of a work permit among otherwise legal migrants is a sign of 
reunification and limited rights of formal participation, which result in lower par-
ticipation in the labor force for reunified Senegalese women in southern Europe.
Senegalese women with legal statuses upon arrival that are indicative of non- 
reunification pathways are more likely to attempt to work. Mixed or irregular sta-
tuses are associated with employment among Senegalese women in France, 
indicating that students (who generally lack a work permit) and migrants with irreg-
ular status are more likely to work than reunified spouses, and this in spite of their 
lack of formal authorization to do so. In contrast, having fully regular status is pre-
dictive of employment in both Italy and Spain; unlike in France, where this status is 
associated with family reunification, this association suggests that Senegalese 
women might be able to access formal channels of labor recruitment, perhaps 
through quotas for domestic workers.
These results show a fairly simple pattern: Senegalese women who have legal 
statuses consistent with family reunification tend to have higher rates of inactivity 
than Senegalese women with other legal statuses. The specific configuration of legal 
statuses associated with reunification varies across destinations, though, giving rise 
to different associations between particular statuses and the probability of inactivity 
in different countries. These results also strongly suggest the heterogeneity of 
Senegalese women’s legal statuses and a systematic association between non- 
reunification statuses—even those that do not include formal residence and/or work 
authorization—and the propensity to be employed upon arrival. In contrast, the 
labor-force participation and employment of Senegalese men is not as sensitive to 
variation across legal statuses or destinations, indicative of a near-universal motiva-
tion to work (with the possible exception of male students in France).
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4.7.3  Transitions out of Employment for Men
The dynamic model of transitions into unemployment for Senegalese men shows 
that lack of fully regular legal status does not increase the likelihood of losing a job, 
nor does possessing fully regular status increase the likelihood of keeping a job. 
Table 4.5 presents results for the discrete-time survival analysis of transitions into 
unemployment for men. These results show that mixed or fully irregular legal status 
is not associated with a statistically significantly different risk of falling into unem-
ployment compared to fully regular status, nor is having entered without a visa 
predictive of this transition. Senegalese men in Spain face a 2.3 percentage-point 
higher risk of falling into unemployment than Senegalese men in France. Interactions 
between legal status and country of residence do not show any significant effects. 
Formal, legal barriers to transitions out of employment thus seem to be limited for 
Senegalese men.
Indeed, few predictors in this model have a significant association with the risk 
of falling into unemployment, which is due in part to the rarity of the transition: 
only 8% of subjects eventually fail, and the survivor function after 7 years—the 
median duration at risk for unemployment—is 95%. The risk of transitioning to 
unemployment is marginally higher for more recent arrivals, perhaps suggesting 
secular declines in labor-market conditions. The risk of unemployment also 
increases with the number of activity spells and the prestige score of jobs, indicating 
that frequent change of jobs and having a “better” job increase the likelihood of 
becoming unemployed. This pattern may indicate that Senegalese men may indeed 
experience a tradeoff between employment and job quality: bad jobs are easier to 
get and to hold on to than good jobs, as is suggested by the literature (Fullin and 
Reyneri 2011). Conversely, male migrants whose families participated in financing 
their trip are less likely to become unemployed, indicating that such migrants may 
be more likely to keep jobs because, in part, they face pressure to “pay off” this 
investment through remittances (Chort et al. 2012).
4.7.4  Transitions into Employment for Women
Transitions to employment for women are suggestive of the eventual transformation 
of reunified spouses into labor migrants. The probability of a transition into employ-
ment among women is much higher than the transition examined for men: after the 
median duration of time at risk for becoming employed (4 years), the survivor func-
tion is only 62%; the figure falls to 30% after 10 years. The baseline risk for women 
is thus quite high, indicating that the majority eventually experience a transition into 
economic activity.
The dynamic model of women’s transitions into employment indicates that secure 
legal status is a strong predictor of eventual work. Table 4.5 presents average mar-
ginal effects for the discrete-time survival analysis of transitions into employment 
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AME se AME se
Legal status (ref.: fully regular)
  Fully irregular (NRP_NWP) −0.0039 0.0073 −0.043 0.044
  Mixed (RP_NWP) −0.0085 0.0091 −0.10*** 0.031
Destination (ref.: France)
  Spain 0.023* 0.0089 0.0097 0.053
  Italy 0.011 0.0089 −0.072 0.047
Entry status: no visa −0.00031 0.0037 0.093* 0.038
Years in dest. −0.0079 0.0068 0.0050 0.0097
Duration at risk 0.00049 0.0027 0.0076 0.0095
Period of arrival: post-1990 0.0092+ 0.0049 0.10*** 0.027
Number of act. spells 0.022*** 0.0036 0.064*** 0.015
Age at start of current migration spell −0.00060 0.00040 −0.0014 0.0018
Years of education −0.00024 0.00056 0.0072** 0.0027
Ethnicity: Wolof 0.0033 0.0064 −0.034+ 0.021
Religion: Mouride −0.0078 0.0060 −0.026 0.042
Years of ed. in dest. 0.0070 0.0070 −0.0037 0.0073
Number of contacts at destination −0.0019+ 0.0011 0.0095* 0.0047
Number of trips −0.00016 0.00100 0.043 0.027
Does not speak language of destination −0.0068 0.0053 −0.0078 0.047
Work exp. at dest. 0.0086 0.0080 – –
Unemployed – – Ref.
Employed Ref. – –
Inactive −0.0031 0.0089 −0.093 0.067
Manual occupation 0.0030 0.0045 – –
ISEI 0.00028* 0.00013 – –
Spouse or kid at dest. 0.0019 0.0037 0.0063 0.036
Spouse or kid in Sn −0.0047 0.0046 0.038 0.044
Geographic origin: from Dakar −0.00082 0.0044 0.023 0.031
Father’s ed.: < secondary school −0.0044 0.0036 0.0096 0.027
Trip paid by family −0.013** 0.0049 0.0012 0.028
Plan to stay: definitive 0.0035 0.0040 0.055+ 0.029
Motive: work/better life −0.0052 0.0038 0.045 0.034
Work exp. in Sn (years) – – 0.0055** 0.0017
Self-reported econ. status: good – – −0.018 0.051
N (person-years) 4010 819
Events 36 90
Log likelihood −131.21 −231.49
Pseudo R2 0.36 0.18
Source: MAFE-Senegal




for women and shows significant effects of legal status. Compared to fully regular 
status, mixed (RP_NWP) status is associated with a ten-percentage-point decline in 
the risk of becoming employed, while there is no average statistically significant dif-
ference between fully irregular and fully regular status. Additional statistical tests 
indicate that the difference in AMEs between fully irregular and mixed statuses is 
significant at p < 0.10. While mixed status is associated with family reunification and 
thus inactivity during the year of arrival in Italy and Spain, most (95%2) women with 
mixed status eventually transition into fully regular status and thus gain access to the 
labor market (perhaps not surprising given the EU Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 
22 September 20033 on the right to family reunification, which foresees that exclu-
sion from the labour market is at most permitted during the first year). Reunified 
Senegalese women in France have this status from the start of their stay and thus face 
no legal barriers to eventual employment even if their economic and administrative 
dependence constrains their work initially. These results indicate that Senegalese 
women who possess or access fully regular status in the process of family reunifica-
tion are likely to make an eventual transition to employment.
Irregular entry status, on the other hand, is also significantly predictive of the risk 
of becoming employed: having entered without a visa is associated with an increase 
of 9.3 percentage points in the hazard of becoming employed. Thus, women who 
entered without a visa are likely to become employed. While seemingly at odds with 
the finding that current fully regular status is associated with employment, the rela-
tionship between irregular entry and eventual employment may be indicative of 
interlinked regularization and employment strategies: women who enter outside of 
legal channels may pursue regular status as part of an employment-focused 
trajectory.
Variation in the effects of legal statuses for women across destinations supports 
the interpretation that reunified wives are likely to make a transition into employ-
ment, especially in France. Table 4.6 displays the substantial variation in the effects 
of legal-status categories in different destinations. Having mixed status in France is 
associated with a lower risk of becoming employed than having fully regular status, 
as is having fully irregular status. Women with fully regular status in France—who 
are likely to have entered through the channel of legal reunification and were the 
most likely to be inactive during the year of arrival—are thus the most likely to 
undergo a transition to employment.
The results for the southern European destinations are more complicated. Mixed 
status is significantly negatively related to the transition to employment in Spain 
while there is no association in Italy. In contrast, there is no statistically significant 
effect of fully irregular status in Spain, while fully irregular status in Italy is associ-
ated with an increase in the risk of employment of 20 percentage points. Senegalese 
women in Spain with regular status are thus the most likely to make a transition to 
employment, and this group is likely to be composed of both reunified spouses who 
gained work authorization after arrival and labor migrants with regular status—the 
2 Tabulation available upon request.
3 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32003L0086
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most likely to work upon arrival in Spain. The latter group is excluded from the 
model’s risk set if they are already employed, meaning that the women with regular 
status making transitions to employment are likely to be reunified wives.
Other results may be indicative of autonomous migration strategies. The positive 
association between fully irregular status and transitions to employment in Italy 
means that migrants with fully irregular status in the first year—who are the most 
likely to be both in the labor force and unemployed—tend both to stay in this status 
and to find work. The effect of entry status is concentrated in France, where 
Senegalese women who enter without a visa have an employment-transition prob-
ability 21 percentage points higher than women who entered with a visa; these 
results may indicate an autonomous strategy where irregular entry is associated with 
eventual transitions to regular status and employment.
These results confirm the importance of including both entry status and time- 
varying legal status in models of employment for women (González-Ferrer 2011a) 
and suggest that women who enter through family-reunification mechanisms, who 
often have a mixed legal status that precludes work, are less likely to become 
employed than women who may circumvent such mechanisms.
Other predictors in the model are suggestive of a positive selection of employed 
Senegalese women: years of education, number of contacts at destination, and work 
experience in Senegal are all positively associated with becoming employed, sug-
gesting that human and social capital play a role in this transition. In addition, plan-
ning to stay definitively in the destination is positively associated with becoming 
employed, while there is no association with having family either at destination or 
in Senegal.
4.8  Discussion
This chapter’s main hypothesis is that the effect of legal status on Senegalese 
migrants’ economic integration—as measured by first-year economic activity and 
employment dynamics—would vary systematically by gender as a result of gen-
dered family reunification policies that produce different constraints and opportuni-
ties for men and women. The results for Senegalese women are largely consistent 




Irregular status Mixed status No visa
AME se AME se AME se
France −0.099+ 0.058 −0.12** 0.037 0.21** 0.071
Spain −0.13 0.085 −0.15* 0.077 −0.058 0.048
Italy 0.20* 0.10 −0.015 0.052 0.060 0.042
Source: MAFE-Senegal
Notes: +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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with a gendered migration system constructed by both legal channels open to 
women in the main contexts of reception and the constraints on female autonomy 
and mobility present in the gender norms of a patriarchal Senegalese context of exit. 
Across all three destination countries, women with legal-status configurations 
indicative of family reunification were more likely to be economically inactive dur-
ing the year of arrival: women with fully regular status in France were less likely to 
work than women with mixed or irregular statues, while women with mixed status 
in Italy or Spain were less likely to work than women with fully regular statuses. 
These findings indicate the operation of administrative dependency (Boyd 1997; 
Kofman 1999; Lesselier 2008) and a concomitant decrease in the ability of women 
to enter the labor market. This is especially true in Spain and Italy, where legally 
mandated waiting periods on access to work permits erect a formal barrier to reuni-
fied spouses’ participation.
Other variables associated with family reunification were also strongly predic-
tive of first-year inactivity among women, including plans to stay definitively in the 
destination country, family financial participation in the trip, and having family 
motivations for the trip. The financial participation of women’s families is over-
whelmingly provided by reunifying husbands, and the association between this 
variable and women’s inactivity suggests that men who can demonstrate the legally 
required financial means to bring a spouse can prevent reunified wives from work-
ing both by removing the economic necessity of women’s work and potentially by 
making women economically dependent. Reunification and its associated economic 
dependency is thus a way to reproduce gendered hierarchies in a context where 
women’s migration, even for reunification purposes, is strongly discouraged because 
of the fear of the loss of social control (Beauchemin et al. 2013).
Family reunification is often associated with dependency for women and at least 
an initial exclusion from labor-market participation, but research has also shown 
that reunified women may eventually work either as part of a family investment 
strategy (Duleep and Sanders 1993) or because of camouflaging of economic moti-
vations in an “associational” move (Kanaiaupuni 2000). The results from this chap-
ter support the contention that family reunification is not necessarily exclusive of 
eventual work. A discrete-time survival model showed that some of the legal-status 
configurations that were indicative of family reunification and first-year inactivity 
also predicted transitions into employment for women. This was directly evident for 
France, were women with fully regular status were more likely to make the transi-
tion to work than women with mixed or irregular status. In Spain, women with 
mixed status were less likely than women with regular status to make the transition; 
while reunified women have mixed status in Spain upon arrival, they are also able to 
access work authorization after a waiting period and those who do so are likely to 
find work. In these two countries, Kofman’s (1999) observation that family reunifi-
cation is liable to transform into another form of labor migration is accurate. Indeed, 
these findings call into question the common practice of relying on admissions cat-
egories as proxies for the motivations of individuals and also make a strong case for 
taking a longitudinal approach to the study of the labor-market integration of reuni-
fied migrants.
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Despite the predominance of family reunification as a legal migration channel 
for Senegalese women, this chapter’s results also point to the existence of autono-
mous migration among Senegalese women with largely economic motives for their 
mobility. Senegalese women in France with mixed or irregular status during the 
year of arrival were likely not to be joining a partner and have economic motivations 
and were thus more likely to be employed during the year of arrival than women 
with fully regular status. These legal-status configurations indicate the predomi-
nance of semi-regular (in the case of students) and irregular work strategies among 
autonomous Senegalese women in France. In contrast, Senegalese women with 
fully regular status in Italy and Spain were more likely to work during the year of 
arrival than women with other statuses, indicating that these women are able to 
access legal channels of labor migration.
In contrast to the labor trajectories of Senegalese women, Senegalese men’s eco-
nomic integration showed little association with different configurations of legal 
status. Mixed status (lacking a work permit) was associated with inactivity, which is 
indicative of flows of students to Europe, especially France. Contrary to hypotheses, 
irregular status was not predictive of employment during the year of arrival, and 
regular status was not associated with transitions into unemployment. Senegalese 
men in Italy and Spain did exhibit significantly higher probabilities of employment 
during the year of arrival, however, lending support to the hypothesis that cross- 
national variation in labor markets would be associated with economic integration. 
It thus seems that Senegalese men are able to access employment in southern Europe 
regardless of their legal status, perhaps due to the extent of demand for low-skilled 
labor in these countries’ robust informal economies, while Senegalese students in 
France are the only male migrants that face legal barriers to their employment.
These findings for Senegalese men are in keeping with literature that shows that 
migrants in such countries do not face an “ethnic penalty” in the probability of 
employment, but may face challenges in occupational mobility (Fullin and Reyneri 
2011). Research with the MAFE data are indicative of the relatively low occupa-
tional attainment of Senegalese migrants in Europe (Obucina 2013), but additional 
research will be necessary to examine the link between legal status and occupational 
types. At the same time, Senegalese men in Spain face a higher risk of falling into 
unemployment than Senegalese men in France, indicating that employment, while 
perhaps easy to obtain, is somewhat precarious.
4.9  Conclusion
While the relationship between legal status and immigrant economic integration is 
a major concern of both policymakers and scholars, many studies of this link do not 
examine how the family context of migration influences both women’s legal sta-
tuses and their participation in the labor market at destination. Legal status may 
matter more for women’s economic integration because of the gendered immigra-
tion policies that produce them. While women migrants’ experiences are growing 
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more heterogeneous, many of them have entered destinations via the legal channel 
of family reunification. Their legal status is thus subject to their family situations.
Family-reunification legislation strongly structures entry channels for Senegalese 
women and produces legal statuses that either directly preclude their labor-market 
participation (as in Italy and Spain) or create other forms of economic and adminis-
trative dependency that may make them less likely to work even if they have the 
legal authorization to do so (as in France). Furthermore, motivations and prefer-
ences of reunified wives and their husbands also act to prevent women from work-
ing, thus acting through legal status to affect labor-market decisions of women.
This chapter found that Senegalese women with configurations of legal status 
indicative of family reunification were more likely than women with other legal 
statuses to be economically inactive upon arrival, while there is little association 
between Senegalese men’s legal status and their participation. This finding held 
across destination countries despite the differing configurations of legal status 
granted to reunified spouses: while mixed status among women was associated with 
higher inactivity in Spain and Italy, so was fully regular status in France.
This is consonant with research that finds that reunified spouses tend to be less 
likely to be economically active (Kofman 1999). In the case of Spain and Italy these 
women face legal barriers to their participation as a result of waiting periods 
(Kofman 2004a). Women in France, however, do not face such barriers, meaning 
that their legal situation is also indicative of economic dependency (Lesselier 2008).
The results also show, however, that family reunification does not preclude labor- 
market participation, as many of the women with family-reunification profiles even-
tually transition into economic activity. This finding echoes the observation that 
family migration may transform into a form of labor migration (Kofman 1999). It 
also supports the view that women migrants have a diversity of motivations for their 
migration and may often strategically participate in an “associational” move for 
economic reasons (Kanaiaupuni 2000).
In contrast to Senegalese women, male migrants with fully irregular status 
(NRP_NWP) did not face any penalty in labor-market participation, employment, 
or the risk of transition to unemployment compared to migrants with fully regular 
status. The legal constraint of irregularity of legal status on economic activity for 
Senegalese migrants in Europe thus seems to be weak, supporting views that immi-
grants to countries with labor-market structures that favor low-skilled labor and 
informality reduce the immigrant “employment penalty” (Kogan 2006), perhaps at 
the risk of funneling them into “bad jobs” (Fullin and Reyneri 2011).
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 Appendix: Raw Coefficient Estimates for Models in this 
Chapter
Multinomial logistic regression coefficients for first-year economic status, women and men
Predictor
Women Men
Outcome (ref: Unemployed) Outcome (ref.: Unemployed)
Employed Inactive Employed Inactive
Legal status: (ref: fully regular)
Fully 
irregular (NRP_NWP)
−0.31 (−0.23) −1.73 (−1.25) 0.58 (0.72) 0.86 (0.89)




0.13 (0.15) 0.69 (0.74)
Destination (ref.: France)
Spain 0.28 (0.14) −1.92 (−0.97) 1.06 (0.84) −12.42*** 
(−8.08)
Italy 15.78*** (6.33) 11.04*** (4.98) 0.26 (0.28) −4.24* (−2.52)
Fully irregular X Spain 0.67 (0.30) 2.81 (1.24) −1.57 
(−1.12)
8.63*** (3.43)















0.80 (0.51) 2.91 (1.45)
Entry status: no visa −2.76 (−0.97) −2.48 (−0.86) −0.61 
(−0.82)
−0.85 (−1.01)
No visa X Spain 2.81 (1.00) 1.64 (0.56) 1.25 (1.04) 1.04 (0.45)
No visa X Italy 2.91 (1.09) 3.45 (1.26) 0.34 (0.37) 2.29 (1.45)
Period of arrival: 
post-1990
0.13 (0.07) −0.07 (−0.04) −0.03 
(−0.05)
−0.58 (−0.79)
Age at start of current trip 0.04 (0.55) 0.03 (0.36) −0.01 
(−0.17)
0.03 (0.41)
Years of education −0.08 (−0.65) −0.07 (−0.60) −0.03 
(−0.76)
0.21* (2.36)
Ethnicity: Wolof 0.91 (0.85) 1.10 (1.02) 0.74+ (1.87) 0.48 (0.86)
Religion: Mouride 0.58 (0.55) 0.50 (0.47) 0.50 (1.12) 0.19 (0.32)
Number of contacts at 
destination
0.32+ (1.95) 0.40* (2.28) −0.04 
(−0.38)
0.03 (0.24)
Number of trips 2.37+ (1.88) 2.70* (2.12) 0.07 (0.45) −0.27 (−0.67)
Does not speak lang. of 
destination
−1.48+ (−1.76) −0.90 (−1.00) −0.25 
(−0.53)
−0.15 (−0.14)
Self-reported econ. status: 
good
2.93 (1.53) 1.93 (0.98) −0.07 
(−0.08)
0.42 (0.43)
Spouse or kid at dest. −0.41 (−0.54) −0.34 (−0.43) 1.50+ (1.90) −0.71 (−0.68)
(continued)




Outcome (ref: Unemployed) Outcome (ref.: Unemployed)
Employed Inactive Employed Inactive
Spouse or kid in Sn 0.08 (0.10) −1.26 (−1.55) −0.38 
(−0.91)
−0.43 (−0.65)




−2.32* (−2.53) −0.07 
(−0.17)
1.15+ (1.76)
Father’s ed.: < secondary 
school
1.27 (1.18) 1.00 (0.94) 0.07 (0.15) −0.12 (−0.22)




Plan to stay: definitive −2.04* (−1.98) −1.06 (−0.99) 0.17 (0.41) 0.45 (0.80)
Motivation for migration: 
work
0.58 (0.80) −0.83 (−1.09) −0.05 
(−0.10)
−1.44* (−2.22)









Employed before trip 2.35* (2.11) 2.81* (2.42) 0.74 (1.29) 0.58 (0.59)
Inactive before trip 1.44 (1.02) 3.90** (2.72) 1.14 (1.20) 3.62** (2.82)
Years of work exp. (Sn) −0.12 (−1.43) −0.13 (−1.50) 0.03 (1.18) −0.04 (−1.00)
Constant 16.81*** (6.26) 15.44*** (5.50) 3.19 (1.57) −0.13 (−0.05)
Observations 309 454
Pseudo R-squared 0.417 0.455
AIC 413.86 475.27
BIC 607.99 738.83
Log likelihood −154.93 −173.64
Degrees of freedom 45 62
Source: MAFE-Senegal
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Multinomial 
logistic regression coefficients. Clustered standard errors






Legal status (ref.: fully regular)
Fully irregular (NRP_NWP) −1.17 (−1.24) −0.32 (−0.23)
Mixed (RP_NWP) −1.47* (−2.16) −1.53 (−1.02)
Destination (ref.: France)
Spain 0.79 (1.05) 1.91 (1.39)
Italy −2.04 (−1.43) 1.25 (0.87)
Fully irregular X Spain −0.23 (−0.17) 0.96 (0.56)
Fully irregular X Italy 3.40* (2.05) −2.32 (−1.28)
Mixed X Spain −0.44 (−0.42) 0.00 (.)
Mixed X Italy 1.04 (0.70) 2.15 (1.23)
(continued)






Entry status: no visa 1.61** (3.27) −0.79 (−1.02)
No visa X Spain −2.62* (−2.42) 2.23+ (1.89)
No visa X Italy −0.34 (−0.34) 0.65 (0.62)
Years in dest. 0.14 (1.01) −0.99 (−1.18)
Years in dest. squared −0.01* (−2.47) −0.00 (−0.73)
Duration at risk 0.10 (0.80) 0.06 (0.18)
Period of arrival: post-1990 1.50*** (3.33) 1.20+ (1.84)
Number of act. spells 0.83*** (4.27) 2.85*** (6.22)
Age at start of current migration spell −0.02 (−0.79) −0.08 (−1.50)
Years of education 0.09** (2.61) −0.03 (−0.43)
Ethnicity: Wolof −0.46 (−1.58) 0.43 (0.52)
Religion: Mouride −0.36 (−0.58) −1.02 (−1.28)
Years of ed. in dest. −0.05 (−0.50) 0.91 (1.03)
Self-reported econ. status: good −0.25 (−0.33)
Number of contacts at destination 0.12* (2.03) −0.25+ (−1.83)
Number of trips 0.55 (1.57) −0.02 (−0.17)
Does not speak language of destination −0.10 (−0.17) −0.88 (−1.29)
Work exp. at dest. – 1.13 (1.12)
Unemployed Ref. –
Employed – Ref.
Inactive −0.96+ (−1.66) −0.40 (−0.35)
Manual occupation – 0.39 (0.66)
ISEI – 0.04* (2.07)
Spouse or kid at dest. 0.08 (0.17) 0.25 (0.50)
Spouse or kid in Sn 0.44 (0.93) −0.61 (−1.01)
Geographic origin: from Dakar 0.29 (0.76) −0.11 (−0.19)
Father’s ed.: < secondary school 0.12 (0.35) −0.57 (−1.23)
Trip paid by family 0.02 (0.04) −1.72* (−2.58)
Plan to stay: definitive 0.71+ (1.86) 0.46 (0.88)
Motive: work/better life 0.53 (1.44) −0.68 (−1.33)
Work exp. in Sn (years) 0.07** (3.09)
Constant −6.89*** (−4.98) −8.86** (−3.28)
Observations 819 4010
Pseudo R-squared 0.232 0.362
AIC 502.15 332.42
BIC 666.93 552.80
Log likelihood −216.08 −131.21
χ2 130.91 699.25
Degrees of freedom 34 34
Source: MAFE-Senegal
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Logistic regres-
sion coefficients displayed. Clustered standard errors
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Chapter 5
Legal Status, Territorial Confinement, 
and Transnational Activities of Senegalese 
Migrants in France, Italy, and Spain
Migrants have long maintained ongoing social, economic, and political connections 
with their homelands, but these transnational activities have garnered increased atten-
tion from scholars and policymakers in recent years. Academic research has shown 
that modern travel and communications technologies have created new kinds and 
quantities of transnational engagement, findings which have challenged the notions of 
the state control of borders and of unidirectional immigrant settlement and assimila-
tion. At the same time, international development agencies and sending- country gov-
ernments have begun to recognize the potential of migrants to be active participants in 
the development of their home communities. Such “co-development” strategies seek 
to leverage migrant cross-border activities, such as remittances, investment, and par-
ticipation in hometown associations, as part of overall development strategies.
Such celebrations of immigrant transnationalism ignore the constraint that irreg-
ular legal status may place on cross-border engagement. While much research on 
transnationalism argues that these activities transgress and subvert the state’s ability 
to control cross-border flows, scholars have generally not been attentive to the sen-
sitivity of different kinds of cross-border action to robust immigration-control 
apparatuses. Transnational activities that are mobile—such as visits to the home-
land—may be more directly structured by legal-status constraints than non-mobile 
activities such as remitting. Furthermore, studies recognize occasional physical vis-
its to the homeland to be an important component of the transnational social field, 
both as an important link between destination and origin in its own right and as a 
crucial way to maintain the affective links that sustain non-mobile activities such as 
remitting and investing. Yet most research does not consider the direct constraint on 
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physical mobility faced by migrants without secure legal status or the effect that 
such reduction in mobility might have for non-mobile, long-distance activities. Nor 
do policy prescriptions for co-development, which actively promote migrant cross-
border engagement, factor in the contradictory state policies that lead to the legal 
confinement and subsequent reduced transnational participation of migrants.
This chapter explores the link between legal status and transnational activities 
through the lenses of territorial confinement and blocked transnationalism. It hypoth-
esizes that irregular legal status results both in direct territorial confinement—an 
inability to visit the homeland—and in indirect caging of non-mobile transnational 
activities. This caging is hypothesized to result from the withering of affective ties 
associated with reduced physical co-presence with kin and other important individu-
als in the homeland from which migrants often draw their sense of status. The chap-
ter also explores the constraint of irregular status on non-mobile transnational 
activities through structural exclusion from institutions in the destination country.
Senegalese migrants in France, Italy, and Spain provide the empirical data on 
which these hypotheses are tested. Senegalese migrants are renowned in the qualita-
tive literature for practicing “transnational livelihoods” predicated on circulation 
between the destination and the homeland and the accumulation of material wealth 
and social status in Senegal in preparation for an eventual return. At the same time, 
Senegalese migrants often lack secure legal status: those without “papers” are often 
“stuck” in the destination country and may thus face challenges in constructing a 
transnational existence. Thus the development potential of this group of migrants—
lauded by the French and Spanish government and coveted by the Senegalese 
state—may be short circuited by lack of secure legal status.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature on 
transnational activities and suggests that scholars of transnationalism have largely 
overlooked both the physical confinement resulting from irregular status and the 
indirect effect of this confinement on non-mobile activities. The chapter then pres-
ents some qualitative evidence on the transnational participation of Senegalese 
migrants. The following section describes the data and methods for the empirical 
analysis. The results confirm that irregular status is negatively associated with short 
visits to the homeland, resulting in a territorial confinement that is transmitted to the 
non-mobile activities of remitting and investing. Discussion of the findings follow 
and a final section concludes.
5.1  Types of Transnational Activities
Since the early 1990s, the concepts of migrant transnational activities—social, eco-
nomic, cultural, and political actions that migrants living abroad carry out in their 
home country— and migrant transnationalism—the condition of being that accompa-
nies such cross-border action—have ridden a theoretical and empirical rollercoaster in 
the social sciences. Researchers initially hailed the concepts as a novel lens for under-
standing the lived bifocal realities of migrants in advanced postindustrial economies, 
with advances in transportation and communications technologies making it possible 
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for these migrants to live their lives simultaneously in destination and sending coun-
tries (Glick Schiller et al. 1995; Portes et al. 1999). Subsequent research has sought to 
distinguish migrant from other types of transnationalism but also questioned the nov-
elty, normativity, scope, and liberatory potential of the phenomenon (Foner 1997; 
Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). The current consensus is that, while transnational 
activities are neither novel nor practiced by all immigrants everywhere, the concept 
still serves as an important conceptual lens for understanding a distinct path of immi-
grant incorporation (Portes 2010): immigrants are no longer limited by the social, 
cultural, economic, and political opportunities offered to them by their new host soci-
eties but can draw on cross-border ties to conduct their lives transnationally.
With the recognition that transnational engagement is neither widespread nor nor-
mative has come an insistence on the heterogeneity of transnational practices. 
Migrants’ activities linking receiving and sending areas can take on a variety of forms, 
and researchers have commonly arranged them according to the typology of eco-
nomic, political, and sociocultural transnational activities (Boccagni 2012b; Itzigsohn 
and Saucedo 2002; Portes et al. 1999). Economic transnational activities include send-
ing monetary and in-kind remittances, investments in property or businesses in the 
homeland, circular labor migration, and informal cross-border trading enterprises. 
Political transnational activities include distance voting, the exercise of dual citizen-
ship, fundraising or other support in the destination for candidates in the homeland, 
and even running for and holding office in the homeland while residing abroad. Socio-
cultural transnational activities can include visits or “systematic communication at a 
distance” with family members and friends in the homeland, organization of home-
land-oriented cultural activities abroad, and participation in civic, recreational, or soli-
darity initiatives. Some scholars also classify participating in hometown associations 
(HTAs) as a political activity given the influence they can have on local power dynam-
ics in the hometown (Portes et al. 1999). Research has thus shown that a wide variety 
of kinds of activities make up the transnational social space.
5.2  The Role of the State in Migrant Transnational Activities
Following Portes et al.’s (1999) call to delimit the phenomenon of transnationalism 
empirically, the last decade has seen a flowering of studies of a myriad of kinds of 
transnational activities among a wide variety of groups (for a review, see Levitt and 
Jaworsky 2007). Research has also focused on the determinants of cross-border 
social action. Many studies have shown that individual characteristics such as age, 
education, occupation, and length of residence in the host community are associated 
with a variety of transnational activities, and scholars have concluded that engaging 
in sustained interaction with the homeland is not a threat to migrants’ successful 
integration in the destination society (Guarnizo 2003; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Itzigsohn 
and Saucedo 2002).
What has been missing from this literature, however, is an examination of how 
state immigration-control apparatuses and the legal statuses they produce (see Chap. 
2) may also structure transnational activities. Given the widespread  acknowledgement 
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of the preponderant role that legal status plays in the incorporation of migrants in 
the destination society (Massey 2007; Portes and Rumbaut 2006), it is surprising 
that scholars have paid so little attention to the impact that legal status may have on 
the transnational activities that have been shown to accompany such integration.
This oversight may be due, in part, to a tension in the transnational-studies litera-
ture regarding the conceptualization of the role of the state. Much of the early litera-
ture on migrant transnational activities focused on the subversive character of these 
activities vis-à-vis national borders. Transnational activities explicitly take place 
across borders and seemingly despite state attempts at control, and some scholars 
found the very fact of subverting a border to be a sign of the weakness or even 
inability of the state to control flows of people, money, ideas, and values (Glick 
Schiller et al. 1995).
In this view, the state and its territorial border—and the national membership that 
this frontier implies—are unable to contain the globe-spanning networks that 
“transmigrants” construct via their incessant physical, social, and economic con-
nections to the homeland. These connections, it is argued, are possible mainly 
because of technological advances in travel and communications that compress time 
and space: jumbo jets make formerly insurmountable distances between destination 
and origin easily traveled, and mobile phones and the internet allow migrants to be 
in daily touch with their families in the homeland (Vertovec 2003). While subse-
quent historical work has questioned the argument that cross-border engagement is 
a novel form of social action (Foner 1997), new technologies have made these activ-
ities easier and cheaper, and have thus had an impact on the quantity and kinds of 
cross-border engagement (Portes et al. 2002).
Despite the assertion that technologically advanced migration transnational 
activities indicate a diminished ability of national borders to contain migrant trans-
national activities, there are reasons to be skeptical of pronouncements of the demise 
of the state. While technology and its democratization are certainly necessary con-
ditions for current transnational activities (Portes et al. 1999), the same technology 
that facilitates the flows of people, money, and ideas in the current globalized world 
has also undoubtedly led to increased state immigration-control capacities. As 
Zolberg’s work demonstrates for the US, migration-control apparatuses have long 
kept pace with advances in technology: the American government introduced a sys-
tem of “remote control” of immigration in the nineteenth century through its 
requirement of passports and visas and concomitant network of overseas consulates, 
and was successfully able to screen out potential immigrants that it deemed “unde-
sirable” (Zolberg 1999). The role of technology is well documented in contempo-
rary border control: the governments of the US and Europe have spent massive sums 
of money to increase surveillance along their southern borders (Carling 2007; 
Massey et al. 2002). Governments have also introduced biometric visas and identity 
documents and electronic document verification systems for immigrant workers. 
The technology that has created the conditions for transnational activities has thus 
also created the possibility of increased control of those flows.
Research has also shown, however, that the technological ability to control 
migration flows is a necessary but not sufficient condition for such control, as it 
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must be coupled with political will to instill and enforce such systems. Formal sys-
tems of immigration control are often compromised by special interests, allowing 
unauthorized flows to continue through “back doors” for reasons of political and 
economic expediency (Freeman 1995; Zolberg 1999). State immigration-control 
capacity is thus often variable, contested, and contingent on a variety of economic 
and political factors. The existence of transnational flows does not necessarily call 
into question the ability of the state to contain such flows.
Indeed, recent research has argued that the state needs to be “brought back in” to 
the study of transnational activities. Waldinger (2008) argues that international 
migrants have and will always participate in the kind of cross-border activities cel-
ebrated as transnational; what is missing in the analysis, he argues, is analysis of the 
ability of the state and its borders to bound both identificational and territorial 
belonging. States and their efforts to control borders can act to “cage” migrants, 
both through processes of settlement and territorial confinement. The identifica-
tional demands of modern nation-states encourage legally resident migrants with an 
initially transnational orientation to abandon it in favor of identification with the 
destination polity.
For those migrants not legally part of the national group, state efforts to control 
movement across borders effectively confine them to the territory of the destination 
country; this constraint on physical mobility entails the progressive withering of the 
social ties that nourish cross-border engagement (Waldinger 2008). Waldinger 
(2008) describes this process as “double capture” in which the destination state 
constrains the cross-border engagement of both documented and undocumented 
migrants. Thus, the state not only has an impact on transnational activities in ways 
that run counter to the subversive description of migrant transnationalism, but its 
efforts to police its borders and ensure social closure are of primary importance for 
the ability of migrants to engage in these activities. Indeed, scholars have begun 
calling for approaches to transnationalism that grapple with the political and legal 
constraints on mobility (Boccagni 2012b; Mountz et al. 2002).
5.3  Homeland Visits and Territorial Confinement 
of Migrants with Irregular Status
How does the legal reality of the state, its borders, and the concomitant legal sta-
tuses constrain the cross-border actions of migrants? The answer to that question 
depends, in part, on the action under consideration. Some transnational activities 
may be more sensitive to legal reality than others, especially those that depend in 
some way on migrants having a secure legal status in the destination society. The 
most relevant example is travel between destination and origin. While this kind of 
travel is certainly much easier, cheaper, and quicker in the contemporary world than 
before, destination states are also more technologically capable of restricting move-
ments across their borders. As Waldinger (2008) points out, migrants do not come 
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and go as they please, but only engage in physical cross-border mobility to the 
extent that states allow it.
Legal status is clearly the key factor in allowing migrants to travel freely between 
destination and their home communities: those migrants who lack secure legal sta-
tus are less likely to engage in this kind of circulation because they are not guaran-
teed re-entry and do not want to risk the cost and potential danger of an unauthorized 
entry (Massey et al. 2002).Empirical research bears out the relationship between 
legal status and circulation. Kaag (2008) finds that Senegalese migrants in Italy 
without “papers” describe themselves as being “stuck” because they do not want to 
expose themselves to the cost and risk of an additional irregular passage. Waldinger 
(2008) finds that homeland visits are the most common form of cross-border activ-
ity among his sample of Colombians, Cubans, Dominicans, and Salvadorans, but he 
also finds that secure legal status strongly predicts the probability of travel home. 
Immigration policies and politics are thus a crucial conditioning factor for this form 
of cross-border engagement: migrants who lack secure legal status experience a 
“territorial confinement” (Waldinger 2008) that constrains their movement across 
the national border. We would thus expect a direct negative effect of irregular legal 
status on Senegalese migrants’ propensity to return home for short visits because of 
the political barrier to mobility inherent in irregular status.
5.4  Blocked Transnationalism and Structural Exclusion
While the constraint that legal reality places on physical circulation between desti-
nation and origin is unambiguous, the link between legal status and cross-border 
action is less clear for other transnational activities. Why would irregular legal 
status constrain remittances, investments, or participation in associations? The lit-
erature provides some answers in the form of the concepts of blocked transnation-
alism and structural exclusion. Restrictive immigration-control policies are a 
negative feature of the context of reception that can block transnational ties with 
the home country (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). This blocked transnationalism man-
ifests itself in the structural exclusion of migrants with irregular status from various 
formal institutions in the destination society (Bloch 2008; Mazzucato 2008; Van 
Meeteren 2012).
Lack of legal status can, for example, prevent migrants from participating in the 
formal labor market, relegating them to informal, precarious, and low-paid jobs; 
this insecurity could make them less likely to have the means to participate in trans-
national activities. Lack of legal status could also constrain participation in various 
financial institutions: not having a bank account or not being able to access credit 
could reduce migrants’ abilities to send remittances to and invest in assets in 
Senegal, for example. Structural exclusion could thus be considered an indirect 
effect of irregular legal status: the direct constraint of insecure legal status is on 
migrants’ ability to participate in formal institutions, which in turn limits migrants’ 
transnational engagement; lacking data on this kind of participation, then, legal 
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 status can act as a proxy for this kind of structural exclusion. We would thus expect 
a direct negative effect of irregular legal statuses on remitting, investing, and par-
ticipating in HTAs because of blocked transnationalism and the structural exclusion 
it engenders.
5.5  Affective Ties, Homeland Visits, and Non-mobile 
Transnational Activities
The negative effect of territorial confinement on circulation between destination and 
origin coupled with research that strongly demonstrate the importance of affective 
ties and physical co-presence for ongoing transnational engagement together sug-
gest a negative indirect effect of irregular status on long-distance, non-mobile trans-
national activities functioning through the withering of social ties. The territorial 
confinement and structural exclusion hypotheses both posit a negative effect of 
irregular legal statuses on Senegalese migrants’ cross-border activities: irregular 
status simultaneously constrains migrants’ abilities to cross the destination state’s 
borders and to participate in formal institutions that promote other forms of cross- 
border engagement. The constraint that the legal reality imposes thus depends on 
the kind of activity and whether that activity involves the physical crossing of a 
border. The literature suggests, however, that occasional physical border-crossing 
itself may be vitally related to the ability of migrants to maintain the social ties that 
underlie continued long-distance transnational activities. If lack of secure legal sta-
tus constrains visits to the homeland, this constraint could be transmitted to long- 
distance, non-mobile activities by the weakening of social ties.
What is it about visits home that might encourage other kinds of transnational 
engagement? Studies of transnationalism often assert that advances in communica-
tions technologies have rendered physical distance, and the need for physical co- 
presence, obsolete (Diminescu 2008). Virtual co-presence, in this view, substitutes 
effectively for physical co-presence in nourishing the social links that motivate and 
sustain regular cross-border social engagement. While scholars of mobility have 
recognized the potential for communications technologies to compress space and 
time in novel ways, there is still some doubt as to the ability of virtual communica-
tion to replace physical face-to-face interactions (Boccagni 2012a).
Mobility research has found, for example, that interactions involving physical 
co-presence are necessary for developing extended relations of trust (Urry 2002). 
Indeed, even communications at a distance, while allowing some maintenance of 
social ties, actually increase the need to reinvigorate these relationships via occa-
sional physical co-presence (Boccagni 2012a; Urry 2002). Physical visits to the 
homeland allow migrants to build and renew the trust and emotional identification 
that underlie long-distance social ties. In a more instrumental sense, they also allow 
migrants to gather first-hand information on the wellbeing of their families, the suit-
ability of business opportunities and partners, and the overall socioeconomic 
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 conditions of their communities and could thus inform decisions to send money, 
invest in assets, and participate in collective development efforts.
The findings of studies of transnationalism literature suggest that cross-border 
activities are responsive to affective ties between migrants and their origin commu-
nities. Itzigsohn and Saucedo (2002) find that the maintenance of emotional and 
affective ties—what they call “linear transnationalism”— is an important predictor 
of sociocultural cross-border engagement. These affective connections are evident 
in other research on other kinds of transnational activities. Landolt et al. (1999: 312) 
argue that Salvadoran household-level transnational activities are motivated by “a 
deep sense of obligation” on the part of the immigrant. Guarnizo et al. (2003) find 
that the expectation that migrants return to their home communities is a strong pre-
dictor of transnational political engagement.
Sana’s (2005) findings that remittances are motivated by status loss and discrimi-
nation at destination also indicate that migrants continue to see the home commu-
nity as their valid reference group and draw their self-worth from home-community 
value systems. Ongoing social ties are also important for the maintenance of trans-
national engagement: Bloch’s study of Zimbabweans in the UK shows that kinship 
ties and staying in touch with family in the origin community are important deter-
minants of remitting. The common finding that married males have a high propen-
sity for transnational activities (Guarnizo et al. 2003; Itzigsohn and Saucedo 2002) 
also reflects contexts of exit from which men migrate more often than women and 
in which migration may be a family survival strategy.
Affective ties to kin play a large role in structuring the transnational activities of 
Senegalese migrants. Riccio (2008) argues that the family is the mainstay of social 
organization for Senegalese both at home and abroad. Organized around commu-
nalism and a hierarchical structured solidarity, the family remains a durable social 
institution in Senegal (Beauchemin et  al. 2013). Furthermore, emigration from 
Senegal is largely a family strategy, as migration is pursued by individual men with 
assistance from kin, and a desire to return home leads to a temporary socially 
expected duration of migration on the part of both the migrant and the family (Riccio 
2008). The family is the main source of status for Senegalese migrants, and this 
connection precludes many migrants from constructing families or pursuing family 
reunification at destination (Beauchemin et  al. 2013; Riccio 2008). Kane (2011) 
argues that these kinds of affective ties are crucial to Senegalese transnationalism: 
Senegalese migrants living abroad engage in transnational activities as a way to 
seek status from their contributions to their family in the homeland, often in prepa-
ration for an eventual return.
Other studies of transnationalism state that physical circulation between destina-
tion and origin is important in facilitating other transnational activities in instrumen-
tal, rather than affective, ways. Qualitative work has shown the importance of 
mobility for transnational political participation: Smith (2006) recounts that 
Mexican members of the Ticuani Solidarity Committee of New York would travel 
to Ticuani to consult with authorities and contractors on committee-funded public 
works projects over the weekend and would be back in New York in time for work 
on Monday morning. Riccio (2001) describes a similar situation for Senegalese 
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migrants, who engage in what he calls “transnational livelihoods” that involve fre-
quent trips back to Senegal to facilitate investments and other business dealings. 
Quantitative work often assumes the importance of cross-border travel but leaves it 
unanalyzed. Portes and associates (Portes et al. 2002; Portes and Zhou 2012) assert 
that transnational entrepreneurship is at least partially dependent on the ability to be 
physically present both “here” and “there,” but the actual practice of short visits to 
the homeland is not included as a predictor variable in models. Waldinger (2008) 
analyzes the regularity and recency of home-country travel, but does not directly 
examine its effect on other cross-border activities.
Occasional physical presence in the homeland is thus of clear importance for the 
maintenance of affective social ties and the instrumental gathering of information, 
which are themselves the crucial social infrastructure of trasnational flows. The 
strand of transnational studies that celebrates the ability of new communications 
technologies to compress time and space in such a way as to allow ongoing cross- 
border activities thus excludes a potentially important determinant of such activities 
by minimizing the importance of physical travel between destination and the home-
land. We would thus expect a positive direct effect of short returns on non-mobile 
transnational activities, such as remitting, investing, and participating in HTAs.
5.6  Caging Non-mobile Transnational Activities
A relationship between short visits to the origin community and other transnational 
activities opens the door to an important indirect effect of irregular legal statuses on 
cross-border engagement that does not directly depend on the physical crossing of 
borders (henceforth referred to as “non-mobile transnational activities”). Waldinger 
(2008) argues that states effectively “cage” migrants with irregular legal status by 
constraining their movement across borders. This caging not only limits their physi-
cal movement but also, by limiting physical co-presence with important people 
“back home,” constrains their social ties to the homeland. Short returns home thus 
act as a mediator of irregular legal statuses. If migrants with irregular legal status 
experience territorial confinement that constrains their ability to circulate, and if 
short visits to the homeland allow migrants to maintain affective ties and gather 
information, and if these ties and information encourage migrants to participate in 
other forms of cross-border action, then migrants with irregular legal status should 
participate less in those forms of cross-border action that depend in some way on 
physical presence in the homeland.
While the literature is suggestive of this indirect effect of irregular legal status on 
non-mobile transnational activities, few studies have simultaneously examined the 
direct relationship between short returns and non-mobile transnational activities and 
the indirect relationship between irregular legal status and non-mobile transnational 
activities transmitted via inhibited cross-border mobility. Waldinger (2008: 24) 
notes that “better settled migrants with secure legal status are more likely to engage 
in activities requiring physical presence in the homeland,” but he does not examine 
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the impact that migrants’ legal status has on both physical presence in the homeland 
and the activities that require such presence. This impels us to examine this indirect 
link and to hypothesize that irregular legal status will indirectly constrain non- 
mobile transnational activities. Senegalese migrants who do not have the ability to 
circulate between destination and origin because of their irregular legal status are 
effectively prevented from engaging in transnational livelihoods that depend on this 
circulation.
5.7  Transnational Activities of Senegalese Migrants
Senegalese migrants in Europe and across the globe have been noted for their regu-
lar and sustained participation in the lives of the kin and communities they left 
behind in their homeland. Studies of Senegalese migrants have argued that they live 
their lives across borders in multiple places simultaneously and that the dominant 
mode of organization of their migration experience is transnational (Kane 2011) 
with an overriding goal of creating economic, social, and spiritual lives in Senegal 
to which they hope to return (Riccio 2008). Indeed, Senegalese are quite active in a 
number of transnational spheres. Official monetary remittances to Senegal tripled 
between 2002 and 2008, rising from $305 million to $1.2 billion (Cisse 2011); and 
while the financial crisis of 2008 took its toll, estimates for 2017 still place official 
remittances at $2.3 billion, or about 10% of GDP (World Bank Group 2016, 2017).
In terms of the absolute value of remittance flows, Senegal ranks third in sub- 
Saharan Africa, behind only demographic giants Nigeria, and Ghana (World Bank 
Group 2016). In addition, official remittances are thought to make up only 54% of 
total remittances. Research has highlighted the impacts of these monetary flows in 
Senegal at the household and macroeconomic level: remittances reduced poverty 
nation-wide by 30%, and accounted for a large portion of national macroeconomic 
accounting, ahead of both foreign direct investment and official development assis-
tance and equal to about 40% of export earnings (Cisse 2011).
The transnational activities of Senegalese migrants are not limited to remit-
tances. Short visits to Senegal by migrants residing abroad are an integral part of 
what Kaag (2008) calls a “circular transnational livelihood,” facilitating trade and 
other economic transactions (Riccio 2008). Recent quantitative work on Senegalese 
migration has shown that Senegalese are more likely than Ghanaians or Congolese 
to make visits to their home country: half of Senegalese migrants visit Senegal 
within 5 years of departure, while only a third of Ghanaians and 10% of Congolese 
do so (Schoumaker et al. 2013). Tall (2008) argues that urban migrants have invested 
a large proportion of their foreign earnings in real estate, and that these visible (and 
occasionally ostentatious) signs of success have played a large role in creating a 
“culture of migration” that sustains a transnational social field and quantitative 
research has recently found Senegalese migrants to have a high propensity to invest 
in Senegal (Schoumaker et al. 2013).
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Senegalese migrants also participate in a variety of transnational associations, 
which collect funds from migrants to promote construction of schools, health cen-
ters, roads, irrigation systems, and places of worship in their villages or hometowns, 
in addition to providing moral and financial support to co-national migrants at des-
tination (Grillo and Riccio 2004; Kothari 2008). Their families also tend to be trans-
national: family reunification is lower among Senegalese migrants than among 
other African migrants in Europe, with spouses commonly remaining in Senegal 
(Schoumaker et al. 2013; Hannaford 2017). Senegalese migrants thus participate in 
a wide variety of transnational activities, lending credence to the assertion that they 
organize their migration strategies along transnational lines.
Despite the apparent ubiquity of transnational engagement among Senegalese 
migrants, studies have also demonstrated that these migrants’ cross-border activities 
are constrained by their lack of secure legal status. Senegalese migrants without 
residence papers are “stuck” in their destination (Kaag 2008; Kane 2011): they do 
not have the legal ability to cross the border that separates them from their home-
land. Riccio (2001, 2008) highlights the important role that acquisition of the per-
messo di soggiorno plays for Senegalese migrants in Italy: without it, they are not 
able to practice the circular transnational livelihoods that purportedly mark the 
Senegalese migration experience.
Lack of legal status constrains the mobile and non-mobile transnational activities 
of Senegalese migrants. This constraint is all the more important given the often- 
precarious legal situation in which Senegalese migrants in Europe find themselves 
(see Chap. 3 for an examination of the pathways into irregular status among 
Senegalese migrants). Senegalese have long been suspected of participating in 
“clandestine” or irregular migration strategies in Europe. Senegalese migrants were 
targets as “false tourists” in France during the late 1960s (Diop 1993; Spire 2005) 
and were publicly visible in the sans papiers movement in the 1990s (Timera 1997). 
Senegalese in Italy and Spain may have first entered these destinations in a quest for 
legal status through regularization programs and remain among the nationalities 
with the highest rates of irregularity.
This chapter explores the link between legal status and the transnational activi-
ties of Senegalese migrants in France, Italy, and Spain. While there is a voluminous 
research literature on the cross-border activities of migrants, few of these studies 
focus explicitly on the impact of migrants’ legal statuses on their transnational 
engagement (Van Meeteren 2012). When the literature does mention legal status, it 
either simply assumes that irregular migrants are excluded from cross-border activi-
ties or finds that they are somehow structurally excluded without examining how 
this exclusion happens. Much of this lack of recognition of the role of legal status 
could be due to the apparent lack of a direct link between legal exclusion and cross- 
border participation. Many researchers may concur with Sciortino, who argues that 
“[l]egal status is significant, indeed relevant, only when and if—and to the degree to 
which—the legal reality is a constraint over the relationships and actions of the 
actor” (2004: 22) and assume that the legal reality is not a constraint over transna-
tional action. This chapter explicitly examines the extent to which the legal reality 
is a constraint over this kind of action among Senegalese migrants in Europe.
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5.8  Hypotheses
Figure 5.1 summarizes the hypothesized relationships between irregular legal status 
and Senegalese migrants’ cross-border engagement. The territorial confinement 
hypothesis (H1) posits a direct legal constraint of irregular status on migrants’ short 
returns to Senegal. The structural exclusion (H2) hypothesis postulates a direct 
legal constraint of irregular status on migrants’ abilities to participate in formal 
institutions that may promote non-mobile cross-border engagement; irregular status 
is thus a proxy for unmeasured blockages of participation in such institutions. The 
affective ties (H3) hypothesis suggests a link between short returns and non-mobile 
transnational activities—remitting, investing, and participation in hometown asso-
ciations—via the maintenance of affective links and the ability to gather first-hand 
information through occasional physical presence in the homeland. Finally, the cag-
ing hypothesis (H4) posits that the territorial confinement of migrants with irregular 
statuses (H1) constrains social ties with the homeland (H3) in a way that dampens 
non-mobile cross-border activities. The legal reality thus constrains cross-border 
action in a multitude of direct and indirect ways that depend, in part, on the crossing 
of physical and institutional borders.
5.9  Data and Methods
5.9.1  Data Source
The analyses performed in this chapter rely on a data from the Migration between 
Africa and Europe (MAFE-Senegal) project. While Chap. 1 describes the MAFE 
project in detail, this section highlights some additional features of the data that are 
pertinent for this chapter’s analyses. The multi-sited character of the MAFE data 
avoids potential biases in the retrospective measurement of transnational activities 








H3: maintenance of 
social es (+)
H2: structural exclusion (-)
H1: territorial 
confinement (-)
H4: indirect effect (-)
Fig. 5.1 Hypothesized relationships between irregular legal status and transnational activities
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Furthermore, the inclusion of three different countries allows study of the extent to 
which transnational practices vary according to the context of reception, especially 
in relation to varying policy contexts regarding legal status. The retrospective nature 
of the data allows longitudinal and time-varying analyses, which are important as 
both legal status and transnational participation are likely to vary from year to year 
over a migrant’s stay at destination.
5.9.2  The Analytic Sample
All person-years during which an individual was a migrant in France, Italy, or Spain 
contribute to this chapter’s analyses. The sample thus includes person-years contrib-
uted by return migrants in Senegal who spent time in one or more of the three 
European countries. Migrants interviewed in any of the European countries may 
also contribute person-years to the analysis of other countries if they previously 
spent time in those countries (i.e., migrants can have more than one trip). The total 
analytic sample comprises 658 individuals contributing 8188 person-years. The 
French subsample contains 264 individuals and 3677 person-years, the Italian sub-
sample contains 200 individuals and 2413 person-years, and the Spanish subsample 
comprises 198 individuals and 2098 person-years.
5.9.3  Outcome Variables
Modules of the MAFE biographical questionnaire gathered information on migrants’ 
transnational practices, including short returns to Senegal, remittances, investments, 
and participation in associations (see Appendix B for the wording of the questions). 
The outcome variables in this chapter are four separate time-varying indicators of 
four types of transnational activities among Senegalese migrants in France, Italy, 
and Spain.
For short returns, the interviewer asked migrants in which year(s) they returned 
to Senegal while living abroad. A dichotomous variable indicates a short return to 
Senegal for each year in which a visit took place (with “1” indicating a visit and “0” 
indicating no visit).
For remittances, the interviewer asked if the individual regularly sent money to 
someone who lived in a different country, and, if so, during which periods and to 
which country. A dichotomous variable indicates remittances to individuals in 
Senegal for each year in which a migrant reported sending money to someone living 
there (with “1” indicating remitting and “0” indicating no remitting). This variable 
captures the directionality and regularity of remittances, but not the amount 
remitted.
Investments were measured by asking individuals if they had ever owned 
(through gifting, inheritance, or purchase) assets in Senegal or elsewhere, and if so, 
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when they owned the asset. A dichotomous variable indicates ownership of at least 
one asset in Senegal purchased while the migrant lived abroad for each year in 
which a migrant reported owning an asset there (with “1” indicating ownership and 
“0” indicating no ownership). This variable excludes inheritances or gifts.
For hometown associations (HTAs), migrants indicated the years during which 
they participated financially, via contributions or membership fees, in associations 
that finance projects in Senegal or support Senegalese migrants in Europe. A dichot-
omous variable indicates HTA participation for each year in which a migrant con-
tributes to such associations (with “1” indicating participation and “0” indicating no 
participation).
5.9.4  Predictor Variables
The main predictor variable of interest is the contexts of reception faced by 
Senegalese migrants is their legal status. As described in Chap. 3, administrative 
histories in the MAFE questionnaire provided information on migrants’ statuses in 
the legal domains of entry, residence, and work authorization. This chapter uses the 
typology of legal statuses developed in Chap. 3. This typology includes indicators 
of entry status and yearly combined residence and work authorizations. A dichoto-
mous variable indicates entry status as visa (V) or no visa (NV) based on migrants’ 
responses about whether or not they had a visa when they entered the destination 
country; this variable is thus defined for the year of arrival for each trip. A compos-
ite categorical variable indicates legal status in each year during the migrant’s resi-
dence in a destination: RP_WP (“fully regular status”), NRP_WP (“mixed status, 
no residence permit”), RP_NWP (“mixed status, no work permit”), NRP_NWP 
(“fully irregular status”). As outlined in Chap. 3, this categorical variable varies over 
time.
Other facets of the context of reception include: a time-varying categorical vari-
able indicating the migrant’s employment status (employed or unemployed, with 
inactive as the reference category); a time-varying dummy variable indicated the 
migrant’s occupation, comparing entrepreneurial self-employment, noted in the lit-
erature as being conducive to Senegalese migrants’ “transnational livelihood,” to all 
other types of employment; a time-varying dichotomous variable measures self- 
reported economic status, with having the financial ability to cover basic needs 
being better than others in the same location compared to lesser self-reported status; 
and a time-varying count of family members or friends residing in the same country 
as the migrant captures potential effects of social networks. In addition to the above 
variables measuring the context of reception, dummy variables for residence in Italy 
and Spain in a given year (with France as the reference category) enter into the 
models to measure heterogeneity between these destinations not already captured 
by individual-level variables.
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Variables measuring years in destination, years of education, sex, and age cap-
ture individual characteristics expected to be associated with higher propensity to 
engage in transnational activities. Years in destination is measured as completed 
years since arrival at a particular year’s destination, and this metric is “reset” for 
each subsequent stay in a different destination; the models include a quadratic term 
on years in destination to account for potential non-linearities in its effect. Years of 
education is measured as an interval variable. In order to avoid age-period-cohort 
collinearities with other variables, age at migration—which remains fixed over a 
given migration spell for an individual but then changes if the same individual 
migrates to another destination—enters the eq. A variable measuring number of 
previous migrations to Europe captures migration-specific human and social capital 
accumulated by an individual over multiple trips.
Research on Senegalese migration and transnationalism shows evidence of dif-
ferential effects by ethnicity, so a dichotomous variable indicates Senegalese ethnic 
group: Wolof, with other ethnic groups (including Mandingue, Pular, Soninké, and 
other) as the reference category.1 Research has also shown that religion, especially 
membership in Islamic Sufi brotherhoods, plays an important role in structuring 
Senegalese transnationalism (Riccio 2001). The model thus includes a dummy for 
belonging to the Mouride brotherhood, with all other religious categories (including 
Tidiane, Layene, other Muslim, and not Muslim) as the reference group.
A set of time-varying indicators of the migrant’s familial connections with indi-
viduals in Senegal measures affective links to the home community, including hav-
ing a spouse in Senegal, having children in Senegal, and having at least one parent 
alive in Senegal. A dummy variable indicating family contributions to the financing 
of the migrant’s trip (which can vary for each trip) captures instrumental or contrac-
tual relationships with the family that might be expected to structure some kinds of 
transnational activities (Chort et al. 2012). A variable indicating the migrant’s iden-
tification of Dakar—far and away the country’s most important urban area—as 
place of origin measures the different geographical zones corresponding to different 
migration streams from Senegal. A dummy for father’s schooling (less than second-
ary school) measures the socioeconomic status of the sending family.
The dichotomous time-varying indicator for short returns was included in the 
model for the non-mobile transnational activities of remitting, investing, and HTA 
participation, allowing testing of hypotheses 3 and 4.
To account for potential period effects on the propensity to engage in transna-
tional activities, a dummy indicates arrival in the 1990s or 2000s, with arrivals prior 
to 1990 as the reference category. This choice of categories stems from the change 
in profile of Senegalese migrants in the 1990s, which corresponded to a change in 
social origins and destinations in Europe (Schoumaker et al. 2013).
1 Qualitative research on Senegalese transnationalism has found that Senegalese in the new destina-
tion of Italy are extremely likely to participate in “transnational livelihoods” (Riccio 2008). As 
Senegalese in Italy tend to be from the Wolof ethnic group and adherents of the Mouride brother-
hood, these modalities are tested as variables in the models.
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5.9.5  Models
Exploiting the longitudinal and time-varying nature of both outcome and explana-
tory variables requires methods that account for clustering of repeated observations 
of the same individual. Regular generalized linear models make the important 
assumption of conditional independence between observations. Such models, how-
ever, are unsuitable for data featuring repeated observations on the same individual, 
which are likely to violate the assumption of independence.2 Including a person- 
specific random intercept in the model, however, allows the dependence to be cap-
tured (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). This model can be written as
 
logit yit it i i it iPr | ,=( ){ } = + + +¢ ¢1 1 2 3x x xz b b b z  (5.1)
where yit is the dichotomous outcome indicator of participation in a given transna-
tional activity for person i during year t, β1 is a constant, xi
¢  is a vector of time- 
constant explanatory variables, xit
¢  is a vector of time-varying explanatory variables, 
β2 and β3 are regression coefficients, and ζi is the person-specific random intercept. 
All outcome and predictor variables are observed at time t.3 The random intercept ζi 
is assumed to be independent across respondents i and conditionally normally dis-
tributed with mean zero and variance ψ:
 
z yi it N| ~x 0, .( )  (5.2)
The person-specific random intercept induces the dependence between repeated 
observations, and can also be thought of as capturing unobserved heterogeneity in 
the propensity to engage in the outcome (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008).
I estimate a random intercept model for each of my four outcome variables on 
the pooled three-country sample using adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature to 
approximate the likelihood function (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). Sensitivity 
tests indicated 48 quadrature points were appropriate for fitting the models 
accurately.
Dependence among the dichotomous responses for the same person can be sum-
marized by the residual intraclass correlation (ρ) of the underlying latent outcome 
variable given the explanatory variables:
2 Models from previous chapters of this book either used dynamic survival models that do not 
violate assumptions of independence or selected cross-sectional samples of the data and thus did 
not need to account for repeated observations on the same individual. All models in previous chap-
ters included corrections to standard errors to account for clustering arising from including multi-
ple trips for individuals, but that clustering is a distinct phenomenon from the variety considered 
here.
3 All models were also estimated with lagged predictors measured at time t − 1 but results (not 
reported, available upon request) were substantively similar.
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Intraclass correlation for dichotomous outcomes is expressed in terms of the 
latent responses because intraclass correlation for observed outcomes varies accord-
ing to the values of the predictor variables. Rodríguez and Elo (2003) propose set-
ting the observed predictors to the selected percentiles (such as the median) in order 
to allow for examination of this correlation for the manifest (observed) outcome. 
These measures of unobserved heterogeneity help quantify the extent to which indi-
viduals are prone to engage in transnational activities even after accounting for 
observed covariates. In the case of high intraclass correlation, it is possible that 
individuals have intrinsically high or low probabilities of engaging in certain trans-
national activities.
5.9.6  Estimating Indirect Effects in a Non-linear Framework
The caging hypothesis posits an indirect effect of legal statuses on non-mobile 
transnational activities via the mediating variable of short returns. Estimation of this 
indirect effect is straightforward in an ordinary least squares (OLS) model: the dif-
ference in the coefficients for the legal-status variables in models with (the “reduced 
model”) and without (the “full model”) the mediator variable (here, short returns) 
can be considered the indirect effect of that variable. In a non-linear framework, 
however, the underlying latent variable has a scale that is unknown and depends on 
the predictors included in the model. Calculating indirect effects in nonlinear mod-
els using techniques developed for linear regression thus conflates rescaling with 
mediation (Karlson and Holm 2011; Mood 2010).
Kohler, Karlson, and Holm propose a method (hereafter, “KHB method”) for 
effect decomposition in a non-linear framework (Kohler et al. 2011). They propose 
extracting the information that is not contained in the predictor variable of interest 
from mediator by calculating the residuals of a regression of the mediator on the 
predictor variable of interest and using the residuals of this regression, which have 
the same standard deviation as the mediator variable itself and thus induce the same 
scale for the coefficients, in the reduced model. The KHB method allows the calcu-
lation of the indirect effects of legal statuses on non-mobile transnational activities 
as transmitted by the mediator variable of short visits to the homeland.
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5.10  Results
5.10.1  Descriptive Results
Descriptive results provide support for the first two hypotheses: migrants with irreg-
ular status return home less frequently, indicating that territorial confinement 
accompanies these irregular statuses; and migrants with irregular statuses partici-
pate less frequently in non-mobile transnational activities, indicating that their lack 
of secure legal status directly blocks them from cross-border action. Table 5.1 pres-
ents weighted4 descriptive statistics by legal status for the analytic sample under 
study. The outcome variables indicating transnational activities are represented by 
the proportion of person-years in which migrants engaged in each activity. These 
descriptive statistics indicate significant variation in the prevalence of each activity. 
On average, Senegalese migrants remit in about 72% of the person-years, while they 
engage in the other transnational activities much less frequently. Short returns occur 
in about 30% of person-years, migrants report owning assets in Senegal about 25% 
of the time, and they participate in HTAs in about 19% of person-years. In addition, 
this table indicates that there is significant variation in the prevalence of these activi-
ties across legal statuses, with F-statistics all significant at p < 0.001.
Migrants with fully regular (RP_WP) legal status are the most likely to visit the 
homeland, remit, and invest, while migrants with fully irregular (NRP_NWP) status 
are the least likely to participate in all of the transnational activities. Those migrants 
with only work authorization (NRP_WP) are the most likely to participate in asso-
ciations. Migrants with only residence authorization (RP_NWP) are less likely than 
migrants with either fully regular status or work-only authorization to engage in all 
transnational activities. This is even true for visits to the homeland: migrants with 
only a residence permit reports such visits less frequently than migrants with only a 
work permit, indicating that a residence permit in and of itself, which should grant 
the legal ability to circulate, is not sufficient for successful circulation. Indeed, 
migrants with both a residence and a work permit report short returns to Senegal in 
almost 39% of person-years, indicating that fully regular status is positively associ-
ated with visits home. The descriptive evidence supports the hypothesis that those 
migrants who make short returns home have a higher propensity to engage in non- 
mobile transnational activities. Figure 5.2 displays variation in transnational activi-
ties conditional on legal status. The figure suggests that migrants with fully regular 
legal status are more likely to participate in each transnational activity than migrants 
with fully regular legal status. In addition, in most cases, migrants with fully regular 
status are also more likely to participate in these activities than migrants with mixed 
statuses.
The descriptive statistics also support the hypothesis of an indirect effect of ter-
ritorial confinement on remitting, investing, and HTA participation via the inhibi-
4 Normalized sampling weights were applied to the data. See Schoumaker and Mezger (2013) for 
a description of the calculation and use of weights with the MAFE data.
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Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Short returns 0.04 0.21 0.23 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.39 0.49 0.30 0.46
Remitting to Senegal 0.55 0.50 0.77 0.42 0.57 0.49 0.77 0.42 0.72 0.45
Asset ownership in Senegal 0.10 0.29 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.41 0.29 0.45 0.24 0.43
HTA financial participation 0.07 0.25 0.28 0.45 0.14 0.35 0.22 0.42 0.19 0.39
Legal status: fully irregular 
(NRP_NWP)
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.17 0.38
Legal 
status: mixed (NRP_WP)
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.039 0.19
Legal 
status: mixed (RP_NWP)
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.099 0.30
Legal status: fully regular 
(RP_WP)
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.69 0.46
Entry status: no visa 0.47 0.50 0.11 0.32 0.49 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.41 0.49
Destination: France 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.62 0.49 0.64 0.48 0.61 0.49
Destination: Spain 0.23 0.42 0.10 0.30 0.082 0.27 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.35
Destination: Italy 0.30 0.46 0.40 0.49 0.30 0.46 0.22 0.41 0.25 0.43
Years in destination 4.03 3.64 8.25 6.93 8.85 8.06 11.1 8.37 9.56 8.13
Period of arrival: post-1990 0.73 0.45 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.50
Age at start of current 
migration spell
27.1 7.88 26.7 5.60 27.8 6.69 26.8 6.83 26.9 6.97
Sex: Male 0.70 0.46 0.80 0.40 0.63 0.48 0.71 0.46 0.70 0.46
Years of education 8.46 5.84 7.74 6.24 8.86 7.14 9.60 6.17 9.27 6.25
Ethnicity: Wolof 0.55 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.45 0.50
Religion: Mouride 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.29 0.45 0.34 0.47
Unemployed 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.16 0.015 0.12 0.025 0.16 0.03 0.17
Employed 0.77 0.42 0.92 0.28 0.72 0.45 0.84 0.37 0.82 0.39
Inactive 0.18 0.39 0.058 0.23 0.27 0.44 0.14 0.34 0.15 0.36
Occupation: self-employed 0.26 0.44 0.20 0.40 0.16 0.37 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.33
Self-reported economic 
status: good
0.12 0.33 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.26
Number of contacts at 
destination
2.03 2.02 1.94 2.15 3.07 2.55 3.68 2.78 3.27 2.71
Number of trips 1.57 0.82 1.29 0.73 1.56 0.95 1.43 0.96 1.46 0.93
Does not speak language of 
destination
0.41 0.49 0.29 0.46 0.36 0.48 0.23 0.42 0.28 0.45
Kids in Senegal 0.40 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.37 0.48 0.29 0.45 0.32 0.47
Spouse in Senegal 0.39 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.34 0.47
Geographic origin: from 
Dakar
0.31 0.46 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45
Father’s ed.: less than 
secondary school



























Fully regular Mixed (no WP) Mixed (no RP) Fully irregular
Fig. 5.2 Average level of transnational activities, by legal status, with 95% confidence intervals. 














Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Trip paid by family 0.32 0.47 0.24 0.43 0.49 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.40 0.49
Plan to stay: definitive 0.53 0.50 0.32 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.50
Trip motivation: work/better 
life
0.62 0.49 0.76 0.43 0.42 0.49 0.56 0.50 0.56 0.50
At least one parent alive in 
Senegal
0.86 0.35 0.91 0.29 0.89 0.32 0.77 0.42 0.80 0.40
N (person-years) 1448 307 937 5496 8188
N (trips) 768
Source: MAFE-Senegal
Notes: Sampling probability weights applied
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tion of short returns. Figure  5.3 shows the variation in transnational activities 
conditional on both short returns legal status. Variation in non-mobile transnational 
activities by cross-border mobility is evident as in the previous figure: migrants who 
circulate are more likely to remit, invest, and participate in HTAs. In addition, this 
figure shows that legal status can operate through short returns to constrain non- 
mobile transnational activities: migrants who lack secure legal status and, as a 
result, do not visit the homeland engage in non-mobile transnational activities less 
frequently.
5.10.2  Multivariate Results
Table 5.2 displays results from the random-intercept logistic regression of each 
yearly transnational activity. In these multivariate models, results are displayed as 
average marginal effects (AMEs). While Chap. 3 outlines the rationale for present-
ing results as AMEs instead of logistic-regression coefficients or odds ratios, it is 
useful to review here some of their advantages. AMEs are useful for the interpreta-
tion of non-linear models and capture the expected change in the probability of the 
outcome associated with a one-unit or discrete change in a predictor variable (see 
Cameron and Trivedi 2010 for more information on average marginal effects). 
Fig. 5.3 Average level of transnational activities, by short return and legal status, with 95% confi-



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Mood (2010) argues that AMEs are appropriate for non-linear model comparisons, 
which is helpful when comparing the effect of a given variable across different 
models (the case of short returns here). For these random-effects models, AMEs are 
calculated assuming that the group-specific intercept is set at the mean of the distri-
bution of the random intercepts (i.e., zero). It is also useful to note that the results 
are subject-specific probabilities, and not population-average probabilities: they 
refer to the yearly individual probability of engaging in each transnational activity.
Each model’s residual intra-class correlation (ρ) is also listed and is indicative of 
the degree to which the latent variable underlying each outcome is correlated across 
years for the same individual and can be interpreted in a way analogous to a Pearson 
correlation coefficient. Short returns has the lowest intra-class correlation at 
ρ = 0.51, but the correlation at the level of the manifest outcome is lower, at 0.30; 
this indicates a fairly low within-person manifest correlation, with short returns on 
one occasion predicting 9% of the variability in short returns on a second occasion. 
Remitting and investing both have latent intraclass correlations of around 0.9, with 
lower manifest correlations of 0.71 for remitting and 0.76 for investing, indicating 
R2s of 0.58 and 0.69, respectively. HTA participation has the highest intra-class cor-
relation at 0.97, with a manifest correlation at the median of the predictors of 0.83. 
This high correlation between yearly outcomes for this activity over time within 
individuals means that 69% of the variability in HTA participation is accounted for 
by previous participation. The within-subject dependence of transnational activities 
is thus much higher for remitting, investing, and HTA participation than for short 
returns. These intra-class correlations reinforce the importance of using a model 
that takes this high degree of within-individual clustering into account.
The following discussion of multivariate results will focus principally on the 
relationship between legal status and the probability of engaging in each of the four 
transnational activities in any given person-year. The base category for the compos-
ite legal-status variable is fully regular status, wherein migrants have both residence 
and work permits (RP_WP). The models also include a dichotomous variable for 
whether or not the migrant had a visa upon entry to the destination.
 Hypothesis 1: Territorial Confinement
Short Returns
The descriptive results provided some measure of support for the hypothesis of ter-
ritorial confinement: Senegalese migrants with fully regular (RP_WP) status are the 
most likely to make short visits home, while those migrants with irregular statuses, 
and especially migrants completely bereft of regular status, have a much lower like-
lihood of circulation. These results are overall averages, however, and do not take 
into account the clustered nature of the data nor the potential confounding effects of 
other predictors. Model I of Table 5.2 shows the results of the multivariate random- 
intercept logistic regression of yearly reports of short returns.
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These results indicate that the association between legal status and visiting the 
homeland is robust: compared to migrants with fully regular (RP_WP) status, those 
migrants with fully irregular or mixed statuses are statistically significantly less 
likely to circulate. Senegalese migrants with fully irregular (NRP_NWP) status are 
22 percentage points less likely to report a visit to Senegal in any given year than 
migrants with fully regular (RP_WP) status. As Fig. 5.4 shows, this translates into a 
subject-specific predicted probability of circulation for migrants with fully irregular 
status of 3%, while those migrants with both residence and work authorization have 
a subject-specific predicted probability of roughly 25%; having fully regular status 
is thus associated with a seven-fold increase in the probability of making a visit 
home compared to having fully irregular status. Senegalese migrants who lack any 
kind of legal authorization have little chance of visiting the homeland because they 
are largely confined to the territory of the countries in which they reside.
Table 5.2 also indicates that migrants with semi-irregular or mixed statuses are 
also less likely than migrants with fully regular status to circulate between destination 
and origin. Lacking only a residence permit (NRP_WP) is associated with a 14-per-
centage-point gap in the probability of visiting the homeland compared to migrants 
with fully regular status, while lacking only a work permit (RP_NWP) is associated 
with an 8-point gap. Although Senegalese migrants with these mixed statuses have a 
higher predicted probability of circulating than migrants with fully irregular status, 
they still experience a degree of territorial confinement compared to migrants with 
fully regular status. Figure 5.4 shows that migrants with mixed status have a predicted 
probability of circulating of between 11% and 17%. While yearly legal status clearly 
has a robust association with short returns, visa status at entry was not significantly 
associated with this outcome.
The model also indicates that there is no significant variation in the probability 
of short returns between destination countries, and additional models (not reported) 
Fig. 5.4 Predicted probability of short return, by legal status category, with 95% confidence inter-
vals (Dashed line represents grand mean of short returns)
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failed to find a significant interaction between the legal-status and destination pre-
dictors. These multivariate results thus support the hypothesis of territorial confine-
ment: Senegalese migrants who lack one or both forms of authorization are 
significantly less likely to engage in short returns to Senegal, and that this effect is 
constant across destinations. The legal reality that creates these irregular statuses 
thus functions as an important constraint on this physical, mobile form of cross- 
border action.
 Hypothesis 2: Blocked Transnationalism/Structural Exclusion
Blocked transnationalism/structural exclusion was evident in the descriptive results: 
Senegalese migrants with fully regular (RP_WP) status were the most likely to 
engage in the non-mobile transnational activities of remitting, investing, and HTA 
participation, while migrants with fully or semi-irregular statuses were less likely to 
participate in these activities. This blockage as a result of lack of secure legal status 
is also evident in the multivariate results of Table 5.2.
Remitting
Model II of Table 5.2 shows the results of the random-intercept logistic regression 
of yearly reports of remitting. Compared to migrants with fully regular (RP_WP) 
status, those migrants with fully irregular (NRP_NWP) status are almost 10 per-
centage points less likely to report remitting in any given year. As Fig. 5.5 shows, 
this translates into a subject-specific predicted probability of remitting of 69% for 
Fig. 5.5 Predicted probability of remitting by legal status category, with 95% confidence intervals 
(Dashed line represents grand mean of remitting)
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Senegalese migrants who lack both forms of authorization, compared to a predicted 
probability of almost 80% for migrants with fully regular status. Senegalese 
migrants who lack any form of legal authorization thus experience some kind of 
structural exclusion as a result of this status that is associated with a lower probabil-
ity of remitting. It is worth noting, however, that the predicted probability is still 
relatively high even for migrants with fully irregular status, indicating a near- 
universality of remitting among Senegalese migrants and an ability to circumvent 
formal barriers to these transfers. In addition to the negative effect of yearly irregu-
lar status, having entered without a visa is also negatively associated with remitting 
(although only at p < 0.10).
The story for the mixed/semi-irregular statuses is less clear. Compared to having 
both a residence and work permit (RP_WP), having a residence permit but not a 
work permit (RP_NWP) is negatively but not significantly associated with remit-
ting, while having a work permit but not a residence permit (NRP_WP) is positively 
and significantly associated with remitting. Senegalese migrants with only a work 
permit have a predicted probability of remitting of approximately 85%, making 
them the group most likely to send money to Senegal. Migrants experience this 
status quite infrequently (less than 4% of person-years), however, and most likely as 
a result of somewhat rare dysfunctions in the receiving states’ immigration-control 
bureaucracies, or simply as the result of poor recall on the part of migrants. The 
legal reality thus seems to operate as a constraint only on those migrants who lack 
all forms of authorization instead of those with mixed statuses.
Investing
Model III of Table 5.2 displays the results from the random-intercept logistic regres-
sion of yearly reports of asset ownership in Senegal. These results confirm the nega-
tive descriptive association between fully irregular (NRP_NWP) status and 
investing: Senegalese migrants who lack both a residence permit and a work permit 
are almost 4 percentage points less likely to own assets in Senegal than those 
migrants with fully regular (RP_WP) status. Figure 5.6 shows that migrants with 
fully regular (RP_WP) status have a predicted probability of investing of 8.3%; 50% 
lower than probability of investing for migrants with fully irregular status. Contrary 
to the results for short returns and remitting, however, there is no statistically signifi-
cant difference between migrants with mixed/semi-irregular statuses and migrants 
with fully regular status in the probability of investing, nor does visa status at entry 
have an effect. The constraint of legal status thus blocks or excludes only those 
migrants with fully irregular status from owning assets in Senegal.
Interestingly, migrants in Italy are significantly less likely than those in France to 
invest, which is the only destination-specific variation evident in any of the models. 
This could be related to the preponderance of Mouride migrants in Italy, who may 
be more likely to donate money to religious endeavors (as is pointed out below, 





Descriptive statistics indicated that Senegalese migrants with fully irregular legal 
status are the least likely to make financial contributions to HTAs. Model IV of 
Table 5.2 supports this finding: migrants who lack both a residence permit and a 
work permit (NRP_NWP) are less likely than migrants with fully regular status to 
contribute to such associations. The difference in probabilities between these cate-
gories of migrants is small: migrants with fully irregular status are only 0.8 percent-
age points less likely to participate in these associations than migrants with fully 
regular status. Nonetheless, as Fig. 5.7 shows, even migrants with fully regular sta-
tus have a subject-specific predicted probability of HTA participation of only about 
2%; migrants with fully irregular status are thus 40% less likely than migrants with 
fully regular status to participate in HTAs. Visa status at entry shows no association 
with HTA participation.
Findings from these multivariate models show that fully irregular legal status is 
consistently directly associated with a lower probability of engaging in the non- 
mobile cross-border activities of remitting, investing, and HTA participation among 
Senegalese migrants, while mixed/semi-irregular statuses do not have a consistent 
association with these outcomes. There is thus evidence that complete lack of autho-
rization serves as some kind of a legal constraint on these transnational activities. As 
the activities in and of themselves do not directly depend on the physical crossing 
of a national border, direct territorial confinement is not an explanation for this 
negative association.
Fig. 5.6 Predicted probability of investing by legal status category, with 95% confidence intervals 
(Dashed line represents grand mean of investing)
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Just as lack of legal status prevents the legal crossing of borders, though, lack of 
legal status could prevent migrants from crossing other institutional boundaries that 
might be important for transnational engagement. Having fully irregular status 
might make migrants less likely to use formal financial services, which could limit 
their abilities to accumulate money and capital to repatriate as remittances or invest-
ments; they might also have fewer options for the actual transfer of funds or for 
accessing credit. Although it is clear that employment and good self-reported eco-
nomic status are positively associated with these outcomes, these effects are net of 
the negative association with fully irregular status and thus do not mediate this 
effect.
Furthermore, Chap. 4 has shown that lack of legal status does not negatively 
affect male Senegalese migrants’ probability of employment in these three coun-
tries; while employment per se is not limited by irregular status, irregularity may 
constrain Senegalese migrants’ ability to participate in the formal labor market, thus 
increasing these migrants’ precariousness. Older migrants with more time in the 
destination country also tend to be more likely to participate in these non-mobile 
transnational activities, and these are the very migrants who tend to possess a more- 
secure legal status. While it is clear that migrants with fully irregular status may be 
excluded from some institutions which may in turn facilitate cross-border action, 
their transnational activities may also be blocked by the uncertainty and precarious-
ness that accompanies their lack of secure legal status. There is thus evidence that 
the legal reality constrains the transnational action of migrants with fully irregular 
status, but the mechanism of this legal constraint is still somewhat unclear.
Fig. 5.7 Predicted probability of HTA participation by legal status category (Dashed line repre-
sents grand mean of HTA participation)
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 Hypothesis 3: Maintenance of Affective Ties
Direct Effect of Short Returns on Non-mobile Transnational Activities
The third hypothesis of this chapter is that visits to the homeland will promote other 
forms of non-mobile transnational activities through the maintenance of affective 
ties and the ability to gather first-hand information. The models for remitting, 
investing, and HTA participation thus include yearly short returns as a predictor, 
allowing examination of the direct effect of a visit home on these non-mobile activi-
ties. Models II, III, and IV in Table 5.2 display the direct effects of short visits to the 
homeland in the same year on each of the non-mobile outcomes. Returning to 
Senegal for a visit is associated with an increase of almost 6 percentage points in the 
probability of remitting and almost 2 percentage points in the probability of report-
ing asset ownership in Senegal. There is a positive association between short returns 
and participating in HTAs, but the effect is not statistically significant. These AMEs 
are displayed graphically in Fig. 5.8.
For two of the three non-mobile transnational activities, then, there is a positive 
direct relationship between visiting home and the probability of cross-border action. 
Both remitting and investing are financial decisions that migrants make in conjunc-
tion with their families: migrants decide whether to send money to family in Senegal 
or to invest capital in assets in Senegal in response to personal and collective desires. 
While other factors may influence these decisions (as we will examine below), they 
are fundamentally about allocation of resources in an extended family unit and are 
thus responsive to bonds of trust and emotion with the receivers of those resources.
Financial decisions are thus subject to first-hand ties and the ability to gather 
information: short visits to Senegal thus allow migrants to strengthen social ties and 
Fig. 5.8 Average marginal effects of short returns, by outcome, with 95% confidence intervals. 
(Source: MAFE-Senegal. Effects for short returns are net of other variables on each model)
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gather information about investment opportunities via physical presence. These vis-
its may also allow the family at origin to more effectively extract resources from the 
migrant, as the contract-centered literature on remittances (Chort et al. 2012) might 
suggest. The same cannot be said about participation in HTAs, wherein a migrant 
makes a decision to participate financially but the association makes a collective 
decision about how to allocate those funds. This allocation decision is thus less 
sensitive to individual, personal visits to the homeland and the affective and social- 
tie- reinforcing co-presence that such visits produce.
Direct Effect of Other Affective Ties (Spouse, Children, Other Family Ties)
Other variables in the multivariate models (see Table  5.2) also demonstrate the 
importance of maintaining social and informational ties for both visits to the home-
land and the non-mobile transnational activities. Having a spouse in Senegal is 
highly predictive of traveling there for a visit: such migrants are 15 percentage 
points more likely than migrants without a spouse in Senegal to travel there. Other 
kinds of family ties, however, were not predictive of increased mobility: migrants 
with children in Senegal showed no statistically significant difference in the likeli-
hood of a short visit, while migrants with at least one parent alive in Senegal were 
actually 5.3 percentage points less likely than migrants without still-living parents 
to make a trip back. Family ties to individuals residing in Senegal are predictive of 
increased individual non-mobile transnational engagements. Senegalese migrants 
with a child in Senegal are 7.2 percentage points more likely to remit and 2.9 per-
centage points more likely to report owning assets in Senegal.
Having a spouse residing in Senegal was similarly positively associated with 
higher non-mobile transnational engagement: Senegalese migrants with a spouse in 
the homeland are 3.8 percentage points more likely to remit (although at p < 0.1), 
and 2 percentage points more likely to own assets. In addition, having at least one 
parent alive in Senegal is associated with a 12-percentage-point increase in the 
probability of remitting. Active social ties to family in Senegal clearly promote 
individual economic non-mobile transnational activities.
In a by-now familiar pattern, HTA participation responds differently to these 
indicators of affective ties. Neither spouse nor living parent in Senegal has a signifi-
cant association with HTA participation, while having a child in Senegal is nega-
tively associated with participation in associations. Neither occasional physical 
co-presence in Senegal nor the residence of family members in Senegal is associ-
ated with collective cross-border activities. These results thus support the hypothe-
sis that affective links with family members residing in the homeland encourage 
cross-border social action, but once again only for those financial activities that are 
responsive to these kinds of personal affective ties.
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Direct Effect of Other Circulation-Related Variables
Other variables also indicate the importance of circulating between destination and 
origin for ongoing non-mobile cross-border engagement. The number of trips is 
highly predictive of transnational activities: each additional prior trip is associated 
with a 7.2 percentage-point increase in the probability of remitting, a 5.2 percentage- 
point increase in the probability of investing, and an almost 1 percentage-point 
increase in the probability of HTA participation. Repeat migration (approximately 
30% of the sample reported more than one trip) thus reinforces the transnational 
social field in such a way as to make non-mobile transnational action more likely for 
both individual and collective activities.
Other indicators of a circular migration strategy are also related to remitting and 
investing. Migrants who reported planning to stay definitively in the destination 
country (46% of the sample) are 10 percentage points less likely to remit than those 
who do not plan to stay definitively, indicating that remitting is integral to Senegalese 
migrants’ ability prepare an eventual return to Senegal. Migrants who reported hav-
ing migrated principally for work or in search of a better life are 14 percentage 
points more likely to remit and 5.4 percentage points more likely to own assets in 
Senegal, suggesting that those migrants with a logic of accumulation are more likely 
to participate in these forms of financial cross-border action.
 Hypothesis 4: Caging and Indirect Effects of Legal Status Via Short 
Returns
Results from the decomposition of direct effects indicate a significant negative indi-
rect effect of fully irregular status on remitting and investing via the mediator of 
reduced short returns. While Table 5.2 displays the negative direct effects of irregu-
lar legal statuses and the positive direct effects of visits to the homeland on non- 
mobile transnational activities of Senegalese migrants, these models do not allow 
testing of the hypothesis of an indirect effect of irregular statuses on non-mobile 
activities via territorial confinement (see Fig.  5.1 for the theoretical model). 
Table 5.3 presents results from the non-linear decomposition of total effects using 
the KHB method and shows the direct, indirect, and total effects5 of irregular legal 
statuses on the non-mobile transnational activities of remitting, investing, and HTA 
participation.
Indirect effects of each of these statuses on the non-mobile activities run through 
the mediator of short returns. For remitting and investing, the indirect effect of fully 
irregular status (NRP_NWP) is negative and significant: 14% of the total negative 
5 The effects are presented as logit coefficients (log-odds) so are not directly comparable to the 
quantities in Table 5.2. The direction and significance of the direct effects of legal status on each 
non-mobile transnational activity are the same as those presented in Table 5.2: there is a negative 
direct effect of fully irregular status on all three non-mobile activities, and a non-significant direct 
effect of the semi-irregular statuses on investing and HTA participation.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































effect of legal status on remitting is due to short returns, while short visits to the 
homeland account for 9% of the total negative effect of legal status on investing. 
Thus, migrants with fully irregular (NRP_NWP) face not only a direct legal con-
straint from their irregular status but also an indirect negative constraint of their 
status via short returns: their irregular status directly reduces their ability to travel 
between destination and origin, and such visits encourage transnational engage-
ment. The lack of ability to maintain and reinforce these social ties translates into 
reduced cross-border action. Irregular status serves to confine migrants to the terri-
tory of the destination, and thus cages their non-mobile transnational activities.
The pattern of indirect effects for the two mixed statuses reinforces the notion 
that territorial confinement is an indirect legal constraint even on individual non- 
mobile transnational activities. While the direct effects of these two semi-irregular 
statuses on remitting and investing is somewhat complicated, the pattern of indirect 
effects is unambiguously negative, indicating that the direct negative legal con-
straint of these mixed statuses on the ability to visit the homeland indirectly reduces 
the remitting and investing of Senegalese migrants who lack either a residence per-
mit or a work permit.
The KHB method thus finds evidence to support the hypothesis of an indirect 
effect of territorial confinement on remitting and investing. The KHB method fails 
to find an indirect effect of fully irregular (NRP_NWP) or mixed statuses on HTA 
participation, which confirms the interpretation that this kind of collective 
 cross- border activity is less sensitive to the maintenance of affective links afforded 
by in-person visits.
5.11  Discussion
Despite a celebration of the border-subverting nature of transnational activities, 
research on the role of the state suggests that the crossing of both geographic 
(Waldinger 2008) and institutional (Van Meeteren 2012) borders by migrants is 
subject to state control. One of the most pertinent forms of control for these types of 
border crossings is legal status: migrants who do not possess a secure form of legal 
status will find it more difficult to come and go physically across the destination 
state’s borders and may also find it challenging to access other institutions that 
require formal state recognition and may help support cross-border engagement.
The results of this chapter unambiguously support the territorial confinement 
hypothesis: Senegalese migrants with fully irregular or mixed statuses were signifi-
cantly less likely to make short returns to the homeland. These insecure legal sta-
tuses thus impose a direct constraint on Senegalese migrants’ physical mobility. In 
Waldinger’s (2008) territorial-confinement formulation, they are at the mercy of 
state immigration-control mechanisms for their ability to make trips back to the 
homeland. This finding is at odds with the portrayal of a globalized world in which 
movements are unfettered by borders, but is consistent with other research on glo-
balization that sees some flows—capital, goods, and some kinds of workers—as 
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freer than others—such as migrant labor (for the example of asymmetric flows in 
the NAFTA regime, see Massey et al. 2002).
The results of this chapter also support the hypothesis that migrants’ transna-
tional activities can be blocked by their lack of secure legal status and the exclusion 
from other formal institutions that ensues. Fully irregular status operated as a direct 
constraint on remitting, investing, and HTA participation for Senegalese migrants. 
It seems that this status may exclude these migrants from accessing other formal 
institutions that are, in some way, related to cross-border engagement. Lack of abil-
ity to open a bank account or apply for credit, both of which require documentation, 
might constrain migrants’ transnational activities. While irregular status does not 
prevent Senegalese migrants from working, it certainly prevents them from working 
in the formal labor market and probably relegates them to insecure and poorly 
remunerated employment; this precarity that accompanies exclusion from the for-
mal sector and its guarantees might decrease the ability and motivation to partici-
pate in transnational activities. These findings seem to be at odds with other literature 
on transnationalism that argues that cross-border action can be the result of exclu-
sion and discrimination felt by migrants at destination (Itzigsohn and Saucedo 2002; 
Sana 2005); in the case of Senegalese migrants, the structural exclusion that accom-
panies irregularity of legal status seems to outweigh the reactive impulse.
Indeed, the results of these models indicate that Senegalese migrants may depend 
in some ways on the accumulation of resources for successful transnational 
 engagement, at least for the individual financial activities of remitting and investing. 
Migrants who report being employed are 46 percentage-points more likely to report 
remitting in a given year than migrants who are unemployed, while reporting work/
search for a better life as the main motivation for having migrated is associated with 
a 14 percentage-point increase in the yearly probability of remitting. Migrants with 
good self-reported economic status are 6 percentage points more likely to own 
assets in Senegal, while those who report work or a better life as the motivation for 
their migration are 5.4 percentage points more likely to be investors.
This strategy of accumulation can be interpreted in light of the strong effects of 
short visits to the homeland and the affective ties that these visits foster. Making a 
visit to the homeland was associated with increased propensity to remit and invest: 
this form of mobility is thus of crucial importance in explaining these financial 
forms of non-mobile transnational activities. This is unsurprising given the asser-
tions of the literature of physical co-presence, which has demonstrated that face-to- 
face interaction is crucial in forging and feeding social ties and interpersonal trust 
(Urry 2002), but this is important determinant of action at a distance has been 
ignored in studies of transnational activities.
The direct effects of affective ties and other links to the homeland are also clear 
in the models: having children, a spouse, or parents in Senegal are associated with 
individual non-mobile transnational activities, as is repeat migration. All of these 
predictors indicate that ongoing links to the homeland are of paramount importance 
in structuring transnational engagement among Senegalese migrants. These find-
ings thus reinforce the idea that building social status in Senegal in preparation for 
an eventual return is a principal motivation of Senegalese migrants (Kaag 2008; 
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Kane 2011; Riccio 2008); Senegalese migrants may thus favor accumulation of 
resources as a way to finance their transnational engagement, perhaps even at the 
expense of pursuing integration in the destination society (Kaag 2008; van 
Nieuwenhuyze 2008).
In addition to examining the direct effect of visits to the homeland on long- 
distance transnational activities, this chapter found an indirect, negative effect of 
irregular legal statuses on these non-mobile activities transmitted through the inabil-
ity to circulate between destination and origin. Migrants who have irregular status 
thus face three kinds of legal constraints on their cross-border actions: a direct legal 
constraint on their physical mobility, limiting short returns to Senegal; a direct legal 
constraint on their formal institutional participation, limiting their remitting, invest-
ing, and HTA participation; and an indirect legal constraint on their remitting and 
investing through their inability to visit home and the concomitant curtailing of 
social ties. Previous studies of transnational activities, in neglecting the relationship 
between visits home and non-mobile transnational activities, have thus neglected an 
important mechanism for the constraint that legal status may have on cross-border 
action.
The results of this chapter have also shown that not all transnational activities are 
subject to the same legal and social determinants. While fully irregular legal status 
was negatively directly associated with all four transnational activities, there were 
important differences among the other predictors. Semi-irregular legal statuses had 
a strong negative association with short returns, indicating that mobility is closely 
related to security of legal status. In turn, short returns along with variables indicat-
ing ongoing social and affective ties to Senegal were important predictors of both 
remitting and investing, both individual financial decisions likely to be influenced 
by sentiment and trust. This strong positive direct association was translated into a 
negative indirect association with semi-irregular status for these two financial activ-
ities through the constraint on border crossing, showing them to be sensitive to legal 
limitations on physical mobility.
HTA participation, on the other hand, is a collective activity and, as such, seems 
to be less responsive to physical co-presence in Senegal and affective ties to the 
homeland. Indeed, if there is any evidence of reactive transnationalism (Itzigsohn 
and Saucedo 2002), it may be with participation in these associations, as those 
migrants who do not speak the language of their destination are almost 6 percentage 
points more likely to report such participation. Legal exclusion does not motivate 
such reaction, but the HTA variable may not actually capture the full range of forms 
of participation in these associations as it only asks about financial contributions to 
them and not benefits from the social services to migrants in destination that such 
associations often provide. This study has thus shown that it is necessary to distin-
guish, in the Senegalese case, between affectively oriented and collective transna-
tional activities, echoing Waldinger’s (2008) assertion that transnational activities 
do not necessarily cluster together.
From a methodological perspective, the results of this chapter underline the 
importance of disaggregating traditional binary measures of legal status. For all of 
the transnational outcomes, there were differences between migrants with fully 
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irregular status and those with mixed statuses that would have been erased by lump-
ing them together as “irregular.” Indeed, research has shown the empirical and con-
ceptual value of a distinction between semi-compliant mixed statuses and fully 
irregular status (Ruhs and Anderson 2010), which this chapter’s results underscore. 
At the same time, migrants’ legal status upon entry, as measured by having a visa, 
had no association with transnational activities. Irregularity is thus complex, as 
Chap. 3 demonstrated, and this complexity needs to be taken into account when 
considering the constraints that this multifaceted legal reality places on migrants’ 
actions.
5.12  Conclusion
Modern nation-states place contradictory demands on migrant’s cross-border activi-
ties. On the one hand, many destination-country governments have started to recog-
nize the role that migrants can and do play in the development of their homelands 
and have put in place “co-development” schemes (Kabbanji 2013; Weil 2002) to 
leverage transnational activities for the benefit of development programs. On the 
other hand, states have erected increasingly restrictive immigration-control appara-
tuses that make it difficult to acquire secure legal status. This difficulty translates 
into a captured loyalty among legal migrants, who have invested heavily in their 
membership, and a physical territorial confinement of those migrants who lack reg-
ular status. This control apparatus, coupled with a dominant ideology of assimila-
tion that often looks askance at foreign loyalties, thus implicitly limits the 
cross-border activities of both documented and undocumented migrants.
The research literature on transnational activities has not grappled with these 
contradictions. Research on transnationalism has debated the novelty and social 
configurations of cross-border activities, but most studies do not consider the role 
that legal status plays in promoting or constraining them. This chapter suggests that 
territorial confinement, which results from lack of secure legal status produced by 
restrictive immigration-control apparatuses, not only directly constrains mobile 
transnational activities such as homeland visits but also indirectly reduces migrants’ 
participation in non-mobile activities, such as remitting and investing. This chapter 
hypothesizes that the indirect relationship is mediated by short visits home, which 
nourish the affective social infrastructure that facilitates ongoing non-mobile, long- 
distance cross-border activities.
This chapter finds that legal status is an important predictor of transnational 
engagement, especially when the direct legal constraint on physical mobility is fac-
tored into other non-mobile forms of cross-border action. At the same time, the 
robustness of the social and affective infrastructure of most transnational activities 
indicates that legal status may constrain but does not completely determine cross- 
border action. While the state and formal institutions may demand “papers” for the 
crossing of some kinds of borders, migrants clearly find ways to circumvent these 
demands; this chapter shows that even migrants completely bereft of residence and 
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work authorization have a non-zero probability of crossing the destination state’s 
geographical border for a short visit to Senegal and continue to engage in other 
transnational activities. Indeed, research has shown that some Senegalese migrants 
may use non-mobile transnational activities such as remitting as a way to maintain 
affective ties with family in Senegal even without physical visits to the homeland 
(Hannaford 2016). At the same time, this chapter shows the importance of taking 
legal status into account as transnational activities are clearly subject to a number of 
legal constraints. This chapter demonstrates that it is crucial to consider multiple 
kinds of statuses: an approach that collapsed fully and semi-irregular statuses would 
have obscured the robust negative association between fully irregular status and all 
kinds of transnational activities.
The results of this chapter also allow a re-examination of the concept of a 
Senegalese “mode of migration” that is centered around “transnational livelihoods” 
(Riccio 2001, 2008). Qualitative literature has suggested that Senegalese migrants 
engage in an explicitly transnational form of migration, with Mouride traders in 
Italy depicted as the most likely to live their lives in Senegal and in Europe simulta-
neously. The ability to circulate between destination and origin is of key importance 
in this strategy, as it allows migrants to conduct entrepreneurial business across 
borders. This chapter, however, finds no effect of belonging to the Mouride brother-
hood or of being self-employed in trading on the propensity of migrants to make 
short visits to Senegal net of legal status, affective ties, and the model’s other 
 variables. Indeed, belonging to the Mouride brotherhood is negatively associated 
with owning assets in Senegal, and being self-employed in trading is negatively 
associated with both remitting and investing. Living in Italy is likewise not associ-
ated with a transnational livelihood, and moreover had a negative effect on invest-
ing. Thus, a transnational lifestyle among Senegalese seems less associated with the 
cultural dispositions of certain religious and ethnic subgroups and more related to 
the interplay between the legal institutional structure that acts to constrain cross- 
border action and social infrastructure that drives these activities.
This study does lend credence, however, to the idea that the “homeland is the 
arena” (Kane 2011) in which social status matters for Senegalese migrants. There 
are strong effects of short visits, social ties, repeat migration, plans to return, and 
work-related motivation on non-mobile transnational activities. This shows that 
Senegalese migrants’ cross-border engagement is largely motivated by a desire to 
return to Senegal eventually. A logic of accumulation at origin may thus dominate a 
logic of integration at destination (van Nieuwenhuyze 2008); both of these logics, 
however, are blocked by lack of secure legal status: migrants without “papers” are 
both directly blocked from transnational participation via legal exclusion from bor-
der crossing, and indirectly blocked by physical caging in the destination and the 
concomitant withering of social ties. Legal status is thus of key importance in keep-
ing open the door to the homeland.
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 Appendices




Short returns When you lived in [destination country], did you return to Senegal for a duration 
of less than one year? In which year(s) did you return?
Remittances Have there been periods of your life during which you regularly sent money to 
someone who was in a country other than the one in which you lived? From 
which year(s) to which year(s)? And in which country(ies) did the individual(s) 
to whom you sent money live?
Investments Now we will talk about the assets or businesses that you may have bought over 
your lifetime, or that you may have received or inherited from somebody. Are 
you CURRENTLY owner, in Senegal or elsewhere, of one or several plots of 
land (agricultural land, building plot, or under construction); of one or several 
house units (house, apartment…); of a business, venture, commercial premises 
even on a rental basis (shop, workshop, taxis…)? And IN THE PAST, have you 
been owner, in Senegal or elsewhere, of plots that you don’t own anymore; of 
house units that you don’t own anymore; of a business, a venture, commercial 
premises even on a rental basis that you don’t own anymore? [then, for each 
asset] in which country is this asset located? And how did you obtain this asset?
Associations In the time that you spent abroad, were you at any time paying contributions or 
membership fees to one or more associations (including religious organisations) 
that finance projects in Senegal or support Senegalese migrants in Europe? From 
which year(s) to which year(s)?
Source: MAFE-Senegal biographical questionnaire








B (se) B (se) B (se) B (se)
Short return (ref.: none) – 0.90*** (5.52) 0.67*** (4.00) 0.16 (0.77)












Mixed (NRP_WP) −1.05*** 
(−3.93)
0.96* (2.01) 0.21 (0.30) 0.17 (0.21)
Mixed (RP_NWP) −0.52** 
(−3.10)










B (se) B (se) B (se) B (se)
Destination (ref: France)
Spain 0.06 (0.24) 0.17 (0.28) −0.71 (−0.91) −1.34 (−1.06)
Italy −0.29 
(−1.11)
−0.51 (−0.77) −1.97** 
(−3.05)
−2.97** (−2.58)




−0.49+ (−1.72) 0.36 (0.83) 0.22 (0.46)

















Period of arrival: post-1990 
(ref: pre-1990)
0.23 (1.06) −0.21 (−0.38) 0.37 (0.54) −1.39 (−1.50)




0.04 (1.08) 0.16** (3.21) 0.23*** (4.00)
Sex: Male (ref: female) 0.07 (0.33) −0.43 (−0.73) 1.06 (1.18) 2.55* (2.31)
Years of education 0.04* (2.28) −0.10+ (−1.90) 0.08 (1.12) 0.17+ (1.93)
Ethnicity: Wolof (ref.: 
other)
0.24 (1.18) 0.12 (0.22) 1.02 (1.16) −1.88+ (−1.73)
Religion: Mouride (ref.: 
other)
0.33 (1.51) 0.03 (0.05) −1.62+ (−1.74) −3.96** (−3.28)
Economic activity (ref.: 
unemployed)
Employed 0.27 (1.09) 4.25*** 
(10.28)
−0.76 (−1.58) 3.58*** (4.47)





−0.67+ (−1.87) −1.10** 
(−2.58)
−0.38 (−0.65)
Self-reported econ. status: 
good (ref.: bad)
0.28 (1.20) −0.37 (−0.79) 1.96*** (3.38) −0.47 (−0.54)
Number of contacts at 
destination
0.01 (0.27) −0.11* 
(−1.97)
0.43*** (4.91) 0.19* (2.15)
Number of trips 0.06 (0.74) 1.03*** (4.24) 2.06*** (5.74) 1.64*** (3.35)




1.22* (2.30) −0.67 (−0.94) 6.50*** (6.42)
Kids in Senegal (ref.: no) −0.01 
(−0.09)
1.07*** (3.65) 1.09*** (3.35) −1.46** (−3.21)




0.56+ (1.82) 0.78* (2.34) 0.98* (2.21)
Geographic origin: from 
Dakar (ref.: other)












B (se) B (se) B (se) B (se)




−0.95+ (−1.67) 0.15 (0.17) −1.28 (−1.18)




−0.07 (−0.14) 0.19 (0.29) 1.75+ (1.94)






−0.54 (−0.90) −1.33 (−1.49)
Trip motivation: work/
better life (ref.: other)
−0.03 
(−0.17)
1.87*** (4.37) 2.23*** (3.46) 0.85 (1.19)













Observations 8119 8119 8119 8119
AIC 6884.76 3941.22 2066.6 3080.79
BIC 7101.82 4156.28 2290.66 3304.85
Log likelihood −3411.38 −1938.61 −1001.3 −1508.39
χ2 493.55 637.36 567.16 305.85
Degrees of freedom 29 30 30 30
ρ 0.51 0.90 0.94 0.97
σU 1.86 5.52 7.25 10.91
Source: MAFE-Senegal. t statistics in parentheses. +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
Random-intercept logistic regression coefficients
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Migrants from Senegal have gained renown for their mobility, especially to 
European destinations. In 2010 Senegalese migrants accounted for more than 4% of 
migrants born in sub-Saharan Africa living in OECD countries, while Senegal 
accounted for less than 1.5% of the total population of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Senegalese migrants were the largest sub-Saharan African migrant group in Italy 
and Spain in 2010, accounting respectively for 23% and 27% of all sub-Saharan 
migrants, and the third-largest such group in France, accounting for 13% of the 
population born in this region. Senegalese also made up a significant share of the 
overall foreign-born population in these three destination countries: almost 1% in 
Spain, 1.3% in Italy, and 1.6% in France. While Senegalese migrants have estab-
lished a presence overseas, they have also profoundly shaped the economy and 
culture of Senegal. Not only does Senegal rank third in sub-Saharan Africa in the 
total volume of cash remittances received, but a “culture of migration” has emerged 
in Senegal that values the economic and social contributions of emigrants. 
Senegalese migrants themselves also remain connected to Senegal for their sense of 
social status.
While prior research has demonstrated the importance of this migrant group, 
scholarship has not fully grappled with the role that legal status plays in the lives of 
Senegalese migrants. Research on Senegalese in Italy, for example, has shown the 
importance of “transnational livelihoods” for their economic success and ongoing 
connections with Senegal, but this research has not investigated how lack of fully 
regular legal status may impede this strategy. Other studies have shown the impor-
tance of maintaining transnational connections for the social status of Senegalese 
migrants, yet only suggests the potential constraints that irregularity of legal status 
might place on physical mobility and other cross-border actions. The lack of sus-
tained attention to legal status among Senegalese migrants is all the more surprising 
given the configurations of irregularity that Senegalese migrants have faced over 
time in their main destination countries. Immigration policies in France, Italy, and 
Spain have consistently created the legal conditions for irregularity among 
Senegalese migrants, as evidenced by their overrepresentation in regularization 
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 programs in Italy and Spain and their participation in the sans papiers movement in 
France in the 1990s.
This book has examined the determinants and impacts of complex forms of irreg-
ular legal status among Senegalese migrants in Europe. It elucidated how multiple 
contexts of reception produce pathways of irregular legal statuses among Senegalese 
migrants in France, Italy, and Spain and how the resulting complex pathways of 
irregular status shape the economic integration of Senegalese migrants into their 
host societies as well as their ongoing participation in the development of their 
homeland.
The three parts of the book have taken an articulated approach to these topics and 
have drawn on both legal texts and the unique Migration between Africa and Europe 
(MAFE) survey. The first part sketched the legal histories of the immigration poli-
cies facing Senegalese migrants in France, Italy, and Spain and the resulting con-
figurations of irregularity that these policies created. The second part empirically 
examined the pathways into these different configurations of irregularity among 
Senegalese migrants using the MAFE data. The third part sought to understand how 
different configurations of irregularity constrain the economic and transnational 
activities of Senegalese migrants.
6.1  Evolution of Immigration-Control Policies in France, 
Italy, and Spain
Chapter 2 laid the historical foundations for this research by tracing the evolution of 
immigration policies and the mechanisms of external and internal control 
(Brochmann 1999) they define in the main European destinations of Senegalese 
migrants: France, Italy, and Spain. Immigration-control policies have played an 
important role in structuring the migration strategies and incorporation of Senegalese 
migrants in France, Italy, and Spain. In France, there has been an evolution from 
colonial-era political and personal “assimilation” of Senegalese to the French 
nation; to a post-independence preferential regime that put few restrictions on the 
ability of Senegalese to enter, reside, or work in France; to a gradual erosion of the 
Franco-Senegalese bilateral relationship and an alignment with the general 
immigration- control regime. Senegalese in France thus had de facto regular status 
for much of the 1960s and 1970s in that they did not need explicit authorization to 
enter or reside in France and were able to take advantage of common post facto 
regularization procedures. Irregularity became more common among Senegalese as 
this preferential regime crumbled, and the participation of Senegalese and other 
Africans in the sans papiers movement in the mid-1990s highlighted the extent to 
which changes in immigration-control legislation had created precarity in their legal 
statuses.
The evolution of immigration-control policies in Italy and Spain took a much 
different trajectory. Spanish and Italian apparatuses of immigration control are 
6 Conclusion
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much more recent: neither had any national-level immigration policy with the nor-
mative status of legislation until the 1990s. Irregularity seems to have been a consis-
tent component in contexts of reception in Italy and Spain, as their frequent and 
massive regularization programs demonstrate. Much of this irregularity seems to 
stem from the mismatch between restrictive immigration-control measures and 
structural demands for cheap, low-skilled labor (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009; 
González-Enríquez 2009; Reyneri 2003). Partly as a result of this mass irregularity, 
immigration-control policy in both countries has since developed in a restrictive 
fashion, marked by an overriding concern with border control along Mediterranean 
coastlines.
In tracing these differential evolutions, Chap. 2 underlined that the legal status 
that migrants possess is a relational product (Sciortino 2004): interaction between a 
state’s policies and a migrant’s strategies creates different kinds of administrative 
statuses. Immigration policies and their control mechanisms have thus created legal 
parameters that define the legal pathways that migrants navigate.
6.2  Pathways into Irregular Legal Status
Chapter 3 examined the pathways into irregular statuses among Senegalese migrants 
in Europe. Drawing on literature that argues for both multidimensional definitions 
of irregularity and recognizing the important role that socio-legal contexts play in 
setting the parameters of irregularity, the chapter hypothesized that context, mea-
sured by both destination and period, would structure both geographic and status 
flows into irregularity. The chapter also hypothesized that pathways of irregularity 
would be linked, and that forms of capital and links to host-country institutions 
would also be correlated with irregularity.
Retrospective life-history data from the MAFE-Senegal project was used to 
study the determinants of the pathways into irregularity of no-visa entry, overstay-
ing, and befallen irregularity. Senegalese migrants going to Italy were the most 
likely to have entered without a visa, while overstaying was more prevalent in 
southern Europe than in France. These results thus showed that context plays a 
strong role in shaping no-visa entry and visa overstay, pathways that occur close in 
time to the act of crossing a border. These pathways are likely to be the most respon-
sive to variation over time and across destination of the socio-legal parameters of 
legal status since most of these parameters have increasingly converged on prevent-
ing irregular entry. These findings support research that views irregularity of status 
as a “legal production” of immigration policies and mechanisms of control (De 
Genova 2002; Sciortino 2004).
These early-trajectory pathways into irregularity are also responsive to migrants’ 
various forms of capital: migrants who have greater access to financial, human, and 
social capital are less likely to follow these paths into irregularity; migration- specific 
social capital in the form of prior no-visa entry facilitate current no-visa entry, but 
an increase in the number of previous trips protects against first-status irregularity. 
6.2 Pathways into Irregular Legal Status
204
Migrant agency thus also structures the pathways that they take or manage to avoid, 
buttressing other findings in the literature that understand state structures as condi-
tioning migrant action but not completely constraining them (Bakewell 2010; 
Coutin 1998; Sciortino 2004).
Changes in legal status, such as befallen irregularity, are more responsive to links 
to institutions in the destination country, such as the labor market, suggesting that 
migrants participate actively in avoiding pathways into irregularity as part of a proj-
ect of integration. Unemployment is, somewhat paradoxically, related to decreased 
probability of loss of regular status, which suggests that the link between labor 
market participation and legal status depends crucially on whether or not the migrant 
works in the formal sector (Reyneri 2003).
In addition to findings on context and links to institutions, Chap. 3 found that 
previous legal status was an important predictor of all of the pathways. This sup-
ports the emerging view in research on legal status that a static binary measure of 
legal status is not sufficient to capture the complexity of legal status categories and 
transitions over migrants’ life courses. This chapter thus contributes to the call for 
disaggregating legal status (Donato and Armenta 2011) and examining connections 
between different kinds of legal status.
6.3  Legal Status, Gender, and Labor Market Incorporation
Chapter 4 examined how immigration policy creates gendered channels of access to 
destination societies’ labor markets. The chapter hypothesized that the effect of 
legal status on economic incorporation would differ for women and men: women’s 
legal statuses are more likely to be the product of dependency-inducing family 
reunification policies that disincentivize work (Boyd 1989; Kofman 1999), while 
men would have more options for labor-market access regardless of legal status 
(Kogan 2006). Women’s labor-market participation would thus be structured by 
their legal status, with those women reunifying with spouses at a destination less 
likely to work upon arrival than autonomous women or men (Lesselier 2008). At the 
same time, the chapter hypothesized that female reunifiers may also have an easier 
time making eventual transitions into the labor market (Kanaiaupuni 2000).
The results indicated that Senegalese women with configurations of legal status 
indicative of family reunification were more likely than women with other legal 
statuses to be economically inactive upon arrival, while there is little association 
between Senegalese men’s legal status and their participation. This finding held 
across destination countries despite the differing configurations of legal status 
granted to reunified spouses: while mixed status among women was associated with 
higher inactivity in Spain and Italy, so was fully regular status in France. This is 
consonant with research that finds that reunified spouses tend to be less likely to be 
economically active (Kofman 1999). In the case of Spain and Italy these women 
face legal barriers to their participation as a result of waiting periods (Kofman 
2004). Women in France, however, do not face such barriers, meaning that their 
6 Conclusion
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legal situation is also indicative of economic dependency (Lesselier 2008). The 
chapter also found, however, that family reunification does not preclude labor- 
market participation, as many of the women with family-reunification profiles even-
tually transition into economic activity. This finding echoes the observation that 
family migration may transform into a form of labor migration (Kofman 1999). It 
also supports the view that women migrants have a diversity of motivations for their 
migration, and may often strategically participate in an “associational” move for 
economic reasons (Kanaiaupuni 2000). In contrast to Senegalese women, male 
migrants with fully irregular status (NRP_NWP) did not face any penalty in labor- 
market participation, employment, or the risk of transition to unemployment com-
pared to migrants with fully regular status. There thus seems to be only a weak legal 
constraint of irregularity of legal status on economic activity for Senegalese migrants 
in Europe., This finding echoes research that demonstrates that immigrants to coun-
tries high labor-market informality and demand for low-skilled labor may reduce 
the immigrant “employment penalty” (Kogan 2006), but may also channel immi-
grants into “bad jobs” (Fullin and Reyneri 2011).
6.4  Legal Status and Transnational Activities
Chapter 5 considered the constraint that irregular legal status might impose on the 
cross-border activities of Senegalese migrants in their main contexts of reception. 
While the literature on transnationalism has often lauded the ability of migrants to 
subvert state authority via their cross-border activities, this chapter argued that state 
action needs to be brought back into the analysis of transnationalism. It proposed 
that state action works most directly as territorial confinement (Waldinger 2008): 
those migrants who lack secure legal status are unable to cross physical borders at 
their will. The chapter also hypothesized that lack of regular legal status would 
impede migrants’ ability to cross various institutional boundaries that would block 
their non-mobile transnational activities (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Van Meeteren 
2012). The chapter sought to understand the link between mobile and non-mobile 
transnational activities by drawing on literature that argues for the importance of 
physical co-presence in building and sustaining affective and trusting relationships 
(Urry 2002) and thus hypothesized that physical visits to the homeland would facili-
tate non-mobile transnational activities. Finally, the chapter hypothesized an indi-
rect constraint of irregular legal statuses on non-mobile activities operating through 
territorial confinement: migrants without the ability to make visits to the homeland 
are less likely to be able to maintain social ties that depend on occasional physical 
co-presence, and are thus less likely to participate in non-mobile transnational activ-
ities that depend on active social ties. The chapter used the MAFE data and its 
information on Senegalese migrants’ transnational activities directed towards their 
homeland in the form of short returns, remittances, investments, and participation in 
hometown associations (HTAs).
6.4 Legal Status and Transnational Activities
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The results of Chap. 5 unambiguously supported the territorial confinement 
hypothesis: Senegalese migrants with fully irregular or mixed statuses were signifi-
cantly less likely to make short returns to the homeland. This finding supports 
Waldinger’s (2008) contention that nation states play an important role in structur-
ing and constraining migrants’ cross-border activities. The results of the chapter 
also supported the hypothesis that migrants’ transnational activities can be blocked 
by their lack of secure legal status and the exclusion from other formal institutions 
that ensues. Fully irregular status operated as a direct constraint on remitting, invest-
ing, and HTA participation for Senegalese migrants. While the exact mechanism of 
this juridical constraint on non-mobile activities remains to be explored, the finding 
of structural exclusion is in line with previous findings (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; 
Van Meeteren 2012).
Chapter 5 also offered evidence for a positive relationship between visits to the 
homeland and non-mobile transnational activities. This is a relationship that the 
literature on transnationalism often implies (Portes and Zhou 2012; Smith 2006) but 
rarely directly examines. This form of mobility, along with other affective links, is 
thus of crucial importance in explaining these financial forms of non-mobile trans-
national activities. The link between physical mobility and non-mobile activities 
provides the theoretical lynchpin for the hypothesis of an indirect, negative effect of 
irregular legal statuses on non-mobile transnational activities. This indirect effect 
was evident for remitting and investing, meaning that their non-mobile actions were 
indirectly caged by the irregular status that led to their territorial confinement 
(Waldinger 2008). The juridical constraint was thus transmitted through the inabil-
ity to circulate between destination and origin. Migrants who have irregular status 
thus face three kinds of legal constraints on their cross-border actions: a direct legal 
constraint on their physical mobility, limiting short returns to Senegal; a direct legal 
constraint on their formal institutional participation, limiting their remitting, invest-
ing, and HTA participation; and an indirect legal constraint on their remitting and 
investing through their inability to visit home and the concomitant curtailing of 
social ties.
Finally, the chapter offered further evidence that different transnational activi-
ties, while often taken as a monolithic object of analysis, have different determi-
nants and do not necessarily cluster together (Waldinger 2008; Van Meeteren 2012). 
While remitting and investing are part of a household strategy of migration and are 
responsive to short visits and other affective links, HTA participation is a collective 
activity and, as such, seems to be less responsive to physical co-presence in Senegal 
and affective ties to the homeland.
These chapters have drawn on the rich information available in the MAFE- 
Senegal dataset to complement the analyses of legal status with other contextual and 
individual predictors of action. The results indicate that lack of secure legal status 
can serve as important legal constraint on the actions of migrants (Sciortino 2004) 
and contribute to the growing research literature on legal status as an important axis 
of stratification in modern societies (Massey 2007; Menjívar 2010). The results also 
demonstrate that legal status constrains but does not completely determine migrants’ 
actions (Van Meeteren 2012). This is an important point of articulation with the 
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body of research that considers the tension between structure and agency in migra-
tion research (Bakewell 2010; Goss and Lindquist 1995). While this book cannot 
attempt to offer a resolution to a tension that marks most fields of social inquiry, the 
results nonetheless support the view that social action may be structurally condi-
tioned but not totally structurally determined (Bakewell 2010).
6.5  What Is Irregularity and Why Does It Matter?
The early pages of this book asked the question, “What is irregularity?” While the 
answer focused on the lexical differences between a variety of terms capturing dif-
ferent forms of irregularity often used interchangeably, the discussion highlighted 
the lack of theoretical precision often underlying sociological work focusing on 
migrant legal status. The first and second parts of this book took this imprecision as 
an opportunity to examine more deeply different configurations of legal status 
among Senegalese migrants, in terms of both their historical creation via immigra-
tion policies and the pathways via which Senegalese migrants enter them. The third 
part of the book tackled a different question: how does irregularity matter? How 
does it constrain the actions of Senegalese migrants? Chapters 4 and 5 thus con-
fronted additional theoretical hurdles involving concepts of economic and transna-
tional activities.
This section will consider the contributions that this book has made to theoretical 
progress in the study of irregular migration, migrant economic incorporation, and 
immigrant transnationalism. “Theory” here is defined as the definition and system-
atic linking of concepts that reflects accumulated knowledge and leads to new 
research in a given field of inquiry. As Portes (1997) argues, the field of migration 
research has both been blessed and limited by a reliance on the accumulation of 
empirical data and the avoidance of grand theorizing. The rich array of source mate-
rial at multiple levels of analysis generated by a variety of methodologies has helped 
build the study of migration into a flexible and expansive enterprise, while the diver-
sity of cases has helped the field avoid overly grandiose single and encompassing 
theories of migration.
At the same time, Portes (1997) warns of the risk of empirical results accumulat-
ing without a systematic theoretical guide to future research or to policy-making. 
Some of the lack of theoretical advancement in migration research has come from a 
mishandling of the fundamental building blocks of theory, such as concepts, empiri-
cal generalizations, typologies, and theoretical propositions. For Portes, a proper 
theory must contain interlinked and falsifiable theoretical propositions that specify 
relationships between concepts. Furthermore, theory must “travel”; that is, it must 
be able to provide insight into social realities under conditions which may differ 
from those that hold for the case at hand. In this way, theory can leverage the empiri-
cal richness of empirical case studies to guide the development of new insights. 
While this book has drawn on data on Senegalese migrants in Europe for its empiri-
cal analyses, it can also offer some modest contributions to theoretical progress 
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through the refinement of some basic building blocks of theory that advance under-
standing of the production and consequences of migrant irregularity.
Concepts privilege certain parts of empirical reality as worthy of investigation 
and thus constitute the fundamental building block of theory. This book has privi-
leged the concepts of “legal status” and “irregularity.” As Chap. 3 argues, there is a 
considerable conceptual muddle in the study of legal status and irregularity. This 
muddle stems, in part, from a lack of clarity in the unit to which these concepts 
refer. The imprecision of the term “irregular migration,” for example, arises from 
the lack of identification of the unit of analysis of which irregularity is a property: 
migrants can have irregular legal status, but entire flows or stocks of migrants are 
unlikely to be irregular. Furthermore, the rules of correspondence linking this con-
cept to its empirical indicators are often unspecified, leading to a multitude of some-
times contradictory uses of the concepts. For example, “irregularity” often gets 
conflated with “unauthorized border crossing” when, in reality, this form of entry 
constitutes one many ways in which migrants can become irregular.
This book contributes to the refinement of the concepts of legal status and irregu-
larity by proposing theoretical and empirical operationalizations that clarify both 
the unit to which the concepts refer and their rules of correspondence. By drawing 
on emerging literature on the multidimensionality of legal status, this book was able 
to define irregularity at the theoretical level in terms of the lack of one or more 
authorizations in multiple legal domains at different points in time. This is a nomi-
nal theoretical definition that was useful for this book but did not aspire to capture 
the “real” essence of irregularity. At the same time, it clarified the relationship 
between irregularity and the various legal domains of immigration-control mecha-
nisms and the time-varying nature of different authorizations over a migrant’s stay 
in a destination. This nominal theoretical definition led to an empirical operational-
ization of the different pathways into irregular status: no-visa entry, overstaying, 
and befallen irregularity reflect concrete combinations of different statuses in differ-
ent legal domains. This approach allowed the analyses to overcome the conceptual 
muddle surrounding irregularity and has helped to put this concept on firmer theo-
retical and empirical ground.
The empirical findings demonstrated that it is crucially important to disaggregate 
binary measures of legal status. Relying on a dichotomy of documented vs. undocu-
mented status would have obscured important variation in pathways into different 
forms of irregularity and in the impacts of irregular statuses on economic incorpora-
tion and transnational activities. These results also demonstrate that sensitivity to 
changes in legal status over time is crucial for modeling the determinants and con-
sequences of different forms of legal status. Many studies do not incorporate time- 
varying measures of legal status and thus miss this important source of variation.
This book has also made a conceptual contribution to the field of immigrant 
transnationalism in its distinction between “mobile” and “non-mobile” transna-
tional activities. The literature on immigrant transnationalism has defined its object 
of study as the ongoing connections between migrants living abroad and their 
home communities, often operationalized in the form of discrete activities that take 
place across national borders. While the literature has differentiated activities by 
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their field of action—social, cultural, economic, or political—it has often ignored 
the physical and geographic specificity of such actions. Some actions labeled as 
transnational do not necessarily directly involve the physical movement through 
space, such as remittances, while others, such as homeland visits, do necessarily 
involve such movement. The book thus proposed a nominal theoretical definition 
that distinguishes these types of activity. While this nominalist definition leaves the 
door open to other conceptualizations, it makes an important contribution to a 
research field that has tended to ignore physical mobility, physical co-presence, 
and legal status.
A final conceptual contribution comes from Chap. 4’s examination of migrant 
economic incorporation, which proposes a typology of configurations of legal sta-
tuses indicating different types of migrants. This typology was necessary in order to 
highlight not only the gendered implications of immigration policy, but also the 
different ways in which these gendered policies get translated into concrete configu-
rations of work and residence authorizations. Without this typology, it would be 
impossible to understand that reunified migrants in France have a different set of 
legal rights than reunified migrants in Spain or Italy. Thus, the meaning of configu-
rations of legal statuses varies across countries with different immigration-control 
regimes, and the typology proposed makes it possible to compare similar types of 
migrants in different legal contexts. As Portes (1997) makes clear, these kinds of 
typologies are important theoretical building blocks in migration research.
6.6  Implications for Policy
6.6.1  The Unintended Consequences of Immigration Policy
The results of this book point to the operation of unintended consequences of immi-
gration policies pursued by the receiving states of France, Italy, and Spain. First 
introduced to sociology by Merton (1936), the idea that social action such as immi-
gration policy can have unanticipated effects has been a cornerstone of analyses of 
American immigration policy (Massey et al. 2002; Portes 2000). These analyses 
have shown, for example, that efforts to stem undocumented migration to the U.S. 
by securing the southern border have not only failed to slow undocumented border 
crossings but also have contributed to a growing stock of undocumented migrants 
living in the U.S. by decreasing their probability of return (Massey et  al. 2002, 
2016). Similar unintended consequences are evident for Senegalese migrants in 
Europe: when France closed its borders to labor migration in the 1970s and stiff-
ened the bilateral agreement regulating Senegalese migration, Senegalese responded 
in part by settling in France reunifying with wives and children, thus putting an end 
to a previously circular system (Timera 1997).
This book traced in depth the evolution of these immigration policies and sought 
to understand how policies that sought to limit irregular migration actually  produced 
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new pathways into irregular status. Quantitative analysis of these pathways revealed 
that irregularity was more common in destinations and periods where restrictive 
controls were put in place. Moreover, these analyses showed that migrants bring a 
variety of resources to bear in circumventing control strategies. Policies thus pro-
duced new forms of irregularity instead of limiting irregular migration.
Additional empirical results indicate how these unintended consequences of 
immigration policy influence the lives and actions of Senegalese migrants in the 
main receiving countries in Europe. Irregular legal statuses largely fail to accom-
plish their intended goal of preventing migrants from working. In addition, legal 
statuses operate more strongly on women’s economic incorporation, with legal sta-
tus configurations associated with family reunification increasing women’s eco-
nomic and administrative dependency via reduced labor-market participation. Legal 
status thus renders a vulnerable population more vulnerable. While results show 
that restrictive immigration policies do not necessarily stop migrants from entering, 
residing, and working irregularly in France, Italy, and Spain, Chap. 5 shows that 
these statuses do act as a constraint on their ongoing participation in their 
homeland.
Lacking regular status prevents Senegalese migrants from returning periodically 
to Senegal and thus also indirectly negatively affects their ability to participate in 
financial, non-mobile transnational activities because the lack of occasional physi-
cal co-presence causes social ties to wither. The lack of ability to circulate between 
destinations and the homeland effectively short-circuits the vaunted Senegalese 
“transnational livelihoods” (Kaag 2008; Riccio 2008). As Chap. 5 showed, restric-
tive immigration policy has thus transformed migrants initially focused on circula-
tion and eventual return into irregular long-term settlers who risk exclusion and 
marginalization.
This marginalization is clearly not in the best interests of the destination society, 
the homeland, or the migrants themselves. The destination societies spend huge 
sums of money guarding borders in a time of severe fiscal austerity, yet they are 
unable to eliminate or reduce irregular migration; these draconian policies occur in 
the context of an aging population that actually needs migrant labor. These restric-
tive policies do, however, succeed in creating a marginalized and exploited popula-
tion with few social rights who are yet unable or unwilling to return to the homeland 
prior to accomplishing their objectives.
The inability of migrants to circulate between destination and origin also has 
negative effects on their home communities. Portes (2009) argues that the develop-
ment potential of migration depends, in part, on the composition and duration of 
migrant flows. Cyclical flows of manual laborers have the potential to have a posi-
tive impact on development by overcoming inefficiencies in sending countries’ 
credit and product markets, transferring skills and resources, strengthening local 
productive structures, and preserving the demographic integrity of sending regions. 
This positive impact hinges on the existence of a vital community back home to 
remit to and develop, and cyclical flows assure that depopulation will not drain a 
community’s vitality. In contrast, permanent flows of manual labor lead to the 
depopulation of sending areas and the weakening of productive infrastructures. As 
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the sending community empties out to be reunited with permanently settled 
migrants, remittances and local productivity decline. The trend towards increasingly 
restrictive immigration policies that confine irregular migrants to the destination 
territory undercuts the cyclicality that Portes sees as vital to the positive develop-
mental impact of labor migration.
6.6.2  Co-development, Veiled Restriction, and the African 
“Capacity Crisis”
The results of this book also suggest the failure of cooperative immigration policies 
undertaken in concert by governments of sending and receiving countries. This 
short-circuiting of the developmental potential of Senegalese migrants is at odds 
with recent evolutions in Europe to encourage and channel migrants’ transnational 
activities for the effective development of their homelands. Such “co-development” 
programs (Grillo and Riccio 2004; Weil 2002) have become de rigeur in most 
European countries’ official migration-management strategies (see Chapter 2 for 
descriptions of such programs in the most recent bilateral treaty between France and 
Senegal and as part of Spain’s “Plan África”). These programs have also become a 
part of European countries’ official bilateral cooperation with African governments, 
thereby implicating sending-country institutions in their efforts. There thus seems to 
be a contradiction between restrictive immigration-control policies that constrain 
economic integration and the physical and symbolic border-crossing of transna-
tional activities and the co-development policies that leverage migrants’ economic 
success and ongoing connections to their homelands.
At the same time, it is not at all clear that co-development policies can be sepa-
rated from policies that seek to restrict migration. More importantly, as Kabbanji 
(2013) points out, most governmental organizations promoting co-development 
draw on a discourse of “managing” migration in the face of rising flows of clandes-
tine Africans, with control of irregular migration seen by France, Italy, and Spain as 
a precondition for leveraging migrants’ private initiatives for the productive devel-
opment of their origin communities. This technical approach conceals the fact that 
co-development strategies have focused on controlling African migrants’ transna-
tional activities and promoting the return of unwanted migrants (Kabbanji 2013). 
Thus, border control and co-development go hand in hand with a two-pronged strat-
egy of preventing migrants from entering destination countries and repatriating 
those that already live there, mostly those in irregular status.
Research has also questioned the impact of cooperative migration-management 
efforts and co-development policies. Most co-development programs involve rela-
tively small sums, benefit a limited number of people, and have not yet been thor-
oughly evaluated for their effectiveness (Kabbanji 2013). Bilateral agreements to 
facilitate legal migration are also constrained by the extremely limited numbers 
involved and the constraints faced by the participating migrants; in the case of the 
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bilateral labor program for Spain and Senegal, very few migrants were able to par-
ticipate for more than one year because renewing permits is the responsibility of the 
employer (Kabbanji 2013). These programs also generally fail in their goal of 
attracting the voluntary return of migrants in the quest for “brain gain”: quantitative 
research from the MAFE project demonstrates that Senegalese migrants’ probabil-
ity of long-term return to Senegal has declined as economic uncertainty in Senegal 
and legal precarity in Europe has increased (Schoumaker et al. 2013).
Part of the lack of effectiveness of cooperative and co-development programs 
could be due to the lack of legitimacy of sending-country governments in the eyes 
of migrants. The Senegalese government, while it tried to stem emigration in the 
1960s through the imposition of exit visas (Kane 2011), has attempted to position 
itself over the last 10 years to be a more effective partner for migrant-led develop-
ment. Nonetheless, Kabbanji (2013) reports that the government of Senegal, like 
other sending-country governments pursuing cooperative migration management, is 
often perceived to be facilitators of the goals of restriction and return. Senegal estab-
lished the Ministère des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur (Ministry of Overseas Senegalese) 
in 2003 (Kabbanji 2013) with the goals of managing migration flows, guaranteeing 
the social and juridical protection of overseas Senegalese, and “promoting” over-
seas Senegalese. In reality, this ministry has drawn on discourses of the sharp uptick 
in illegal migration of Senegalese to Europe to step up its cooperative migration- 
management efforts. The Senegalese government agreed to high-profile and contro-
versial involuntary returns of illegal migrants from the Canary Islands in 2006 
(Gagrielli 2008), and the Ministry of Youth has participated in “fight” against illegal 
migration and in the management of the oft-criticized bilateral labor-immigration 
agreement with Spain (Kabbanji 2013). It thus seems that the government of 
Senegal, despite professions to protect migrants abroad and support their invest-
ments in Senegal, has fallen prey to the logic of “migration management” preached 
by EU governments.
This collusion with restrictive European policies probably only adds to the pre- 
existing lack of legitimacy of the Senegalese government in the eyes of many 
Senegalese, both migrants and non-migrants alike. Recent results from the 
Afrobarometer project show that public trust in all branches of the Senegalese gov-
ernment has been declining in recent years despite a high level of support for 
democracy (Afrobarometer 2009). This “capacity crisis” confronts many African 
states and is a fundamental factor in explaining their lack of development (Englebert 
2002). This lack of capacity among African states arises, in part, because of an 
incongruence between pre- and post-colonial political structures, and results in a 
neo-patrimonial ruling system, the irrelevance of the rule of law, the evaporation of 
trust in institutions, and increased corruption (Englebert 2000). This kind of neo- 
patrimonial system can also lead to a situation where communitarian association 
founded on the social capital inherent in extended families and ethnic networks can 
take the place of weak or absent coordinating institutions (Portes and Vickstrom 
2011). While societies founded on this sort of macrosocial organization can func-
tion, the mechanical solidarity that substitutes for coordinating institutions can lead 
to a fragmentation of social order (Portes and Vickstrom 2011).
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This capacity crisis has a number of implications for the migration policies pur-
sued by sending countries. Senegal is among those states that have experienced a 
lack of legitimacy and a capacity crises resulting from the spread of a neo- patrimonial 
system (Englebert 2002). Adepoju (2004) argues that this kind of lack of capacity 
among African states has been a fundamental driver of emigration from sub- Saharan 
Africa. At the same time, the social capital that fills the institutional vacuum also 
underlies the perpetuation of international migration (Massey 1993) and the wide-
spread adoption of transnational household strategies of risk diversification and 
accumulation (Stark 1991). The overall failure of African states to acquire legiti-
macy and invest in human development has Africans to build their own institutions 
for their personal and collective goals that operate on social capital.
The findings of this book support the interpretation that social capital is one of 
the main determinants of migrants’ continuing participation in the development of 
their origin communities: affective ties and the physical co-presence that nourishes 
them are strong predictors of migrants’ remittances to and investments in Senegal. 
The main obstacle that they face in this endeavor is legal precarity in the destination 
countries, which undermines these social connections. This is the fundamental facet 
of the immigration policies of destination states and sending-state policies do little 
to change the fundamental juridical exclusion that many migrants face.
It is thus not surprising that Senegalese migrants would be wary of their state’s 
institutional efforts to leverage migrants’ development efforts, as it was the funda-
mental institutional failure of the state that led to and sustained the very act of 
migration. Coupled with the veiled restriction and involuntary return promoted by 
the cooperative migration-management policies of receiving states, there is ample 
reason to be skeptical about the prospects for a positive effect of co-managed migra-
tion on either migrants or their sending communities.
It is ultimately the migrants themselves and their home communities that bear 
the brunt of this incoherence. Effective immigration policy in Europe and Senegal 
alike would be best served by aligning their goals to support overall human develop-
ment and capacity-building and creating opportunities for economic participation 
and circulation between destination and the homeland.
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